This book is about the social control of dissent in the era of alterglobalization. It documents in detail how social control forecloses and destroys the social spaces through which social movements nurture the development of dissent and the public spaces through which they effect disruptive challenges. This global, preemptive control relegates dissent to the realm of criminality. The charge is insurrection, but the accused have no weapons. Protesters are not the ones who are “out of order”.

The book compellingly concludes that much of normalized policing of protest must be reconceptualized as political violence against democracy.

If we recognize that meaningful dissent relies on political associations, the emergence and sustenance of which in turn relies on the ideas, organizations, networks, and culture of social movements, which are themselves ambiguous, borderless, and highly unpredictable –what then, exactly, must a democratic society protect?
Dedication

To our wounds, and the creativity and courage it took to get them
To our healing, and those who protect the space for it
To the silence of fear, in compassion and combustion
To the global we have made
To the dream we demand with our eyes open
To another security
To affinity and trust and affection
To difference and dialogue, late into the night, and enough time for it
To the abundance that is ours.
SHORT bios

Amory Starr is the author of Naming the Enemy: Anti-Corporate Movements Confront Globalization (2000) and Global Revolt: A Guide to Alterglobalization (2005). She holds a PhD from the University of California, Santa Barbara.

Luis A. Fernandez is author of Policing Dissent: Social Control and the Anti-Globalization Movement (2008) and teaches at Northern Arizona University. He holds a PhD from Arizona State University.

Christian Scholl is lecturer of political science at the University of Amsterdam and holds a PhD from the same university.

LONG bios

The manuscript of Amory Starr’s Naming the Enemy: Anti-Corporate Movements Confront Globalization was completed in 1998, more than a year before the Seattle WTO protests. Later published by Zed Books, it is the first systematic survey of the movements which would shortly converge into the anti-globalization movement. Her second book, Global Revolt: A Guide to Alterglobalization, is an introductory text, reviewing points of consensus, disagreements, and some of the tactics from the global struggle. (Zed Books, 2005) She also wrote and directed This is What Free Trade Looks Like, a 2004 documentary which examines México’s experience with NAFTA as a basis for understanding the WTO. Her articles appear in Cultural Studies, Agriculture and Human Values, Journal of Social Movement Studies, Qualitative Sociology, Journal of World Systems Research, New Political Science, Latin American Perspectives, Social Justice, Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, Socialist Register, and Journal of Developing Societies. Currently, her activism focuses on the political economy of food. She holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of California, Santa Barbara.

Luis A. Fernandez is an assistant professor in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Northern Arizona University. He has worked for several research institutions, including the National Council on Crime and Delinquency and the Morrison Institute for Public Policy. His work appears in various journals, including Qualitative Sociology and Social Justice. He is also the author of Policing Dissent: Social Control and the Anti-Globalization Movement., (Rutgers, 2008) and the co-editor of Contemporary Anarchist Studies (Routledge, 2009). He holds an M.A. in Political Science and a Ph.D. in Justice Studies from Arizona State University.

Christian Scholl is lecturer of political science and gender studies at the University of Amsterdam. His research expertise is focused on global political economy, the history of transnational social movements, social control and security cooperation. His dissertation documented the interactions between protestors and police during summit protest in Europe. He is the author of several academic articles published a.o. in Tijdschrift voor Gendersstudies and Mobilization. He holds an M.A. in Gender studies and a Ph.D. in social sciences from the University of Amsterdam.
# Table of Contents

Chapter 1: What is going on? ................................................................. 1  
  Understanding social control................................................................. 3  
  Understanding dissent........................................................................... 11  
  Dissent in the era of alterglobalization................................................. 17  
  Methods................................................................................................. 22  
  Toward a new framework for studying the social control of dissent...... 23

Chapter 2: The Geography of global governance.................................. 35  
  Space, legitimacy, and the contestation of global governance................. 37  
  Selecting a location.............................................................................. 42  
  Dividing space..................................................................................... 48  
  Controlling individuals’ movement...................................................... 56  
  Militarization....................................................................................... 59  
  Channeling Dissent.............................................................................. 63

Chapter 3: Political economy of the social control of dissent................. 68  
  What does it cost?................................................................................. 69  
    Security.............................................................................................. 71  
    Operations of a Secure Summit.......................................................... 73  
    Collateral costs to the locality............................................................. 75  
  Tensions................................................................................................ 78  
  Political Economy of Social Control.................................................... 81

Chapter 4: Policing of Alterglobalization Dissent................................. 86  
  Regulatory and Legislative Dimensions of Policing............................... 92  
  Intelligence........................................................................................... 96  
  Event Policing...................................................................................... 104  
  Prosecution........................................................................................... 112  
  Transnationalization of protest policing.............................................. 116

Chapter 5: A taxonomy of political violence......................................... 125  
  Marginalization................................................................................... 128  
  Preemption........................................................................................... 131  
  Permeation and accumulation............................................................. 134  
  Political consciousness & terror........................................................... 137  
  Collectivity........................................................................................... 141  
  Space and discourse............................................................................ 146  
  Feeling Culture.................................................................................... 149  
  Political violence................................................................................. 154
Chapter 6: Anti-Repression: resisting the social control of dissent........163
Resisting spatial control........................................................................................................163
Breaching the zones, blockading back..........................................................163
Marching tactics and organizing crowds..................................................165
Affinity groups.............................................................................................166
Counter-observation..................................................................................166
Pirate communication..................................................................................168
The political economy of solidarity............................................................169
Legal Teams..................................................................................................170
Street legal....................................................................................................173
Political litigation.........................................................................................174
Surviving political violence.................................................................180
Know your rights, know our past, know your enemy.................................180
Solidarity.....................................................................................................181
Trauma groups...........................................................................................183
Security Culture.........................................................................................184
Protecting bodies.........................................................................................185
Remaining out of order..............................................................................187

Chapter 7: Democracy Out of Order.......................................................191

Appendix A: Summits directly observed by authors.................................199

Appendix B: Of Stones and Flowers............................................................200

Appendix C: Suggestions for future research............................................218

Bibliography...............................................................................................220
We began writing this book as a wall was built in East Germany. Two and a half meters high, it was composed of metal fencing with concrete foundations and designed to cradle a curlicue of razor and barbed wire. Each bolt and hinge of the wall was soldered in place. It looked like a fence around a prison or a military base, and indeed it sported motion detectors and video cameras. But this fence wound its twelve kilometers, at €1 million per kilometer, through forest surrounding a small seaport town. It protected the 3-day meeting of the Group of 8 (G8), expected to issue their annual proclamations about intentions to “Make Poverty History”, save Africa, or stop global warming. The fence (a “technical barrier”) was employed to keep out terrorists and – coincidentally – those who had expressed their desire to participate in the meeting, point out its hypocrisy, or draw attention to the failures of similar economic strategies in their home countries which are European, African, or other regions of the post-colonial Global South. It was guarded by no less 18,000 police, as well as contingents from the German military.

The fence imposed an exclusionary geography – castle, moat, hinterlands – on a purportedly democratic nation and landscape. This security was funded mostly by provincial taxes of German citizens, whose willingness for such public expenditure was, in turn, purchased with a currency Barry Glassner has called “the culture of fear”. Terrorists are over there, over here, around the corner. Immigrants are invading occupations and culture. The youth are increasingly and irrationally violent. The anxiety of these probabilities somehow overwhelms the quieter world in which our jobs (or hopes of them) become increasingly “precarious”.

Media images and public policy bring violent persons into sharp focus, and offer grand, comforting solutions, while the glacial melt of our economies is portrayed as natural or at least inevitable, and surviving is left to our own cleverness.

The era of alterglobalization is yet another phase of the centuries-long struggle between imperial powers and their targets. In this era, much is old and a little is new. As during colonialism, global elites use military force, political institutions, culture and ideology, rearrangements of the social order, and economic trickery to grasp the resources, labor, and markets of the parts of the world with natural wealth, and the productive parts of their home countries — the farms, the small shops, and lately, the creativity of their digitized teenagers. As throughout colonialism, the apparent damage and dehumanization of this process is justified, even celebrated, as a long-term improvement in the lives of the victims. As with colonialism, resistance takes every possible form and then some.

But today the world is supposed to be a democratic one, with human rights. And the vast majority of people expect it to be so. Now colonial processes take place in a global social fabric in which the invisible ink connecting the points of violence, theft, and destruction is painstakingly revealed by a resilient network of scholars and activists. Under the fierce protection of a web of geeks and expert communities, democratic
access to new communication technologies enables instant circulation of peoples’ news of their suffering and struggle. Critical interpretation of events gets smoother and political parties are cast aside in favor of direct solidarity among movements and peoples of every social position. It is getting harder to hide massacres. The multilingual term ‘alterglobalization’ refers to the diverse yet synchronous and solidary movements which not only oppose globalization in its current form but also propose alternatives – alter globalizations – to it.

This book is about the social control of dissent in the contemporary era. The global, preemptive, and violent control of dissent relegates it to the realm of criminality. The charge is insurrection. The accused have no weapons. We must conclude that protesters are not the ones who are “out of order”. Democracies are not supposed to criminalize dissent.

A number of scholars have studied the policing of protest and the interactions between police and protesters, defining models of interaction, and showing how they are changing historically. Our concerns are quite different. First, we see policing as just one tactic of a system of social control which is far more subtle, indirect, and significant than civil management of protest. Second, we do not limit our notion of dissent to protesters. We are concerned with a much larger group – those people who would dissent. And we shift the unit of analysis from individual (would-be) dissenters to the social movements which give life, sustenance, and strategy to dissent.

Because we are making a drastic and significant shift from the familiar territory of the policing of protest to the social control of dissent, the remainder of this introductory chapter provides a review of social control and dissent as they have been conceptualized and studied previously and outlines the conceptual and methodological basis for our study.

Understanding social control

There are two conceptions of social control. The first, running from Hobbes through Mead to today’s criminal justice literature, conceptualizes social control as a set of mechanisms intended to protect the health of society by enforcing (even eliciting) normative social behavior. The second, running from Marx through Chomsky, sees social control as a tool of class struggle, in which mechanisms ranging from state use of force to ideological reproduction are used to protect elite power. Both approaches recognize both formal and informal mechanisms, but Foucault connected the two approaches by integrating formal and informal mechanisms and showing how power is pervasive in control and resistance – even showing how those polarities interpenetrate.

Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Locke grappled with how governments could rule (or control) their citizens while still protecting their “natural” rights and liberties as citizens. For Hobbes, social control meant the ability of the state to maintain stability so that society remains civilized (counterposed to what he viewed as a “brutal” state of nature). According to Morris Janowitz, social control was a concept used by American sociologists to describe a “common endeavor” aimed “toward an ideal”. As developed by the liberal discipline, social control came to be thought of as the means by which a humane society reduces coercion, eliminates misery, and increases rationality. It was originally considered to be antithetical neither to pluralism nor to social transformation. Indeed, social control was understood to be the outcome of evolving social organization. In the 1920s, social problems were understood as failures
of social self-regulation (social control). During the 1930s, this perspective spread to Europe and influenced Karl Mannheim to conceptualize freedom as the social control (via parliamentarism) necessary to protect society from authoritarian rule threatened by social planning.5

What Janowitz calls an “alternate formulation of social control as a process of socialization leading to conformity” was proposed by social psychologists in the 1940s. By the 1960s, sociologists reimagined what was going on. Instead of a benign process, the nation state wields social control to incorporate the “mass of the population” (“the periphery”) into the society’s central institutions and value systems. The mechanisms of social control? “Civility”6, “self-control”, and “disciplined cultural appreciation”7 (what Foucault calls “disciplinary power”, internalized and reproduced by the objects of power). Janowitz concludes that force and coercion have been restricted to ever “narrower limits in relations both within and between industrial societies”8. Meanwhile, as parliamentary participation declined, social inequality divided the population into interest groups, and social movements emerged as a method of shaping society. As elite political structures suffer crises of legitimacy, they are less able to dictate moral and social value systems. It is here that we see the shift to what Foucault calls “biopower”. Rather than influencing social relations through values and morality, power operates in the realm of desire. Consent is “manufactured” not only through mass mediated ideology, but also through the production of insecurity, distraction, and consumership.9

While scholars in various other subfields were understanding social control in new ways, the disciplinary field of social control itself shrunk to a narrow concern with management of deviance and crime. What Gibbs describes as the functionalist approach of the 1960s continued to see conformity to consensual norms as delivering reciprocal social relations. The conflicting Marxist perspective recognized social control operating in a context of antagonistic inequity, viewing criminal law as a means of enforcement and reproduction of class relations. The Marxist perspective was perhaps a little overzealous, ignoring crimes like murder that are usually punished even in non-capitalist societies and laws such as traffic rules that benefit all classes (of automobile users, discriminating still against bicyclists).

The functionalist emphasis on norms helps us see how social control is enacted in subtle and indirect ways by all members of society, not only elites – a revelation that would make Foucault in/famous. At the same time, some actors have more capacity for agency in shaping social control.10 In 1977 Gibbs announced that social control studies were “in the doldrums for several decades” and hence there was no clear definition of social control. In 1982 he rejected social control as a general, collective process, and insisted it must have actors. The “social” dimension of social control refers to that process through which parties manipulate others through “means other than a chain of command”. As normative consensus declined, Gibbs expected social control to shift to law and to positive incentives. In 1989 he argued that control should be the central object of sociological investigation.11 Simultaneously, Chunn and Gavigan urged critical scholars to abandon the “liberal” and “instrumental” concept of social control “in favor of one attentive to the dynamic complexity of history, struggle, and change.”12

Meanwhile, almost all US social control literature hurtled down one trajectory, criminal deterrence. Meier and Johnson defined deterrence as “concerned with a particular source (the legal sanction, a signal (a threat) and a target (violators).” After
one rigorous test they concluded that extralegal factors are as powerful in producing compliance as legal ones.\textsuperscript{13} Several scholars have sharply criticized criminology for failing to take a broad, systems perspective on the function of law, imprisonment, social control, and criminology itself in the context of capitalist social relations.\textsuperscript{14}

American sociology, still in the main exceptionally reluctant to acknowledge class struggle and devoted to the idea of a liberal/liberatory democratic state, locks social control to deviance. Critical criminologists concerned with such matters as the discrepancy between law enforcement of working class and capitalist class crimes remain marginal in their attempt to bring attention to white collar and corporate crime, let alone the larger issue of criminalization as a dimension of class relations and capitalism. In contrast, European-style political studies conceptualize social control as the maintenance of existing class relations through private property and force. The state participates, taking the side of capital. In P.A.J. Waddington's words:

> Patrolling the boundaries of respectability – and thus reproducing patterns of domination and subordination, and inclusion and exclusion – is the exercise of largely invisible state power. Individual officers selectively exercise their discretion on the street under the guise of neutrally enforcing the law and keeping the peace. But the police “keep people in their place” in quite another, and much more visible, manner when they suppress overt dissent against prevailing social, political and economic conditions. Here the notion of the police as neutral and impartial enforcers of the law is exposed for the myth that it is; since their first duty becomes transparent – to protect the state, whose coercive arm they are. This exposure of the fundamental role of the police as custodians of the state’s monopoly of legitimate coercion can be revelatory...[P]olicing of public order exposes the tensions between state power on the one hand, and citizenship on the other.\textsuperscript{15}

Poulantzas rejects the simplistic assumption that the state would be an instrument in the hand of capitalists, stressing the relative autonomy of state institutions. Regardless of its degree of autonomy, it is clear that today the state contributes to the smooth functioning of capitalism by reproducing its hegemony, defending its property rights, and eliciting consent of lower class groups through strategic alliances.\textsuperscript{16}

Social control could be understood as the central preoccupation of the Frankfurt School and other Marxists, who undertook a systematic analysis of the subtle ways that political consciousness and criticism are preempted through culture, ideology, and institutions.\textsuperscript{17} In the US, similar analysis has found its home in specialized fields, such as education and media studies, rather than coming out of the tradition of social theory. Both European and American scholars have developed a analysis of education as a social control strategy that reproduces social inequality.\textsuperscript{18} More recently, American scholars have traced how media institutions function to “manufacture consent” and reproduce politically expedient “illusions”.\textsuperscript{19}

Forged by fascism’s popularity in place of socialism, and socialist parties’ own limitations, the sophisticated analysis of what came to be known as the Frankfurt School scholars was matched by social movements which expanded the terms of social struggle to “de-colonize the lifeworld”.\textsuperscript{20} While movements proliferated to challenge non-economic aspects of oppression, new concepts of power and struggle theorized how the most subtle and internalized dynamics of social control could be resisted.
Perhaps the leading example is queer theory, which proposed that individuals’ gender performances could be subversive to the gender binary and heteronormativity.21

The Frankfurt School built a set of theories of what Goode calls “informal” social control.22 Foucault’s typology of “technologies of control” is one of the most popular and sophisticated of these: Technologies of production aim at controlling, transforming and manipulating objects and raw materials. Technologies of sign systems involve the production of symbols and signification. Technologies of power determine the conduct of individuals and of flows and submit them to certain ends or dominations. Technologies of the self are techniques that individuals use on themselves to modify their souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being. According to Foucault, these four technologies hardly ever function separately. For Foucault, the interesting interactions are those between the technologies of power and those of the self, termed ‘governmentality’. By this he means that government does not only legislate and rule, it is also implicated in shaping, guiding, and affecting the conduct of people. Indeed, government constitutes people in such a way that they become governable. Foucault recognizes a distinct difference between a mode of social control that depends on the threat of death and a mode of social control that manages to produce a certain form of life.23

One of the areas of governmentality is ‘disciplinary power’. The concept grasps the exercise of control over the human body, specifically at the anatomical and biological levels. Disciplinary power can emanate from national policies (e.g., abortion policies, capital punishment). Technologies of power control by classifying and objectifying bodies, particularly in institutions like prisons, hospitals, and schools. The benefit of this form of social control, according to Foucault, is the reduced need for coercion or force. These technologies teach us to produce docile bodies (and subjects) ourselves; we internalize what it means to be a citizen in a democracy and then we police our own behavior. Biopower, on the other hand, aims not only at controlling individual behavior but also at producing populations. Shifting its attention from the individual body to the flow of bodies and goods through time and space, it aims at the reduction of the probability of an undesired event. Foucault connects the emergence of biopower to the ability of the state to use statistical technologies to understand and study its citizenry. Based on these technologies, the state implements policies that produce a productive population to fit the larger economic needs. Moreover, where coercive power used a hierarchical relation of force or domination to achieve its ends, disciplinary power circulates through discourse and is internalized and exercised by the dominated, who also participate in its reproduction and recirculation horizontally through society.

Understanding social control means understanding how various forms of repression encourage and discourage the transformation of dissent into social movement participation. But scholars concerned with the control of social movements have generally not positioned their studies in the context of social theory of social control. Instead they have worked within the concepts provided by criminology and social movements. Tilly defined repression as “any action by another group which raises the contender’s cost of collective action”.24 Piven and Cloward argue that protest is “structured” not only by repression, but also by channeling, cooptation, and direct and indirect pressure on movements to assert institutional legitimacy and conform to behavioral decorum.25 Waddington et. al. propose a synthetic analysis of social movements and social control, conceptualized together as integrated, relational
dynamics of “public disorder”. Oliver defines repression as “ways of reducing protest without giving people what they want”, but recognizes that “anything which suppresses or disrupts…communication and social networks through which collective action could diffuse and people could organize … can repress protest.”

The bulk of literature on repression of social movements has focused on the policing of protest, which is only one dimension of social control. (We review this particular literature alongside our analysis of policing in Chapter Four.) Compounding this limitation, social movements literature has paid little attention to operationalizing and measuring impacts of social control on dissenter who have not yet entered the realm of collective action. An exception is Wilson, who emphasizes the importance of analyzing the effects of social control generated between government agents, protesters, and “observers or potential joiners” and asserts that police action has its most direct impact on the mobilization of potential joiners (“whether by marching or licking stamps”), noting that it may encourage as well as discourage them. His definition of social control emphasizes criminalization as a policy and discursive tactic.

Social control is exerted in the face of an apparent norm infraction and aims at revenge, restitution and/or deterrence. In the context of protest action, social control is the process of labeling and treating dissenters as deviants. This process will be referred to as criminalization...a denial of the political status of acts and affirmation of their deviant character.

Oliver’s recent work provides another rare focus on the repression of would-be dissenters. Reviewing the startling criminalization of African American people during the last three decades, she argues that crime and dissent share the properties that they involve challenging the dominant social order and that they are subject to social control. Authorities decide which things to define as crimes, authorities decide how much effort to put into the control of the different kinds of crimes, and authorities decide what kinds of tactics and strategies to adopt in crime control. Authorities decide which kinds of dissent to criminalize and they also decide which categories of dissenters are most dangerous....What to criminalize and whom to target are the crucial elements of a social control system. The minute we recognize that it is possible to target people who are dissenters for control, whether or not they commit specific illegal acts of dissent, we are ready to see that “crime control” and “dissent control” can never be disentangled.

Oliver goes on to interpret the significance of this recognition as a failure of the subdisciplinary boundary-making of social movements scholarship:

Part of a theoretical and political agenda among social scientists in the late 1960s was to reject older treatments of social movements that lumped them together with other forms of “deviance.” As part of the debates about the meaning of the Black riots, many social scientists argued that they needed to be understood not as mere criminality nor as mindless emotional expression, but as extreme expressions of political grievance. But along with these political concerns, a generation of sociologists was engaged in a sub-disciplinary
movement to create and legitimate a specialty in the study of collective behavior and social movements... The sharp distinction between political collective action and common crime that was important in the foundation of the sub-discipline was never revisited.30

Riots were included as constituents for social movement study, but no systematic analysis was lavished on other criminalized transgressions by oppressed groups in order to determine which ones should be treated as part of the study of social movements.

A striking new book by Cunningham documents that the "normal" intelligence activities of the FBI, before, during and after the official COINTELPRO programs of 1956-1972 also amounted to counterinsurgency, a concept that has been strikingly absent from the literature on social control and social movements and one which we believe must be introduced to this discourse.31 Counterinsurgency actions of the state identify social movements as direct threats to the existing political authority; as such they are targeted for elimination with the use of force. What are the criteria for classifying dissenters as counterinsurgents in a democratic society?

From this review, we take several concepts which we will refer to throughout the book. First is the Marxist, critical criminologists', and a few social movements scholar' concern with the political motivations for criminalization. Second is the social theorists' attention to forms of control which are interiorized in "technologies of the self" to "manufacture consent". Third is the historical record of domestic policing as counterinsurgency.

Understanding dissent

Ever since corporations claimed rights to free speech protections under the US Constitution in the 1970s32, it has been difficult to get a word in edgewise. Since dissenters now include the embattled tobacco lobby, racists, and violent anti-abortion groups, much of the scholarly discourse on dissent has focused on its "social costs" and interesting questions such as how it relates to legislation such as that prohibiting hate crimes.33 More dramatically, in these years of urgent "wars on terrorism", dissent is portrayed as a self-indulgent and treasonous risk to fellow citizens.

Thoroughly out of fashion, the idea that non-elites might deserve some say-so in their societies has been re-branded as something called "civil society".34 'Civil society' is a strange term. One might take it to mean a society which is civil – inclusive, respectful? Instead, its recent usage is an odd euphemism for "the rest of us", those outside of the circuits of decisionmaking. Civil society is a pre-trivialized agglomeration of those who seek, meekly, some consideration – nevermind that these are the majority of global citizens. Civil society does not dare to dissent, it merely seeks a vague and nonthreatening "participation".

Dissent is premised on the standing that "civil society" scrambles to assert. It is a registration of discontent or disagreement within a political community or contract. Citizenship is one such contract. Sunstein proposes that dissent ensures the flow of information needed for an organization or society to make sound analysis and decisions.35

We are interested in the power relations between the state and would-be dissenters. Under what conditions is discontent translated into dissent? Gamson’s 1968 Power & Discontent emphasized the importance of feelings of trust (in one’s
government), personal efficacy, and access to organizations which encourage opposition. Schwartz suggested that “salience” is important and Craig & Maggiotto added “entitlement”, which they operationalize as “a belief that democratic governments should be responsive to the demands of citizens generally” and “a high sense of internal efficacy” to the conditions which foster the expression of discontent. Recently, Giroux has argued that dissent depends on hope. Dissent also relies on “discursive space”, a complex and subtle concept which means that there is some realm with openness, flexibility, and visibility in which discussions and dissent can flourish. Sunstein argues that dissent is endangered not only by laws, but by any conformity pressures. Neoliberalism also undermines citizenship, attempting to replace it with much more entertaining consumership. Possible dissenters, then, may be preemptively silenced by tactics that influence their sense of entitlement, efficacy, organizational networks, trust in government, sense of hopefulness, and space. Moreover, Gaventa pointed out that powerlessness (or the failure to dissent) must be analyzed directly and distinctly from the operation of power.

Dissent is usually conceptualized as a speech act, a discrete event with an individual speaker, a space, a speech. This concept is based in the legal articulation of the individual’s right to free speech. But how did the speaker get there? Were they alone? What were their fears and risks? How did they have the courage to be there? Did they learn about their topic? How much time did they spend in meetings in advance of the speech? Who developed the plan and prepared the infrastructure for the event at which they spoke? The archetypal image of an isolated act of political speech is both rare and distracting. Significant political speech almost always takes place in an institutional, social, and cultural context. Dissenting speech depends on a social network of resistance and/or an external environment which provides at least a little (just enough?) encouragement to create a sense of entitlement, salience, and efficacy.

A more accurate image of dissent places the dissenter in the context of some kind of mobilization or manifestation. These noninstitutional forms of contentious interaction are protected by law as “assemblies” in the US or “protest events” in Europe. Assemblies are organized by a legal entity known and protected as an “association”. Fung points out that every major democratic theory promotes associations as both enhancement and evidence of democratic society, although different kinds of associations, operating in different political contexts, influence in uneven (and sometimes unexpected) ways. Recognizing the importance of networks of resistance to meaningful dissent, we believe that the unit of analysis for dissent must be collective. But associations, too, are manifestations arising from and depending on a larger network of meaning and solidarity – a social movement. We believe that social movements are the appropriate unit of analysis both for studying dissent and for defending it.

What, then, is a social movement? This turns out to be a difficult question, about which scholars do not agree. For our purposes some of the most basic points shall suffice. First, social movements are contentious – this means they are interested in exposing or advancing through a social conflict or pressing for a shift in their society. Second, social movements are collective, participatory activities. Third, social movements are processes in which ideas and organizations evolve in a changing context.
Much social movements scholarship seeks to explain how social movements do what they do. This work is important to this study because social control seeks to interrupt that how, reducing (or reducing the impacts of) movement action. A minority of scholars have concerned themselves with what social movements do with and to their societies. This work is also important because it reveals what is at stake for elites in the contentious projects of social movements, and might help us understand why expensive, illegal, or unusual social control is implemented. It also reveals the larger social costs of social control, which delays or deprives society of social movements’ insights and challenges.

The first approach to social movements, in an effort to make sense of collective behavior (at first concerned with crowds and panics in the context of American exceptionalism), and predict its impacts, have focused on individual participants’ motivations and on movement mechanics:

- Why do people participate in movements? The histories, motivations, and psychology of activists who dare to take part in social movements is understood as the matter of political consciousness.48
- How do social movements mobilize resources effectively (or ineffectively) to win their struggles? Resources include bank accounts, meeting rooms, underemployed’s unfilled hours, abandoned buildings, satellite time, paint, celebrities, organizations49 with tax-free status or staff.50
- When and where do social movements act? Social movements operate in a political context which may provide more or less physical, discursive, and social space, symbology, historical irony, compassion or information overload, shifting power relations between elites, or moments when the authorities are looking the other way. This context with all of its various contents is called the political opportunity structure.51
- How do social movements communicate with the larger society? They must conceptualize what they are about, simply and effectively framing their problem or project for public campaigns.52

The second approach, forged by scholars recognizing class struggle, sees social movements “as carriers of political projects”. Thus there is more concern with the content of social movements, their “themes and logics”.53

- Social movements’ ideologies are their beliefs, including their analyses of social problems and futuristic visions. Ideologies enable participants to have an empowered understanding of the problems they are facing, to envision a different future, and to invest in a vector of struggle. Much more than a frame, ideologies’ “systems of meaning” are “learned” through social structures and social networks.54 A movement’s ideology takes a position in a historic struggle and dialogue about society.
- Buffeted by fascism and deeply concerned with the subtle impacts of modernity, European political studies such as the Frankfurt School’s critical theory questioned resources often taken-for-granted in the US, like the role of charismatic leadership, professionalization, and bureaucracy.55
1 | What is Going on?

• Refracting the impacts of modernity and urbanization on the self, experience, culture, and social life, social movements may give rise to new social "interests" and ideas, "themes and logics", cultures of resistance, and networks.

• This approach has identified an increasing focus (in the last few decades) on individual subjectivities, including bodies and emotions as sites of resistance and politics.

The diagram below contextualizes our use of the concept of dissent. Dissent (and its social movement/s) develops into collective and public contestations through a series of zones of political involvement. Each zone provides an increase of intimacy, intensity, and resources (organizations, networks, culture, and social space). Dissent is a large and diffuse arena of contemplation, talk, and action. Although it may take many forms, from furtively writing graffiti to placing oneself as a human shield, resistance is dissent that involves some kind of transgressive action. When that action becomes collective (it has, as Alberto Melucci proposes, established a "we") and acquires some process, it has become a social movement. As social movements become organized they learn how to sustain contentious action, launch campaigns, and/or assemble networks. Protest, the focus of most social movement analysis, is that subset of dissent, in which it becomes public and visible. Protest may emerge as part of contentious campaigns and projects or spontaneously and independently. Protest events are nurtured by "submerged" resources, cultures of resistance and networks which imbue and sustain perceptions of entitlement, outrage, and possibility. In both cases, protests should be seen as the most public, visible, yet rare manifestation of a continuum of social phenomena of dissent much of which exists in often invisible "structures of abeyance".

Our point is that an exclusive focus on protest is static and decontextualized. Understanding (and protecting) dissenting protest requires attention to its development and sustenance. Most significantly, we believe that protest cannot be protected without protecting social movements, which are a changing network of discursive spaces and disruptions, not always coherent organizations and ideological polarities. Among other things, this means that there are many opportunities to interrupt and redirect them. At the same time, movements’ network forms are in some ways more robust than hierarchical ones, and may have more elastic responses to control.

Figure 1: Zones of political activity, from Dissent to Protest
Dissent in the era of alterglobalization

What is alterglobalization and what is special about its social movements? Alterglobalization is old. It is a continuation of cross-class anticolonial struggles, incensed by cultural and economic invasion. It reignites socialist revolutionary re-imaging of power. It draws on the best of labor movements' increasingly solid solidarity and threat of large-scale, perhaps international, simultaneous disruption. Alterglobalization is new, if only as a matter of degree, in the extent to which the battle is: transnational, involving networks and tactics which operate in global space; discursive, competing for hegemony over economic concepts and possibilities; and creatively unruly, persistently breaking the "routine" of ignorable dissent and protest.

It may also have novel kind of activist. Hardt and Negri, looking to find a population that can challenge post-modern capitalism, find "the multitude", replacing concepts like "the people" or the "proletariat", which rely on a centralized conception of power and distinct classes. "The multitude ... is legion; it is composed of innumerable elements that remain different, one from the other, and yet communicate, collaborate, and act in common". What is "common" no longer arises out of some unifying material situation, but instead out of the information society, which shapes subjectivities recognizing both singularity and collaboration.

Action within the alterglobalization movement is inspired by two traditions. One of them is characterized by the concept of "civil disobedience". As early as in 1552 Étienne de la Boétie elaborated the importance of disobedience by demonstrating how ruling is based on consent, and consenting means ultimately being obedient. The tradition of civil disobedience was further influenced by Thoreau in 1849, who refused to pay taxes because that would mean to support slavery and the war of the US against Mexico. It was developed into a strategy by activist theorists, including Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. Civil disobedience is based on the
What is Going on?

refusal to obey a law, seen by dissenters as illegitimate. It amounts to an intentional trespassing of the law, without, however, questioning the general legitimacy of sovereign politics. In fact, being arrested or prosecuted for the trespassing is often an integral part of the functioning civil disobedience. In this way, activists can show that they were consciously violating a law because of a particular injustice and not because they challenge the system as such.

Stemming from radical syndicalist struggles at the end of the 19th century (especially in France and the United States), "direct action" intends to prevent the implementation of undesired policies and to create autonomous social structures. Voltarine de Cleyre's 1912 account of direct action methods makes clear that we are dealing here with an autonomous form of political action that rejects representation and mediation. Direct action is employed by actors who want to act on their own terms to resolve a situation. In this respect, direct action forms are interconnected with the Do-It-Yourself concept found within a considerable part of the global movement.

As a general cultural form, 'Do-it-Yourself' refuses mediation by representatives or anointed officials. Instead, people organize themselves autonomously, to produce and exchange. They authorize themselves and encourage others to do likewise. According to Tilly and Tarrow, direct action tactics are pre-modern action forms that vanished in the “modern repertoire”. They reach this conclusion based on the assumption that forms of collective action within a nation-state are intrinsically mediated and aim to create change by influencing governmental practices.

During the nineties, however, Europe witnessed a visible emergence and circulation of direct action tactics applied by environmental, animal rights, and antiglobalization activists reviving the experience of direct action campaigns of anti-nuclear and antimilitaristic movements of the 1970s. Since the blockades of the Seattle 1999 WTO (World Trade Organization) Ministerial, the repertoire of direct action has been a hallmark of the alterglobalization movement. (Please see Appendix B for a discussion of the "violence" which the alterglobalization movement is sometimes accused of.) Why this shift to pre-modern action repertoires? Civil disobedience and direct action tactics point to a different mode of practicing resistance relying on the necessity of disruption.

Both civil disobedience and direct action contain an important tension between legitimacy and legality. From the point of view of civil disobedience, when a law is experienced as illegitimate, then illegal actions are considered to be legitimate. In the tradition of direct action, laws are seen as part of a regime which is itself illegitimate in so far as it prevents people from organizing autonomously. Both civil disobedience and direct action, therefore, accept illegal forms of acting, seeing them as legitimate, even necessary, methods of expressing dissent effectively. This is significant because, as Weber notes, the legal-rational form of rule relies heavily on the perceived inherent legitimacy of the formal rules themselves, backed up by state's monopoly on the use of force.

What is also central to both traditions is the use of the body for challenging power structures and bringing about social change. This is not a new concept; the Greek philosophy of sovereignty included the body. Scott's history of resistance emphasizes the use of masquerade to increase the power of the body. Fanon understood decolonization as requiring the experience of bringing your whole being to the point of violence against the colonizer. Hardt and Negri argue that alterglobalization insurrections have a peculiar dimension of embodiment, echoing
Foucault’s theory of ‘biopower’ (the production of “docile” bodies and ways of living daily life). Many forms of action visible in alterglobalization mobilizations mobilize the body as a political weapon in striking ways. Dissent is articulated not merely through intellectual concepts and social networks, but through considered and designed personally embodied action.

The civil disobedience tradition and some forms of the direct action tradition recognize the importance of disruption to effective dissent. Disruption functions as a costly intervention to the enactment of illegitimate laws and to the reproduction of the current scenario and its hegemonic norms. Piven and Cloward conclude that social movements win only when by using disruption they raise the costs of an elite project to the point at which it becomes in the interests of elites to obey dissenters.

We can now further articulate Figure 1. The protest circle refers to a public articulation of a disagreement, often in combination with concrete demands of what should be done instead. Most forms of protesting rely on the notion of representation. People complain about what their representatives are doing or not doing and ask them to change their policies, or try to build power to get their own representatives included in the decision-making. Disruption goes further, challenging the project of representation at the heart of liberal democracies. In fact, when disruptive action is taken, representation itself is seen as part of the problem since it robs people of direct control over their social environment and contributes to the pacification of conflicts. Acts of disruption reject appeal to or dependence on a third party, a representative, to take on the demands and find solutions. Rather, they constitute a direct and autonomous collective entrance into and grasp of the institutionalized political sphere. The methods of civil disobedience or direct action/disruption attempt to prevent policies from being implemented. In the alterglobalization movement, what is disrupted is the flow of official discourse which legitimizes new policies.

From this review of the literatures relevant to dissent, we will use several key concepts throughout the book. The first is that dissent is a process and it has collective dimensions. Second, dissent depends for its development and articulation on a series of different kinds of social spaces. Melucci best describes the needs of these social spaces for secure experimentation. Third, dissent in the era of alterglobalization is direct and personal. It is carried out by activists, not by representatives. Thus we need to be concerned with how social control affects the capacities of would-be dissenters to participate bodily. Fourth, effective dissent requires access to disruptive possibilities.
Methods

This book is based on multi-method research by three sociologists during the period 1999-2009. We have performed participant observation research at a collective total of 20 international protests in North America and Europe, beginning with the WTO meetings in Seattle in 1999 and including the NATO protests in Strasbourg in 2009. (See Appendix A for a complete list.) In addition, the authors have also performed participant observation at a collective total of more than 50 domestic events, often relevant to the international movement. Two of the authors recently conducted a research project examining the effects of surveillance on activists in the United States. Each author has conducted several interview-based studies on related aspects of social control, on which we draw. We analyzed relevant policy and legal documents to capture the shifting control tactics of authorities. Finally, in preparing this volume, we examined relevant archival material on alterglobalization, the anti-war/peace movement, and other current movements.

For reasons discussed above, our unit of analysis is the social movement (including its ideas, capacities, networks, members and would-be members), which corresponds to the concept of “assembly” as protected in law. We approach our analysis of social control and dissent considering its impacts on the formation of social movements, not individual dissenters.

An important point to understand about our methods is why, if we seek to understand the social control of dissent most broadly—not just protest—is our sampling frame mass protests of Summit meetings? Each episode of mass protest is actually bigger than the protest and control of it, encompassing the whole event and many aspects of social control which begin months or even years prior to the days of action and continue years afterward. But this still doesn’t answer why these events are an important or valuable source of data. We believe that summits and other mass protests are especially useful because they are a snapshot of an entire social movement in its diverse participants and activities. These diverse participants and their experiences with social control are extraordinarily well-documented throughout the event, before during and after. We can study the effects of social control on diverse groups who would not normally be documented as they are affected in their ordinary operations throughout the year. Moreover, the actions of more pacific sectors of these social movements do not ordinarily conflict with the police, nor are they generally saturated with journalists asking about their satisfaction with the expression of their political rights.

We have studied social control with our own bodies. This method produces a richness of detail which complements aggregate data. Wherever in this book you find data reported without a citation to another author’s work, it is from our data. In addition, throughout the text you will find longer excerpts from our field notes. These are marked in italics.

Toward a new framework for studying the social control of dissent

With contemporary empirical research on the social control of social movements focused on policing of protest, social movements are reduced to “protesters” and any impacts on the broader group of dissenters are left unstudied. A more thorough approach requires awareness of the developmental dimensions of social movements.
as well as their various forms and levels of participation. Different kinds of social control affect these locations in the life of a social movement. This book articulates a more comprehensive framework for examining both the tactics and the effects of social control. We identify three sites of study: the geography of control, the political economy of control, and violence.

We begin with the crystallized image of dissent today, the fence. In an era in which ideological hegemony is a serious front in a purportedly democratic world, the struggle for legitimacy is serious and brittle. In 1998, alterglobalization movements reconceptualized protest marches. They proposed that the marches take as a goal entering the meetings or, if dissenters are not allowed in, blockading them. This was a brilliant addition to the existing repertoire of dissenting public speech, and birthed a whole repertoire of technologies for blockading – educational fora, conferences, human chains, unarmed but armoured citizens, and public art. Protesters’ lumbering and diverse physical assaults of global governance meetings have been met with increasing expenditure on police and a re-mapping of social space around each meeting of the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, WTO, Inter American Development Bank, and each Free Trade Agreement negotiation. This geographic intervention has made visible and palpable the state-corporate-institutional collaboration behind economic globalization. These meetings have become a fragile symbol of its contested hegemony. Stronger walls are built to intimidate would-be dissenters, yet the strength of the walls indicates clearly the loss of legitimacy of the institutions huddled inside. This is obvious to every newspaper columnist.

Chapter 2 advances a systematic approach for the analysis of the governance of space. After introducing central concepts for the study of spatial interactions, drawing on recent innovations in social geography, political theory and philosophy, we advance a systematic approach for the analysis of the governance of space. The control of the flow of bodies and the incapacitation of movement, are revealed as the central objectives of the governance of space. Various tools are available for materializing the spatial control of dissent: the selection of the location and the re-mapping of the spatial surrounding; tools for dividing space; tools for controlling movement; and tools for separating protestors from each other. These analytical perspectives are applied to a set of summit protests in the US and Europe. Thereby, we highlight the preemptive character of control shifting its focus to the preparatory phase and the transnationalization of these tools for governing space through the creation of policing standards.

A public contemptuous of dissent and dissenters is easily made fearful of them and willing to pay for “protection” (although whether security expenditures indeed protect citizenship is questionable). Chapter 3 examines the political economy of social control. We trace the political economy of dramatic civil repression in the national economies as well as in the state institutions of social control. Over the last decade, the cost of policing transnational protest has skyrocketed. Preparing for a summit, local and national law enforcement engage in extensive planning, training, and construction projects. Security for each protest costs governments millions of dollars, placing a large burden on the city or region hosting the meeting. Although information is limited at the moment, we believe that these budgets will provide insight into the growing transnational social control of dissent.

Social control of the alterglobalization movement has focused on a new regime of preemptive physical control, which deflects, redirects, and interrupts assembly. The
operations of police are diverse and complex. They include the definition, vigilance over, and prosecution of crimes, the militarization of events and interactions, and even public relations activities with the media. All of these activities refer to the violent entitlements of the police and prison system. In chapter 4, we inventory these tactics. In chapter 5, we analyze the interrelationships between activist bodies, dissenting minds, and social spaces which nurture dissent. We find that police tactics are in effect mass and individual psychological operations, serving to marginalize, isolate, delegitimized, and demonize dissenters and dissent. We argue that these effects ought to be considered as political violence. Historical studies of totalitarian regimes’ use of terror for social control already grasps the social fact that physical violence (disappearance, assassination, torture) directed against some individuals has a social control effect, through terror, on other individuals’ minds/psychology, and on the social fabric of associational activity (dissent). This social fact has been restricted to totalitarian societies and has not been analyzed as a continuum, with applications in democratic societies. Therefore, police tactics in democratic societies have not been considered in the multiplicity of their effects (on bodies, minds, and social space) nor in their indirect effects on persons other than the immediate victims of policing, surveillance, etc. We begin this consideration.

Much of what is known about social control at the moment was first tracked through activists’ own work to protect and defend themselves. Methods range from legal collectives which work to teach people their rights and help people with criminal charges, to art projects intended to draw attention to surveillance, to creative ways of interacting with fences, and media projects focused on these issues. In Chapter 6, we draw on this work for further insights into the social control of dissent.

Our concluding chapter does not recapitulate the book, but instead goes beyond the analysis in the chapters to further theoretical proposals. In Appendix C we provide ideas for future relevant research.

We do believe—and as activists, we know—that hegemony is a struggle. Although this book is focused on the mechanisms of social control in the Global North, we write it suffused with the struggles of the Global South and surrounded with tactics and interpretations of our wins, be they still momentary, partial, and insecure.
Standing on a balcony above the 6th floor I am trying not to look suspicious. The road down there is empty, although it is still early, about 10pm. Only a small group of men are standing at the crossroad. I am sure they are undercover cops. I try not to look in their direction, although it is hard to find something else worthwhile to look at. We are only a few meters away from the red zone. Tomorrow, the official celebration of NATO’s 60\textsuperscript{th} anniversary will take place. After a few years without major summits being held in cities, the NATO decided to hold its anniversary in Strasbourg. Instead of the usual perimeter fences, dissenters were confronted with a “flexible security zone concept”\textsuperscript{88}; zones in three colors indicating security status which could be re-adjusted at any moment. As usual, the red zone covering most of Strasbourg’s historical center would remain a prohibited area. Since only a few bridges offer access to the center of Strasbourg from the protest camp at the outskirts, protesters reckoned that all the bridges would be cordoned by police from the early morning hours onwards. Therefore, several groups had arranged sleeping places at houses in the centre. Retreating from the balcony, I entered a living room where about 20 persons tried make themselves comfortable for a short night next to drums, costumes, and backpacks. At 5am we would get up to hit the road at 5:45 and be at the meeting place at 6am. We hoped to be able to cross a few streets without being noticed. Given the instruments and the pink and silver dresses we would wear, not the most realistic plan. And we hoped others would make it as well. (April 2009)

In 1975, few people took notice when the G8 (at the time it was only the G6) first met to re-install economic stability and expansion for their countries. Even fewer people saw the meeting as problematic or worthy of protest. Global summit meetings went virtually unnoticed for several years, until movements in the Global South (especially in Latin America) confronted the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.\textsuperscript{89} In the early 1980s, “food riots” (sometimes called “IMF riots”) emerged in many developing countries, and Global South scholars and activists developed a critical analysis of the role of these institutions in the continued dependent development of the postcolonial world.\textsuperscript{89} In 1985, the Western world witnessed the first mass protests against a G8 meeting in Germany. Twenty thousand people took to the streets of Bonn, accompanied by 10,000 policemen. At the time, these European protests were so unthreatening that the then US president, Ronald Reagan, traveled with only two personal bodyguards. Fourteen years later, in 1999, Bill Clinton visited a much more fortified city of Cologne. However, he was still able to sneak out of the meetings to
have a beer and a steak in a local bar. Eight years after Clinton’s visit, in June of 2007, the G8 meeting gathered in a tiny and isolated village in the northeast of Germany. This time, the geography of the hosting town was transformed into a mobile fortress, including a 12 mile long fence costing approximately 12 million Euros. In addition, the national authorities declared a “no-protest zone” around a three-kilometer-wide concentric zone surrounding the fenced area. This was reinforced with 18,000 police officers available in the region, along with 3,000 army soldiers, two U.S. Marine boats, and several “observation” tanks.

This chapter focuses on the spatial transformations occurring around global governance. To understand these spatial dynamics we draw on the discipline of geography. Henri Lefebvre argues that space is always political and ideological. Space is not something fixed, given, or even obvious. Rather, it is produced through social relationships and intricately connected to social stratification. David Harvey takes this insight further, examining the role of space in social arrangements in late capitalist societies. Like other locations of social production (e.g., the factory, schools, etc.), the rearrangement of space can produce conflict between different social groups. There is constant interaction and struggle between competing forces seeking to define and control use of space. Social conflicts have a spatial dimension. Edward Soja makes a similar claim, suggesting that injustice and space are inseparable. That is, the reproduction of class differences involves spatial configuration and arrangements. As a result, this spatial arrangement can develop into contentious politics that help uncover the dialectic of control and resistance. Charles Tilly argues that spatial relations are important for a contextual perspective on processes of contention, since space, in a similar way as political opportunities, constitutes and structures social relationships and networks.

The social dynamics of space, however, also have a temporal dimension. Doreen Massey even proposes a break from the analytical dualism between time and space. In her perspective, they are necessarily intertwined. Therefore, she introduces the concept ‘tetradimensionality of space’, constituted through its verticality, horizontality, deepness, and temporality. This is an important aspect for analyzing the production of legitimacy and the social control of dissent through the manipulation of space, since it means that also the control of time is a spatial practice. For example, summits are not only held in remote locations, but also timed to occur during the working week, which incapacitates the mobilization of workers and students, who would need several days holiday to express their dissent.

Space, legitimacy, and the contestation of global governance

In order to understand why space became such a central aspect of the social control of global dissent, we first want to explain how dissent takes a spatial form in challenging global governance. The first important note is that manifestations of dissent do not just use physical space, but engage social relations as well.

International meetings of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the G8 and G20, the European Union (EU), the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and the World Economic Forum have become crystallization points of global power relations. However, these meetings are certainly not the only possible crystallization points for global conflicts. That they are now widely perceived in this way, as sites where hegemonic power structures can be revealed, is a
result of activists’ choice to confront summit meetings and to do so spatially (as opposed to doing so through media discourse, popular education, or other means).

In 1999, something happened that fundamentally changed the struggle around the legitimacy of global governance. On the 30th of November, tens of thousands of dissenters blocked intersections around the convention center hosting the WTO meetings in Seattle. What was later referred to as “the Battle of Seattle” was coming-out party of the (Northern) alterglobalization movement. While protest outside meetings and ministerials had occurred in other parts of the world in previous years, this one managed to produce a global broadcast of the resonant grievances against globalization. Because the WTO meeting had to be suspended due to the fact that few delegates could reach the convention center, this protest unmasked global governance, and did so primarily through the disruption of space. The protesters in Seattle re-appropriated the public functions of space and used it to question the very foundation and legitimacy of global governance.

The spaces surrounding summits are normally interwoven in the fabric of the city, in all of its uses. While not all of this space is legally “public”, a large part of it is generally accessible and used anonymously and freely, even as surveillance technologies are already encroaching on that reality. This space is not only a space of rights, but also an infrastructure of commerce and social life of the city. During summits, this space is abruptly and severely changed, curtailed, militarized, and made impenetrable. This affects not only the free and semi-anonymous use of the space for dissent, but also the formal and informal exchanges and circulations of the city. The social geography of the hosting area is suspended from its normal spatial functions, affecting not only participants and dissenters of the meetings but ordinary citizens and activities as well.

Lefebvre makes a threefold distinction that helps to understand the relations between dissent and space: perceived space, conceived space and lived space. Perceived space (or spatial practice) relates to the social (re-)production of space in daily life. Conceived space concerns the (dominant) representations of space, for example a map, related to the production of discourses and meaning. Lived space, finally, is the product of the interaction of the first two categories. It is in lived space where dissent makes its engagement, establishing space on its own terms (sometimes called ‘counter spaces’ or ‘space of resistance’). As summits attempted to use the conceived space of world cities as a proper setting for their authority, social movements usurped the summits’ entitlement by disrupting the normal reproduction of flows in those spaces. Movements violated the flow of traffic and commerce, replacing normalized hegemony with unfamiliar uses such as puppets, dancing in the streets, and surprising punctures of the purportedly inviolable boundaries of institutions such as banks. Attempting to reassert control, summits asserted special maps over the city, maps which asserted their need for “security” while purporting to “respect” democracy by demarcating special space for it. Again, movements refused to participate in this reproduction and flooded the map with creative contradictions of boundaries, transforming the summit’s conceived space into a network of spaces of resistance.

After the first mass protests during the 1980s, the G8 countries needed to show that their talks were a legitimate part of “responsible governance”. As dissent intensifies each year, the G8 has to prove ever more convincingly that they take seriously the concerns of the protesters and that they are working on solutions to global problems, such as poverty, AIDS, climate change, and poor countries’ debts. The embrace of
these social problems by the G8 is a diversion from the economic and financial concerns that originally preoccupied their gatherings. Of course, the social agenda resulted primarily from the demands that civil society and social movements placed on the organizations. For these meetings to appear legitimate and beneficial for the entire globe, the G8 countries must keep one eye on their own economic objectives and another on seemingly humanitarian endeavors. Without this balance, the group risks its legitimacy to direct global development. This balancing act worked relatively well until 1999.

The visibility of social conflicts has to do with the capacity of social movements to appropriate spaces of hegemonic production of visibility. Agnew calls this the “global visualization of space”.97 From Seattle 1999 WTO onward, protesters ensured that global meetings would always be connected to imagery of mass protests in the streets, including blockades, tear gas, skirmishes, and police violence. This tactic was so effective that these global institutions were left with a serious dilemma: how to simultaneously defend the legitimacy of their agenda and their own legitimate place as part of democratic societies. That is, global institutions have to control challenges to their legitimacy and at the same time tolerate protest, in order to appear to meet the basic ideals of liberal democracy. Governing forces, then, need to allow protesters access to the streets. We argue that to solve this dilemma, global institutions use space as one of the primary locations for control. In order for global meetings to continue, these institutions have to simultaneously repress dissent and appear open and democratic. Severe repression could reinforce protesters’ claims that the WTO, IMF, World Bank, G8, and other institutions are undemocratic and harmful. Yet welcoming protest that has proven so effective at disrupting meetings risks the institutions’ appearance of authority.

The G8 is not an official institution with any kind of central office or commission. The G8 started as an informal meeting between the leaders of the six most prosperous industrialized countries (now eight). Its increasing influence and visibility requires it increasingly to follow the rules of legitimacy. This means that meetings have to be prepared, hosted, and chaired each year by one of the eight countries, placing a certain logic and restriction on their choice of location. Wherever their meetings will be held, the place will nowadays become a space for contesting global power relations. They cannot admit that they should better do it in an undemocratic non-member nation (such as Qatar, where the WTO met in 2001), or return to the remote mountains of Canada each year (the G8 met in Kananaskis in 2002). This spatial decision would mean to lose the struggle for legitimacy. No, every year the meeting has to take place in one of the member countries. Since it is clear that they do not dare to meet in a major city any more, and since there is no really remote countryside available in Europe (at least not remote enough to prevent thousands of activists from gathering nearby and blocking the summit), the G8 is confronted with a challenge.

The geographical moves of the G8 summits mirror the struggle over the legitimacy of the G8 itself and of global governance in general. It tells us how the struggle over legitimacy is organized spatially. And it shows how global governance needs to manifest itself geographically. Despite immense effort and cost of securing those meetings, despite media attention to the protestor’s arguments, whether sympathetic or dismissive, despite the fact that the summit meetings are unnecessary in terms of reaching practical results for the countries involved, not having summit
meetings is not an option. For the G8 countries it would be equivalent to admitting that their meetings and our policies are not legitimate.

This weakness of global governance institutions (the geography of legitimacy) is rarely mentioned in the literature on globalization, debates about possible decline of the nation-state, or commentary on summit protests. These analyses tend to focus on the way protestors possibly influence the content of global governance and do not pay attention to the form of governance being contested, nor its struggle and vulnerability in this symbolic dimension.

So it seems that a very practical and seemingly effective way to counter the hegemonic form of global governance institutions is to leave them no space for actually manifesting their legitimacy. The streets of Seattle, Genoa, Calgary, or of a little island in Italy become contested spaces of global governance. For the authorities, in turn, one question has become crucial: how can police govern space more effectively?

The remainder of this chapter explores empirically how dissent is spatially controlled to produce legitimate global governance. We identify four mechanisms of control: location decisions, dividing the space, regulatory controls on individuals, and militarization. These four mechanisms cover the spatial operations before and during summit protests. As we will point out in the concluding discussion of our findings, the four mechanisms together render summit meetings as laboratories for examining how institutions act to reduce the risk of undesired discourse. As we examine these mechanisms, we do not suggest that they are about the total suppression of dissent. Instead, we propose to think of each mechanism as a way of channeling confrontations into predictable, and thereby controllable flows of people, ideas, and events.

Selecting a location

The selection of a summit location is an important aspect of the geography of global governance and mirrors the contestation of global power relations. This tactic first became apparent shortly after Genoa 2001 G8. The Canadian Prime Minister announced that next G8 summit would relocate to the small mountain resort, Kananaskis. This was also the case when the European Union Ministerial Council decided to stick to Brussels as a permanent meeting place instead of rotating the meetings to the presiding member country. At the same time, neither the WTO nor the IMF nor the World Bank has held a major gathering in Europe since 2000, instead holding meetings in either the United States (where protest has become less robust in the aftermath of 9-11, 2001) or in places difficult for protesters to access, such as Qatar or Hong Kong. However, the move from cities to remote, rural, authoritarian, and island sites as locations for summit meetings is just one of rather broad spatial considerations undertaken by the authorities when selecting a location for a summit.

Already at Genoa 2001 G8, the delegations were not hosted in a royal building in the city center, but on a boat in the port. The authorities justified this location by referring to the contested presence of President Bush, whose security they would not be able to guarantee in the city center. While there are no reasons to doubt this official account, one should keep in mind that alterglobalization movements around the world had by this point demonstrated both the capacity to come very close to the
convention centers of summits and a total lack of interest in endangering heads of state. The more careful selection of locations within cities, thus, can be related to the alterglobalization movement’s ability to pose a visible challenge and disruptive effect to summit meetings themselves and the spatial flows involved in their organization.

The attempts of authorities to avoid disruption through careful choice of the venue can be understood as a struggle to define and control territory. Deleuze and Guattari introduce the concepts of de-territorialization and re-territorialization to grasp the mechanisms behind the opening and closure of a political field. Whereas rigid segmentarity of states tries to control territory, social movements challenge these rigid boundaries by favoring connectivity. Deleuze and Guattari call these rigid segmentation “striated spaces”, and the de-territorialised with open and decentralized connections “smooth spaces”.

The networked and decentralized character of alterglobalization movements is exemplary here for the challenge of territorial boundaries and hierarchies. They spirited representative opponents through borders to form a loud encircling apparition, conjuring a dispersed global movement all in one place. Suddenly peasant Korean farmers were beating drums in downtown Seattle. The territory of hegemony has been permeated, as Deleuze and Guattari put it “the enemy’s territory has been shattered from within” - and would continue to be no matter how it sought to isolate itself. The “striated space” of global governance faced the “smooth space” of global solidarity and cooperation.

Moreover, the action repertoire of blockading explicitly aims at disrupting the material flows necessary for a smooth summit meeting. The extensive spatial preparations, then, can be seen as a way to re-territorialize social control through segmentation of space into functional units. The selection of the location is a first step in this. In order to avoid disruption though decentralized blockades, authorities chose sites that were less easily accessible and easier to protect.

After Seattle 1999, the next WTO Ministerial was Qatar 2001. A Muslim nation ruled by a monarchical family established in the mid-1800s, Qatar has a constitutional ban on mass demonstrations and open dissent. Thus, the selection of a country both far from the networks of organized protest and totally hostile to protest itself limited protest. Protesters created other political territories for confrontation, blockading European airports to prevent delegations from leaving their countries for the Ministerial. In this way they de-territorialized the spaces of a summit meeting of the WTO, which had tried to re-territorialize it – at least for one Ministerial – in far isolation of any possible dissent.

While the selection of Qatar for the 2001 Ministerial produced the desired effect of reducing disruption, it also resulted in reinforcing the claims that the WTO was undemocratic and illegitimate. As stated previously, these global institutions need to balance two kinds of legitimacy. While they need to ensure undisrupted meetings, they also require that populations across the globe view them as legitimate forms of governance. If labeled undemocratic, their claims to beneficent authority over the global regulation of markets are weakened. The decision to hide in Qatar was another strike against the WTO’s by-then shaky credibility as a democratic institution.

Two years after the Qatar meeting, the WTO met in Cancún, México. While presenting a more open national climate than Qatar, the location presented significant obstacles for protesters. Unlike Seattle, there is little history of political organizing in Cancún, so there were few local resources for mobilization. Cancún is also relatively isolated, requiring days of travel for Mexican protesters and expensive air travel costs for
those living outside the country. Finally, it offered a geographically easy place to defend. The Cancún hotel zone is a narrow strip of land 31 km long with water on both sides, connected at each end by a bridge to the mainland. During the protest dates, the local authorities closed down the bridge nearer to the city, requiring protesters to travel 33 km if wanting to protest close to the WTO meeting location. In addition, police established a series of security checkpoints on roads leading to the open bridge. Vehicles were inspected and suspected activists were denied entry to the entire Hotel Zone.

Besides the political history of the locality and the ease of physically isolating the meeting location, the symbolic dimension of the locality also played an important role. The area around Cancún is supposed to be one of the beneficiaries of the free trade regime delivered in this case by NAFTA. The Mexican Government sought to showcase its modernity and development while hosting the WTO, including an advancement of civil liberties since its infamous slaughter of University students in 1968. The isolation of the event, accompanied with high fences, and restrained police who mostly stayed behind the fences aimed to reinforce the perception of a well-organized state tolerating dissent. To put it in Lefebvre’s terms, the Mexican Government was engaged in the reproduction of conceived space, seeking to reify Mexico as modern state. Without appearing to enact political closure, the state accomplished a nearly complete spatial closure of the summit’s venue. And by using the fence to separate weary police from energetic and lively protesters, the Mexican state avoided a militarized image. The exception was the looming presence of battleships some miles offshore.

We witnessed a masked group of people entered a Pizza Hut and demolish it. Shortly after, the riot police showed up, surrounded the building, but did not attack the protesters. Later, we learned that the Mexican Government had given the order to police the event lightly, since they had to present Mexico as a developing democracy. Mexico was busy reterritorializing its own political image, so left international franchises unprotected from anti-corporate activists.

In contrast, a few years earlier at Québec City 2001 FTAA, the Canadian authorities could not afford the luxury of geographical distance to keep protesters at bay from the Summit of the Americas meeting. Canada immediately lost the image of a democratic event simply by erecting a fence perimeter around the meeting. 101 The fence divided the city and was promptly dubbed “Canada’s wall of shame” by protesters, press, and the local population. The authorities had not built a very strong fence, and it was promptly breached. The police then spent days bombarding approaching protesters (and neighborhood residents) with tear gas, concussion grenades, and rubber bullets, losing any hope of a democratic image to one of lumbering soldiers defending a stone citadel from the rabble. Conveniently, the location of such a battle in Québec was strategic on the symbolic level because the region already has an image of militant conflict. Days of police and protesters hurling tear gas back and forth at each over a fence could be dismissed as ordinary regional culture but also un-Canadian.

One year after the protest in Québec City, Canada hosted the 2002 G8 meeting. This time the gathering was in Kananaskis, an isolated mountain resort. To ensure the isolation the government territorialized a security area of radius 6.5 km, restricting travel along the nearest highway and establishing a no-fly zone of radius 148 km and deterrioralized the organization of the wilderness by closing camping facilities in the area. 102 The rural location and large perimeters made it difficult for protestors to
organize a mass presence. The isolation was so successful that protesters were unable to get within viewing distance of the world leaders’ meeting in Canada. Instead, activists had to territorialize Calgary, some 112 km from the meeting, as the political location.

A similar tactic was employed for the Georgia 2004 G8. The leaders of the eight most developed nations gathered at a resort on Sea Island, located 96 km south of Savannah, Georgia. The location was selected for its seclusion, facilitating tight security measures. No protesters were allowed on the island, and even journalists were confined to Savannah.

Another criterion for selection becomes clear when examining Gleneagles 2005 G8 and Heiligendamm 2007 G8. For both of these summits, police publicly admitted that they were looking not only for a remote location difficult to reach from major cities, but also for an area where the population is not likely to be very supportive of the alterglobalization movements’ activities. This admission is an important one, implying not only police investigation of the local political scene and population, but also a study of the socio-political history of that area. In the case of Gleneagles 2005 G8, Scotland has less activist structures and tradition of summit protest than England. The hotel in Gleneagles is situated in a hilly area and is difficult to reach by one highway and a few roads via small towns. The nearest protest camp could only be located on the other side of a hill, about 24 km away of the summit’s venue.

Heiligendamm 2007 G8 offered a chance to the German chancellor Angela Merkel to present the region where she grew up to the rest of the world. The little sea resort of Heiligendamm where the G8 gathered is situated in the poorest region of former East Germany. At the same time, the seashore location was geographically well chosen because police forces only had to secure the meetings from three sides, and always had a backup route for getting delegates in and out by using the sea as a way of transport (which they finally had to do, due to the activist blockade of all land roads).

The luxury sea resort hotel chosen as the summit’s venue stands in a crass contrast to the poverty and high unemployment in that region. Like Cancún and Gleneagles, this region offered the benefit of very little leftwing activist structures and history and a substantial presence of rightwing and fascist groups. For movement activists this meant putting a lot of energy toward establishing contacts with the local population and creating infrastructures that would be necessary for the week of protest. For a moment, it looked as if the symbolic dimension could be referриториализed by activists, when they presented the fact that the avenue towards the conference hotel was once declared the most beautiful parkway by Adolf Hitler, who was also still mentioned as citizen of honor in the register of a nearby town. These historical details were picked up by the world press and initiated a little scandal about German history and the political symbolism of the summit’s venue.

We have seen that isolated social geography is as important as the physical. While Genoa was close to many Italian cities and even close to other countries, Heiligendamm was quite far from any major metropolis in Germany, and relatively far from other Western European countries. Gleneagles was far enough away from the two major cities Edinburgh and Glasgow. Cancún 2003 WTO, Kananaskis 2002 G8, and Georgia 2004 G8 followed this pattern. This is the conceptual map of Europe now used for summit security considerations. From the perspective of governing space, the distance from cities is beneficial for controlling and restricting arrivals of activists from
elsewhere, for minimizing access to activist infrastructure and sympathy, and for reducing the possibilities and targets for disruptive actions at places nearby the summit.

In sum, geographical selection of secluded places for summit meetings can set the stage for controlling space. Selecting the right location can, from the outset, subdue the level of protest, making it more difficult for activists to travel, gather, organize and disrupt the meetings. Over the last few years, there is an increasing trend toward isolated, easily defensible locations. In this way summit planners have politically deterritorialized the political space of oppositional political cultures and institutions active and networked in major cities and territorialized politically naïve or at least disorganized areas, taking advantage of their very different political territory. Summit meetings have more and more become again striated spaces that easily defy the challenges of smooth spaces of global resistance from below.

Dividing space

After the movement’s success in challenging the space of global governance through the penetration of summit meetings, the authorities’ tactics for controlling movement can be best understood as an attempt to re-territorialize dissent into striated and anticipated spaces. Deleuze’s and Guattari’s analysis of how dominant power structures rely on a tactic of closing off spaces that have been opened through decentralized organized processes of de-territorialization can be very helpful for understanding the functioning of the tools for controlling movement. The tactics of controlling movement reveal how authorities focus on the regulation of flows. They try to disrupt the capacity of decentralized movements by re-territorializing their flows before and during protest events. The central objective here is the channeling of dissent into pre-established zones and the incapacitation of spontaneity.

Once a location is selected, authorities start to re-organize the surrounding area by rating spaces on a “danger scale”. This process has the explicit intent of channeling dissent into pre-established zones, far away from the actual gatherings, in order to secure the operational flows involved in a summit meeting and to secure dangerous objects identified beforehand. This process is primarily about space. That is, it is about the temporary reorganization of Lefebvre’s “conceived space”. It involves changing the social relations that exist within a specific city or location from a “normal” stratification of daily life to a new social existence where users of the city are divided between new categories (e.g., protagonist, local businessperson, summit personnel). Thus, the division of space involves the transformation of the locale before a protest occurs.

Again, it becomes visible here how important the time preceding the actual summit has become for the governance of space. While control over space is still an important part of the actual policing during protest events, authorities attempt to pre-structure the space in such a way that disruptions of the summit meetings become unlikely if not impossible.

The general logic of the operations involved in the control of space through dividing it can be captured clearly from the framework provided by Foucault. The techniques of enclosure, segmentation, sub-division of function-related units, and ranking, which he describes as part of the emergence of a new type of social control taking place in hospitals, jails and schools, are used in a similar way for the governance of public space around summits. Foucault’s ideas are instructive in examining this process. Specifically, his notion of disciplinary diagrams helps to explain how space is
divided for control purposes. In his inquiry into the control mechanism deployed against the plague, Foucault showed how disciplinary diagrams emerged that required the strict division and careful supervision of space, reinforced with inspection and order maintenance. The basic ideas of containment are used to control protest.

The most sensitive and highly controlled zone is the “red zone”, a no-go area (meaning no one can go in without credentials granting access, which are sometimes issued to residents whose homes are within the defined area), secured by ever-longer fences. The fence at Québec City 2001 FTAA was 2.5 kilometers long, while the fence at Heiligendamm 2007 G8 stretched 12.5 kilometers. Also the construction of the fence has been steadily improved, and is nowadays standardized in the security handbooks of transnational police agencies. Fences are higher, more massive, with cement foundations, and often equipped with movement detectors and surveillance cameras. These no-go areas prevent dissenters from actually articulating their protest at the place where global governance decisions are made. In urban areas, walls composed of shipping containers are assembled during the days preceding the summit meetings in order to protect certain objects, to enforce the no-go areas, or to channel protest marches.

Preparatory spatial arrangements do not stop here, however. Already in Genoa 2001 G8 the red zone was surrounded by a yellow zone. In Québec City 2001 FTAA, protest groups even negotiated with police to establish several green zones, where protesters could gather impotently far from the red zone, and purportedly safe from police action. These zones were ultimately breached not only by tear gas floating in from the saturated yellow zones, but also by police combat teams. At Heiligendamm 2007 G8, the red zone was inside the fence, and a 3km wide concentric zone surrounded it. In this zone protest and assemblies were banned by a “General Directive” issued a few weeks before the Summit. Dissenters who entered this yellow zone, despite not having trespassed a fence and finding themselves still quite far from the meeting itself, could be prosecuted for committing a criminal act. The sea space and the air space were subdivided into high and low security zones as well. At Strasbourg 2009 NATO, the three cities involved in the summit – Strasbourg, Kehl, and Baden Baden – were organized into leveled security zones.

For the security preparations concerning NATO’s 60th anniversary in April 2009, the German and the French police decided to work instead with “flexible security zones”. The cities of Strasbourg, Kehl, and Baden Baden, hosting the NATO summit, were subdivided with a three-level security-zone concept, in which the borders of the zones could be adapted to emerging police necessities. The highest security zone could only be accessed by local inhabitants; the next zone could be accessed but was a no-protest zone. In the last zone, finally, registered protests were permitted, but constant identity controls took place. In addition, the German police manipulated the protest preparations spatially by not allowing for any protest camp on the German side. Protesters coming for several days thus had to get to the protest camp on the French side, with no chance to participate in the protest events on the German side due to intensifying border controls. The border-crossing was further complicated by the temporary suspension of the Schengen agreement. This suspension has become a habitual practice since Genoa 2001 G8, re-introducing of border controls between EU member states on a temporary basis.

While the spatial divisions for controlling space discussed so far are all of preemptive manner, there are more tools employed during the protests in order to
maintain spatial control. These measures often depend on the national or local police culture. Three levels of frequent measures can be distinguished, however: police strategy, vehicles, bodies, and the reduction of anonymous and safe space.

Space is also reterritorialized in the context of planning police operations. For Heiligendamm 2007 G8, the federal criminal investigation police was responsible for securing the space within the fence, while the national police forces were responsible for the no-protest zone surrounding the fence. The region around the no-protest zone was subdivided into areas secured by designated police units from various states. The major highways leading to the biggest city nearby, as well as big train stations and airports were secured by the federal police and the army. In preparation for Miami 2003 FTAA, law enforcement divided downtown Miami into relatively small surveillance grids to monitor marches and protesters. More specifically, each grid contained undercover officers who reported to the Operations Center via radio. With the information, law enforcement was able to track the movement of “spontaneous direct actions”. In addition, the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation provided live video feed to the Operations Center to further monitor protestors.

In addition to semi-permanent blockades erected with fences and containers, police mobilize flexible barricades composed of rows of police vehicles (cars, motorcycles, etc.). These are used to define, seal, and change routes of marches and protests, prevent moving groups from meeting one another (or from arriving to the designated starting point), blocking, delaying, and directing dispersal, and protecting vulnerable access points unprotected by other means. While police vehicles are used in all countries, Genoa 2001 G8 is one of the best examples of this tactic. The militarized police forces called Carabinieri not only used their cars to block roads and to encircle demonstrators, but also to disperse them with a tactic called “carousel”, whereby a police vehicle drives fast in a circle in an area occupied by protesters.

Another tool available to authorities are the bodies of police officers. Police use their bodies to separate and divide space, so that protesters remain isolated either from other protesters or from the public. This is accomplished in several ways. For example, police isolate and separate snake marches. This style of march, avoiding predetermined marching routes, “snakes” around in and out of streets spontaneously, a tactical maneuver that make traditional policing more difficult and the disruption of traffic more possible. In response, police sometimes use large numbers of officers to surround the entire march, thus defining two territories which could be reshaped on the move: inside the protest space and outside. The inside space contains protesters, who are now isolated within this space. The space outside remains relatively undisturbed, but the public remains separated from protesters. In effect, this division of space prevents protesters from mingle with the public or for individuals in the public to spontaneously join in the march. It also prevents protesters from departing the protest, stopping for food or to go to the bathroom.

In Germany and the UK, this tactic is called “Kessel” (kettle), which involves the police corralling dissenters or an entire demonstration using several lines of police. While in the case of a demonstration this normally means that the march is accompanied like this, with smaller groups it normally means being stopped for several hours until everyone is either identified and checked or even arrested. During a big demonstration in Hamburg just a few days before Heiligendamm 2007 G8 summit, in response to the employment of this tactic, the organizers of the demonstration aborted the march. Totally enclosed by several lines of police for hours, the demonstration was both invisible
(because of its immobility) and very unattractive (because of its appearance of criminality). After the demonstration was aborted, several hours of confrontations ensued between dispersed dissenters and police forces. Another form of separation used is preventing two marches from joining up. At Miami 2003 FTAA, small "feeder marches" were prevented from arriving to join the main march.

Police use similar tactic to ensure control over permitted marches. At New York City 2002 WEF (World Economic Forum) police surrounded and isolated a large protest. With an estimated number of 10,000 marchers, the police used the permit process to establish a route for the protesters, which allowed them to place barricades, officers, bikes, and fences in strategic places. Ultimately, all 10,000 marchers were mostly isolated from the public, again reproducing an inside and outside protest space. Knowing the route, the police used barricades, officers, bikes, and motorcycles to contain the march to a predetermined path. At one point, I observed what appeared to be the entire march contained between motorcycled officers riding on one side of the march and a three-foot barricade stretching for many blocks on the other side. The police ensured that marchers would remain on the established route. At Gleneagles 2005 G8 British police units focused on containing protest events during the summit by strategically hindering the entrance to certain spaces and objects of protest with long lines of heavily equipped riot police. Dissenters who still insisted on making their way to the enclosed space were forced then to find ways to break or circumvent the police lines, which rarely happened. At the opening demonstration at Gleneagles 2005 G8, hundreds of thousands of protesters in Edinburgh were channeled through the inner city with metal fence constructions restricting their mobility for most of the route. Once started, there was simply no other way than following the flow of the masses into one direction. There were few opportunities to get out of the demonstration during the entire march. One protester commented that day that he “felt like a sheep being directed to the fields”.

Knowing the endpoint of a permitted march, U.S. law enforcement often use a series of pens at the end of march that can hold thousands of people. This method is most common in New York City, where police officers use metal barricades to mold the space. In some instances, police will build several corrals, allowing only a specific number of individuals into each space. This makes it so that a march of 20,000 people (or more) can be broken down into segments of 2,000 or less. The Washington DC police used the same tactic during DC 2002 IMF/WB. A fortified and barricaded space with hundreds of officers dressed in riot gear awaited the marchers at the final destination point. Once the march arrives at its end point, the timed permit for the route ends, and those outside the pen are urged to disperse. The pen then remains the only “protest space”.

Another form of spatial control is the reduction of anonymous and safe space. Both constant police observation and the use of cameras contribute to this strategy. This clearly reduces the feeling of activists that they can move freely and therefore lowers the probability of disruptive actions. Police habitually surveil spaces crucial for the infrastructure of dissenters, such as camps, convergence centers, and independent media centers. But also during marches themselves, dissenters are subjected to constant photo and video surveillance. Besides reducing the space of dissenters for anonymously moving and assembling, this is also a tool for gathering evidence for possible legal prosecution after the summit. Anonymous space is also reduced by constant identity checks, which begin on the routes toward assemblies. Police often
control the assembly areas, only allowing people to enter if they show their identity cards. Entering into protest space, then, implies leaving behind privacy, anonymity, and security.

Another tactic for reducing anonymous and safe space is the sabotage of crucial activist infrastructure. Alterglobalization movements rely on a lean but sophisticated infrastructure of convergence centers, often operating a week or more before the protests are starting. This includes independent media centers, legal support offices, camps, food kitchens, training centers, art workshops, and information points. This structure provides a context for flexible coordination of various political actions, a safe space for retreat and recreation, and opportunities for different modes of political participation. Authorities have acknowledged the strategic capacity of these infrastructural projects, and often frustrate the creation of such places in advance, by not cooperating in allowing legal ways to establish them. One example is the German police forcing individual property holders to contact the police before providing land to the camps of Heiligendamm 2007 G8. During the protests, infrastructure is often raided or evicted by the police. This happened with the convergence center at Prague 2000 IMF/WB, with the Hvitfeldtska School at Göteborg 2001 EU, and with the Independent Media Center in the Diaz School at Genoa 2001 G8. In 2003 it occurred again with the Independent Media Center in a squat in Geneva. In 2005 and in 2007 police forces surrounded camps of Heiligendamm 2007 G8 dissenters during the night. Targeting the working and sleeping places of dissenters, the authorities disrupt activists’ preparation for action and restrict the capacity for (unexpected) movement. When the camp was surrounded during the night and a whole day at Gleneagles G8 2005, dissenters had to find a way to get out of the camp and come close to the G8 meeting, without being snatched by the police.

Sabotaging safe spaces of protesters is complemented by counterposing sanctioned spaces to activist infrastructures. While protest camps, independent media centre and convergence centers are frequently monitored and raided by police, the authorities happily facilitate the organization of counter-summits consisting of discussions in large buildings often far away from the summit site. This way, dissenters are channeled into the more easily manageable spaces of a counter summit rather than to the spaces were disruptive actions are prepared. This clearly demonstrates that the tactical division of space does not aim at avoiding protest, but at channeling it into certain spaces that are easier to control. Global dissent is re-territorialized into striated and anticipated spaces.

Controlling individuals’ movement

Zones, barricades, and encirclements, whether used preemptively or during a protest, are control mechanisms aimed at direct physical control of groups. Another approach to re-territorialization mobilizes policies and legal barriers to impede individuals’ movements to express their dissent. A whole series of regulatory tools pre-empts movement of the activist network: ban orders, travel bans for foreign activists, daily obligatory registration, preventive (mass) detention, imposed spatial restrictions for demonstrations and assemblies, and (the reintroduction of) border controls.

Ban orders are a legal instrument to restrict movement and to extend the spatial regime of no-go and no-protest zones. This instrument was widely employed at Gleneagles 2005 G8 and Heiligendamm 2007 G8. In Scotland, an extraordinary legal
Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, originally intended to prevent minor football disturbances, was mobilized in order to enforce ban orders. It resulted in dissenters receiving ban orders during the protests in the days before the opening of the G8 meetings; the orders covered the entire region surrounding the summit’s venue. This way, dissenters who the police identify in this region after being “banned” could be charged with committing a criminal activity. Ban orders normally last until the day after the summit is ending. In the case of Germany, police gave bans to activists who participated in actions in the region of the summit’s venue, sometimes even months in advance. This way, the participation of targeted dissenters is incapacitated already even before the actual summit protests start.

In order to frustrate the movement of foreign dissenters, authorities coordinate internationally to impose travel bans on activists who allegedly pose a risk. Already as early as Prague 2000 IMF/WB, a train of Italian activists was held at the border to the Czech Republic because authorities claimed to have identified persons that have been taking part in an international preparatory meeting some months before. For this reason, they did not let the train enter the country. Before Genoa 2001 G8, Berlin’s senator for internal affairs imposed a travel ban on at least 16 activists because they would potentially pose a risk. This assessment was based on tracing their legal records. One of the persons, for example, had been fined for graffiti painting. These persons had to register in person every day for a week at their local police department. During the week of protest in conjunction with Heiligendamm 2007 G8, 556 people were turned away from the borders to Germany. In some cases, the decision was based on additional information requested from the authorities of the dissenter’s country of origin, in other cases the simple fact of carrying a black hoodie in the luggage was sufficient to deny entry to Germany.

This points to another tool being re-employed by authorities: massive border controls. Internal border controls have been abolished by the Schengen agreement implemented in 1995, but this agreement is temporarily suspended for summits in Europe. Schengen agreement was suspended for Genoa 2001 G8 and Heiligendamm 2007 G8. (For Gleneagles 2005 G8 this was not necessary since the UK are not part of the Schengen agreement.) The border controls during Genoa 2001 G8 and Heiligendamm 2007 G8 were massive. At the border to Italy cars on the highways were supposed to line up in a special cue for those foreigners heading towards Genoa. At the same time, the airport and two train stations in Genoa were shut down in order to restrict and contain the dissenters coming by train. In both cases, nearby ports were heavily controlled. The Italian authorities turned away a ferry with 135 Greek dissenter at the port of Ancona.

Another measure for controlling people’s movement is the imposition of conditions for demonstrations and assemblies. While Della Porta and Reiter stress the advantages of this aspect of a negotiated management approach of policing protest, they did not analyze the wider implications for the social control of dissent. In Germany it is now common that authorities not only determine in advance which route a demonstration is allowed to take, but also where it starts and where it ends, how long and how high the banners may be, when the demonstration may start, and sometimes even how many people are allowed to participate. If demonstrators disagree with these imposed conditions, they are either left to do an illegal action, go to court to assert their right to protest (which can take several months), or not do an action at all. The police, meanwhile, define criteria to determine when a demonstration or assembly
is behaving either ‘well’ or ‘badly’. If people are deviating from the pre-established route, or carrying too large banners, or jumping or disguising their faces, the police now have a reason to intervene, or even to dissolve the assembly. Assemblies that are ‘negotiated’ and that stick to the imposed conditions are defined as ‘good’, while assemblies that are spontaneous or not adhering to ‘negotiated’ rules are defined as ‘bad’ or even ‘violent’ and so criminalized. Criminalizing a demonstration allows police to invoke regulatory measures to outlaw, disperse, and assault dissenters.

A final preemptive tool available to authorities is detention. During Göteborg 2001 EU, the police surrounded the Hvitfeldtska School, a space that was legally granted to protesters for sleeping and coordinating activities, and arrested about 400 people before the protests were to start. Mass arrest is also used to incapacitate groups of dissenters during protests. 600 detentions/arrests were made at Seattle 1999 WTO, 859 at Prague 2000 IMF/WB; 1115 at Göteborg 2001 EU; 310 at Genoa 2001 G8; 600 at Washington DC 2002 IMF/WB; 700 at Gleneagles 2005 G8; 1140 at Heiligendamm 2007 G8; nearly 2000 at Copenhagen 2009 UN Climate Conference; 106 and 1000 at Toronto 2010 G20 (the largest mass arrest in the history of Canada). 107 Distinct from mass arrest, snatch squads may intervene at any moment to grab an individual, often with force. Sometimes these are individuals who have been surveilled and selected in advance, and other times they are chosen spontaneously.

Preemptive exclusion of foreign and veteran activists is expected by authorities to reduce the likelihood of creative, uncontrolled activist reterritorialization (disruption) of the Summit. On a symbolic level, it also deprives local activists of the encouraging experience of international solidarity.

Militarization

One of the most immediately striking visions of summit meetings is the militarization of the space surrounding the event. It is no hyperbole to say that the space becomes a war zone, with officers dressed in sophisticated military gear and accompanied by armored vehicles. The closer to the actual meeting location, the more militarized the space becomes.

Over the last couple of decades, the policing of protest witnessed an increase of both military tactics and the use of military equipment. The growth and normalization of police paramilitarism is well documented in the criminology literature. 108 Peter Kraska and other scholars have clearly demonstrated that the line between police and military institutions is becoming less distinct. 109 As a result, it is now increasingly difficult to distinguish between war and law enforcement. For evidence on the militarization and militarism present in U.S. policing, Kraska points to the spread of SWAT Teams trained in military tactics and armed with assault rifles and armored vehicles. Originally designed for hostage rescue or engaging heavily armed criminals, the use of SWAT teams has widened to include less dangerous situations, such as raids on houses of accused drug dealers.

The militarization of policing that began in the 1970s continues to impact the policing of protest today, sometimes with devastating consequences. The “less than lethal weapons” used in policing protest (such as bean bags, pepper bullets, and acoustic weapons) were used first by militaries for “peace keeping” purposes and then defused into police departments. An example of the flow of technology from the military to the police is the recent use of sound cannons. Sound cannons (technically
called Long Range Acoustic Devices or LRAD) are weapons that emit high frequency sounds aimed to stun and paralyze humans. They were first developed by the United States Navy to prevent ships from getting too close. This technology crossed the military/police boundary in the United States for the first time during the 2009 G20 protest in Pittsburg. Subsequently Canada threatened to use it during the G20 gathering in Toronto. Outside of alterglobalization protests, police have also threatened to use the technology in Oakland, California, after a contentious trial involving the police murder of a young man in the local train system. All this supports Kraska’s claim that looking into the militarization of police is important in understanding security in the 21st Century and the control of dissent in the late-modern era.  

Mainstream journalists use the phrase “war zone” to describe the militarization they witness in the days before the start of an event, often noting that it does not look like a space for a peaceful global gathering, but rather like a city preparing for civil war. Each such observation threatens the legitimacy of global governance. Rural areas provide the option of avoiding these images, because the military reorganization of space, while present, is less dense, striking, and photogenic. The erection of the fence around Heiligendamm revealed its dramatic intrusion in a rural and forest context, but few journalists took photos. Moreover militarization of a seemingly generic rural area shocks fewer residents, and does not have the charge of the disruption of a familiar (often touristic) site used regularly by millions of citizens.  

Summit security zones are depopulated of usual users (businesses and organizations are often required to close) and repopulated by an overwhelming number of police and military officers in combat gear: 5,000 at New York City 2002, 5,000 at Kananaskis 2003 G8, more than 3,000 at Miami 2003 FTAA, WEF, more than 20,000 at Heiligendamm 2007 G8 (18,000 police officers and 2,500 army soldiers).  

The use of actual military units further blurs the line between law enforcement and the military. After the employment of several thousand soldiers of the Swiss army for Évian 2003 G8 (which is officially in France, but close to Switzerland), Heiligendamm 2007 G8 involved the largest military operation at a summit in Europe, triggering a public debate in Germany. Officially, the involvement of the army in internal security operations is constitutionally prohibited. However, the German authorities framed these operations as legally permitted “administrative assistance” in case of an emergency situation. During the preparations the German army was involved in the construction of an emergency road and several observation flights with Tornado airplanes. The highway from the airport to the summit venue was overseen by observation tanks of the army, a Tornado overflew a protest camp at a height of only 80m, and military personnel were posted at a civil hospital in Bad Doberan. Canadian Forces’ fighter-jets also patrolled a no-fly zone over the Kananaskis security zone.  

While the preparation of a summit as a militarized war-zone often takes several weeks, if not months, the re-conversion into a “normal” state of affairs goes much quicker. Often a few hours after the official summit ends and the delegates leave town, police and military have also left the city. Fences and barriers are removed, graffiti is cleaned, protest posters removed, and broken windows repaired. Global governance meetings impose a geography, changing the city, and then leave, as if the events had never happened. For someone who has participated in a protest march a few days before it will look like as if the protests never took place, as if nothing has happened. Activists who walk through those streets can still see the action as if superimposed on a landscape surreal in its demilitarized quiet.
It suddenly is possible for anyone again to walk freely through the streets without being observed, checked or arbitrarily arrested. In some ways, the protest has been erased, made meaningless. In another way, the city is forever changed, because the image and possibility of its militarization is burned into the minds of every witness. Even years after a protest, it can be surprising to find access points open and unguarded. This is the “ghostly remainder” — or reminder — of global governance.

Yet, this demilitarization is only partial. The reality for the local population is that the space is forever altered, because some of the security apparatus are left in place. While the most obvious fences do come down, what remains behind are the security cameras, the equipment that police purchased, and the mentality resulting from the hours that law enforcement spent training to control crowds. While the local population may not know it, these apparatus will likely be turned against them if they mobilize for better wages, cleaner air, or protest police brutality.

In Cancún, only one day later, we found ourselves walking “freely” but in disbelief over the bridge at km0 where we were held, rudely, 9km away from the opportunity to express our dissent to the Ministerial itself. Not only the militarization was gone. Also gone was the huge and shrine to the farmer Lee Kyung, who had died in the protest. It had seemed permanent when we gathered there last night. These disappearances themselves felt violent and dishonest. We felt deceived to be allowed to travel across that bridge, because such freedom denied the ghosts of the fence and the soldiers, the decision to revoke our freedom and to silence our dissenting presence. The bridge was no longer just a bridge. The bridge reeked with the possibility of restriction. Space ceased to flow and we through it, but now contained a series of questions, “is it open now?” “Will it be open later?” “Is there another way to get there, or not?” “Will they let us pass?”

After a summit, the location is not a space for questioning global governance any more. The summit leaves scars on the psyche of the witnesses, but we cannot point to it. How precious, although also terrifying, that time seems, when the shadow that is economic globalization affixes itself to a building, and can be pointed and screamed at. A few men meet in a room surrounded by armies, brutally disinterested in the voices outside, revealed for what they are. But as their Summit recedes from physical space it becomes ethereal, and its haunted witnesses speak of an otherworldly military visitation, unbelievable in their “free” city. The time of protest/war is erased from the spatial memory and does not even survive as historical episode. The only time protestors were able to reclaim a summit place as a contested site of global governance was when in November 2007, on the occasion of severe sentences against activists concerning the protests of Genoa 2001 G8, about 60,000 people rallied there with the slogan “We are history”.

Channeling Dissent

The networked and decentralized character of alterglobalization movements contributes to a de-territorialization of global governance during mass protest events. They open a space for global conflict by making it difficult for existing political institutions to govern. Spatial tactics of protesters exemplify the process of de-
territorialization. Direct actions during summit protests rely on a decentralized model giving various groups a chance to apply their favored tactics in a certain place, while at the same time profiting from the cumulative effects through the temporal simultaneity (and distribution) of these decentralized actions. Such a mode of resistance coincides with what Deleuze and Guattari have called de-territorialization. Summit authorities work to re-territorialize social conflicts in order to make dissent manageable. They attempt to regain control over space through location decisions, dividing the space, regulatory controls on individuals, and militarization.

As we have demonstrated in this chapter, space, global governance, and its contestation are interlinked. Dissenters from all over the world gather at IMF, WTO, and G8 meetings to express concern regarding corporate globalization, while simultaneously attempting to undermine the legitimacy of global governance through blockading and disrupting the flows of summit meetings. To regain and maintain control, police have developed a set of spatial strategies, choosing geographically defensible and socially isolated locations, dividing space, controlling individuals movements, and, militarizing the space.

Examining these mechanisms together, we see that the spatial control of globalized dissent is increasingly organized in a pre-emptive way. Thereby, the social control mechanisms do not aim so much any more on only protest avoidance, but on channeling protest into pre-established spaces and predictable flows in order to foreclose the potential for disruption of the Summit space. Whereas the disruptive capacity of movements is incapacitated pre-emptively through eliminating anonymous space for unpredictable actions, entire cities or rural regions are manipulated spatially in order to guarantee a smooth functioning of the flows (of people and material) involved in a summit meeting, while holding protesters at a distance.

Foucault describes such mechanisms of spatial division as a new form of social control. He shows how 'modern' institutions such as the jail, the school, or the hospital rely on a similar refinement of the techniques of enclosure, segmentation, sub-division of function-related units, and ranking. Control over activities is gained through the techniques of a daily schedule, the temporal construction of actions, the coordination between body and action, and the instrumental codification of the body, which ultimately leads to the maximum possible exploitation of the body. These mechanisms, Foucault states, organize complex spaces that not only fix movement but also allow for circulation. That is, power organizes the flow and circulation of bodies and products. Control, then, is not only about restriction, but, importantly about channeling flows in more convenient directions. Effective protest engages public discourse by directing itself to authorities and fellow citizens. It is most effective when it disrupts official flows. It requires mobility, movement, and flow in order to achieve these tasks. Spatial controls transform protest flows into ordered, contained, restricted places more convenient and less disruptive to the Summits.

On the other hand, the spatial control of dissent focuses on the avoidance of what Foucault has called "an undesired event" (2007: 33). By precluding the possibility of disruption, the flows involved in a summit meeting are ensured. Foucault points out how the avoidance of an "undesired event" hinges on making the flows of goods and people predictable. Gilham and Noakes argue that police strategically incapacitate the movement of some protesters, while allowing others to move freely. This 'strategic incapacitation' is generally aimed at those protesters who law enforcement deem dangerous or view as a potential problem, whose movement is
then temporarily incapacitated. Our study, however, demonstrates that the incapacitation of ‘movements’ in order to avoid undesired and unpredicted events, does not –or mainly not– happen during protests. Police and authorities have developed an entire arsenal of techniques to organize the contested spaces for the manifestation of global governance and to incapacitate spaces of resistance preemptively. Dissent is spatially re-located and preempted long before people gather in the streets.

However, let us not forget that the spatial dimension of control remains inextricably linked to the symbolic dimension of governance. Hence every tightening releases contradictory forces. The farmers of Heiligendamm may have been right-wing, but when their fences were mistaken for the Summit’s, they did not blame the activists. Spatial controls peculiarly perturb residents who are also divided from their flows and occupied by their own militaries.
Chapter 3
Political economy of the social control of dissent

In the light of the remarks of the French President, can the Minister reassure the House that good Scottish food will be served at the Gleneagles Summit? (British Lord Wallace of Saltaire)\textsuperscript{115}

Over the last thirty years an entire economy has developed around securing global ministerial and summit meetings, such as the G8, G20, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, and the World Economic Forum. As the meetings became increasingly contentious through the 1980s and 1990s, the responsibility of “securing” the Summits became more important for the states hosting the gatherings. As a result, greater funding was allocated for security, leading to a large infusion of monies to local law enforcement agencies. Some of this money is spent on overtime salaries, extra personnel (including private police\textsuperscript{116}), city services such as transportation and waste management, and federal services such as special deployments of military and border agencies.\textsuperscript{117} Some of the money is invested in new technologies, which are left behind with local police agencies long after the event. This arsenal of new technologies and weapons includes new surveillance technologies (such aerial surveillance and fixed street cameras), \textsuperscript{118} “less-than-lethal” weapons” (such as bean-bag shotguns or acoustic weapons),\textsuperscript{119} and the latest riot gear.

This chapter examines the political economy of the social control of dissent. By political economy we mean the politics of mobilizing and using resources. To that end, this chapter provides a preliminary analysis of security costs of Summits, aiming to uncover the power dynamics behind the flow of money and resources.

This is a preliminary analysis for several reasons. First, there is almost no previous scholarship examining these expenditures.\textsuperscript{120} While some attempts have been made to examine G8 and G20 costs by a research group at the University of Toronto,\textsuperscript{121} no similar attempts exist across other organizations, such as the WTO, IMF, or WEF. Second, while the data that is available comes mostly from newspapers and government agency reports, host governments rarely disclose detailed information on expenditures. In those cases where budgetary data is provided it is given in the aggregate and without much detail. When we have interviewed law enforcement about funding, they are either not forthcoming or do not have access to the information. When details are given they are not comparable across Summits. We have in one case the cost on police overtime hours, and in another the costs of renting the venue including catering. Thus, the work here is a first step, enticing, but frustratingly incomplete. As such, our analysis enters in a new area of research. We hope that other scholars will help us uncover further information.
In this section we first assemble the available data on expenditures. Then we explore the most visible manifestation of power relations – tensions about who pays. Finally we offer some conclusions about what these expenditures mean for the social control of dissent.

What does it cost?

Despite the limited information available to us, it’s staggeringly clear that these security budgets are extravagant. New York City 2002 WEF spent approximately $11 million for police overtime alone. Expenditures for Washington DC 2003 IMF/World Bank were $14 million. Miami 2003 FTAA was approximately $23.9 million. London 2009 G20 was $30 million. $1 billion was spent on Toronto 2010 G8/G20, the most expensive event to date. After Toronto, a debate unfolded in the media regarding the high cost spent on security. This could open up some much-needed discussion on the budgets for these meetings. However, as of now it does not appear like the costs will trend downward.

Kirton and colleagues have documented the increasing expenditures of G8 and G20 gatherings from 2001 to 2010, as summarized in Tables 1 and 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Genoa, Italy</td>
<td>$40 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Kananaskis, Canada</td>
<td>$93 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Évian, France</td>
<td>No data available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Sea Island, Georgia, United States</td>
<td>$40 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Gleneagles, Scotland United Kingdom</td>
<td>$140 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>St. Petersburg, Russia</td>
<td>No data available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Heilgendamm, Germany</td>
<td>$124 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Toyako, Hokkaido, Japan</td>
<td>$280 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>L’Aquila, Abruzzo, Italy</td>
<td>$124 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Toronto, Canada</td>
<td>$309 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Cost of “securing” the G20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Washington DC, United States</td>
<td>No data available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>London, United Kingdom</td>
<td>$28.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Pittsburgh, United States</td>
<td>$98.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Toronto, Canada</td>
<td>$574.6 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To date, the Canadian government has been the most forthcoming with information about security spending. Table 3 shows the expenditures the total cost of security expenditures per department and agency for Toronto 2010 G8/G20. Although they did not release detailed information about how the money was spent, the data does show the diversity of law enforcement agencies involved in security operations, including both police and military agencies. And it includes a number of non-law
enforcement organizations and even private institutions (noted in the table as “Industry”, without further specification).

Table 3: Costs for securing the 2010 G8 & G20 Summits in Toronto

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department/Agency</th>
<th>Spending (in Canadian dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Royal Canadian Military Police</td>
<td>$507,459,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness</td>
<td>$278,310228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense</td>
<td>$77,570,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Security Intelligence Service</td>
<td>$3,137,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>$2,266,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada Border Services Agency</td>
<td>$1,180,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>$1,240,581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Air Transport Security Authority</td>
<td>$399,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health Agency of Canada</td>
<td>$583,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>$2,829,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency Reserve (Fiscal framework)</td>
<td>$55,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$929,986,110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are three types of expenditures: security itself, operational costs of a secure summit, and collateral costs to the locality.

Security

Examining the overall budget of summit meetings, one observes a significant rise in costs after Seattle 1999 WTO, perhaps because law enforcement in Seattle was criticized for not having spent enough time and money to study the tactics of the alterglobalization movement. In the protest following the case of Seattle, law enforcement agencies responsible for policing Summits took their work more seriously.

As noted earlier, a portion of the security-related part of the budgets goes into the payment for police officers hired to supplement the local staff. A report to the Canadian Parliament after the 2010 G8/G20 in Toronto reports that one of the drivers in increasing G8 security costs is the relative numbers of law enforcement agents near the venue. If the number is low, perhaps due to the rural nature of the location, then the costs is higher resulting form the import of officers, soldiers, and military equipment. G8 Summits generally deploy 20,000 security personnel, which means diverting 3.7 to 4.7 percent of the available security personnel of most G8 countries to a single event.

Another aspect of the costs directly involved in security concerns equipment. One piece of equipment is the increasingly longer and more robust fence. For Heiligendamm 2007 G8 the costs for the 12 km long perimeter fence amounted to €12.5 million. Police and material equipment is coordinated of on a national, provincial and local level. In the case of Évian 2003 G8, for example, one hundred warplanes were mobilized for surveillance purposes of the summit area. Use of military equipment is very expensive. A one hour flight of a German army Tornado, such as those used at Heiligendamm 2007 G8, costs €41,804 plus costs of the pilot and other personnel.

In addition, new equipment is purchased for the police operations, such as new police cars, helicopters, boats, night vision sights, protective clothes, and
communication technology. For renting a digital police radio network in Heiligendamm, the federal government spent €3.6 million.² Summit meetings are a welcome occasion to improve the equipment of local police forces.

Other material preparations concern accommodation and catering for the police forces. In the case of Heiligendamm 2007 G8, the costs for catering were €630,100. The money spent on renting buildings for the police operations amounted to €1,074,600.

Security operations also involve hiring subcontractors. In 2003 the Canadian government spent an undisclosed amount of money to develop a security communication plan, hiring CPG International to put the plan together. CPG International is one of the world’s largest communication consulting firms. The Canadian government refuses to disclose the amount of the contract, but a contractor working with the company told us that it was substantial.³

Operations of a Secure Summit

Smooth transport of summit participants has become a costly and complicated operation. To avoid mixing delegates with dissenters, helicopters and boats have become common vehicles for daily transport of delegates during summit protests. The transport costs for 2005 Gleneagles G8 amounted to a total of £1.5 million, including coaches, luggage trucks, cars, and helicopters for approximately 4,400 delegates and media persons. Moreover, the airport of Prestwick had to be upgraded to security standards. £35,000 was required for the team planning these adaptations. A temporary structure cost £197,000 and £635,000 was spent upgrading areas of the apron tarmac which are not usual for normal airport operations.

The costs for the accommodation, catering and entertainment of the official summit delegations are diverse. At Prague 2000 IMF/World Bank, approximately $67 million was spent converting the “Palace of Culture” into a conference facility. For Genoa 2001 G8, $2.89 mill was spent on a luxury cruise liner which served as accommodation for the political leaders. These costs are normally paid by the national governments since they are the official hosts of such meetings.

We have the most complete information for one case, Gleneagles 2005 G8. 2,375 delegates were accredited to the summit, but only 475 had access to the hotel in Gleneagles, and only half of these stayed at the hotel. Rent of the Gleneagles hotel (including catering for the guests) for 7 days cost £1,085,000. Set up of the conference facilities (meeting rooms and offices) cost £2.2 million through the company Jack Morton Worldwide. In addition, there were the costs for interpreters (£145,000), printing of conference handbooks (£31,000), installation of a secure IT network at the summit site (estimated £66,000), transport and catering for inspection visits (£6,000), installation of backup generators (£26,000), and compensation for the unavailability of the other rental properties during the period of the summit (£63,000), preparation and breakdown rental time cost £104,000. Additional catering, together with a 24-hour snack bar cost £39,000. The meals of the prime ministers themselves (two working lunches and two dinners) were covered by the Government Hospitality budget and cost £10,000 included wine and flowers. The parallel program for the spouses of the G8 leaders amounted to £22,000.
As we discuss further in later chapters, media strategies are an increasingly important dimension of the social control of dissent. For Kananaskis 2003 G8 meeting, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police hired a public relations firm to design an information campaign. GPC International, a partner company of Fleishman Hillad is a major global player in the world of information consulting. The expenditure for this service is classified as national security secret. GPC International was involved in the planning of the event from the onset, developing a multilevel communications operation targeting different types of “stakeholders”, such as the global media, local residents, and national protesters. GPC International was involved in the planning process months prior to the protest. Their task was to add a communications layer to the overall policing strategy.

In an effort to control the message coming out of these summits and the protests against them, Summits have an interest in keeping the journalists inside, covering the news of the Summit itself, rather than outside, covering dissent. At Gleneagles 2005 G8, more than 3,000 journalists were accredited (about 2,100 of them actually collected their security badges). Inside the Summit security zone, media centers provide workspaces with internet, edit suites, radio booths, and space for press conference given by authorities and summit officials. Including catering provided for journalists, the British government spent £3,852,000 on media facilities, £1,454,000 on transportation for journalists. For Heiligendamm 2007 G8, the German federal government spent €15 million for the press centre, which was constructed for the Summit. Also the press and information office of the federal government obtained a increased annual budget for executing the G8-related press tasks, and €81,000 on police public relation work.

The summit outreach program at Gleneagles 2005 G8 for involving leaders from non-G8 countries spent £69,000. At Heiligendamm 2007 G8 €2.8 million was spent on promotional gifts (largely distributed during the meetings).

Collateral costs to the locality

The political economy of summit meetings also involves frequently scarce local resources. The German administrative district of Bad Doberan spent approximately €600,000 for the Heiligendamm 2007 G8. The federal government refused to take over these costs that resulted largely from the construction of two ambulant treatment centers and cost of labor. A total of 14,053 hours were spent for the G8 summit by fire brigades from Rostock and Bad Doberan and an unknown number by the brigade of Bad Güstrow. The voluntary and employed rescue services worked in total 63,243 hours. In addition, officers of emergency units from other German provinces, the “Technisches Hilfswerk” (Technical Relief Organization), and the Germany Army contributed to the emergency response operation during the G8 summit. The provincial government paid for these extra working hours, although the responsibility for emergency response was with the city of Rostock and the surrounding administrative counties. In total, the money spent for the emergency response services added up to €3,786,200.

Another negative effect of summit meetings for local business comes from preventive closure, sometimes explicitly recommended by authorities, and always implicitly stimulated by the scare tactics in the media. It was difficult to purchase food near to the Carlini stadium where many of the protesters found accommodation at Genoa 2001 G8 because most local stores were closed and even barricaded. Similar
scenes accompany summit protests elsewhere. Yet, for small-scale enterprises one or more days of closure can be significant. For these reasons, the German authorities stimulated shop owners in the city centre of Rostock to keep their shops open during the days of 2007 Heiligendamm G8. Nevertheless, the president of the North-east German Retail Association Heinz Kopp confirmed that many retailers suffered a loss of profit up to 80 percent during the week of the G8 summit. Yet another loss of profit for local business can emerge from property damage. Shops (and especially their windows) can be the victim of confrontations between police and protesters. At Quebec City 2001 FTAA, many shops cannily boarded up their windows but remained open to do business with and provide services to dissenters. At Heiligendamm 2007 G8 it was the local farmers who lost profit. According to the provincial minister of Agriculture, eight farms were directly affected by the police protester interaction in the fields surrounding Heiligendamm, resulting in an estimated damage of €32,000. Other damages of local business and public infrastructure cost €100,000. Costs from property damage are often not covered by the federal government.

Évian 2003 G8 clearly exemplifies the complexities and delicacy of international “cooperation” around Summit security. In some cases, it is less costly not to police or enforce the law. For instance, during a planning meeting, Micheline Spoerri (head of the police in Geneva) admitted that local law enforcement received orders not to intervene against possible property damage in the city of Geneva (which expected simultaneous protests with Évian). The reason for this order was based on a cost benefit analysis. The municipal government in Geneva reasoned that to prepare for a large protest, they would have to pay foreign police form other cities for their services. This would be true regardless of whether or not there was property damage as a result of the protest activity. In other words, having foreign police officers in Geneva ready to confront protesters would be expensive, in fact too expensive for the local municipality to cover. Thus, tolerating widespread property damage was the cheaper option, since this potential damage was likely cheaper than substantial bills for French and German officers.

These costs for local communities are often justified with an anticipated raise of tourism arising from the worldwide attention a region gets during such summits. The attraction of future investment is a recurring promise circulating before summit meetings. A study by Deloitte and Touche preceding Prague 2000 WB/IMF predicted a summit-related profit rate of $26 to $79 million, with another $188 to $413 million through extra investment in the following five years. In a debate of the British parliament the baroness Royall of Blaisdon pointed out that the First Minister expected the benefits to Scotland to be around £500 million, 10 times the costs of security. To convince cities of these promises, Toronto 2010 G8/G20 expenditures included two million dollars for a fake lake designed to promote tourism in the area. Prior to Genoa 2001 G8, the Italian government produced approximately $100 million to “spruce up” the city before the G8 delegates arrived in town. However, these increases in tourism may never materialize. As a local tourist agency from the region of the Gleneagles 2005 G8 confirmed, the expected increase of tourism failed to appear. Despite to glossy magazines in English language about the prospects of the region and a regional collaboration in the special ‘information office for economy for the G8 summit’, the tourist sector of Heiligendamm could also not attest a significant increase in the two years after 2007 G8. Also the Gleneagles Hotel of
the 2005 G8 could not report a rising profit rate after the summit. The possible rural venues of global summit meetings might suffer a similar fate as urban venues did before: they might realize that a breeze of the image of being the centre of the world can easily turn into an image of being a heavily fortified “war zone”. Laura Tartarini, a lawyer from Genoa, pointed out that there was no increase for the tourist sector in Genoa after the 2001 summit and that the city is famous now for the murder of Carlo Giuliani and the police violence rather than for its tourist attractions. Although the federal Italian government compensated financially for the losses resulting from the summit, the inhabitants of Genoa felt like the soul of their city was being raped for a summit that had nothing to do with their city.  

This lesson is not lost on other cities. After Genoa 2001 G8, fewer cities queued up for hosting the next meeting of the global elite.

Tensions
As is the case with most projects that require large pools of money, the complexity of spending the funds increases the chances of conflict between local agencies participating in the event, such as conflicts between police departments or between police departments and city government. An instance of this conflict was present during the planning for Washington DC 2003 IMF. Expecting 50,000 protesters, law enforcement agencies were asked to develop a policing strategy to control large groups, ensure that Seattle 1999 WTO would not reoccur in DC. To make this possible, the agency hired thousands of police officers from nearby cities, scrambling to find funding to pay overtime. Two months prior to the protest, DC Police Chief Charles H. Ramsey expressed concerns about the impact on the department’s annual budget. He warned that, without federal assistance, police “might be forced to patrol a smaller area, restrict delegate’ movement or seek more help from federal law enforcement agencies or the National Guard.”

The Washington Post reported that police jurisdictions approached by the DC Police Department were “reluctant to send officers to Washington because…the District might not be reimbursed for the cost of the extra police protection – and thus might not be able to pay officers from other departments”.

This funding problem was resolved with creative financing; the presidential administration in power at the time proposed that the federal government earmark $15 million from the national budget to cover IMF security costs. While the example of Washington DC 2003 IMF revealed inter-city conflicts, these conflicts can be international. Évian 2003 G8 constitutes an odd case of international tensions over who would pay. At an official level, France organized, planned, and coordinated the summit meeting. The biggest part of the French budget for the summit went on the building of a heli-port for those leaders flying directly to Évian over the Leman Lake (£225,000). However, because of the choice of a location close to the border, Swiss and German police had been involved in the security operations. Switzerland provided 10,000 extra police and soldiers, spending an estimated €16 million. Already the costs for the deployment of the Swiss army added up to €4.3 million Euros. Germany supported the operations with 1,015 police. The total costs of the military operations for the summit amounted to an estimated cost of €4,3 million. Switzerland was also confronted with the costs of damages through clashes that ensued in the nearby city of Geneva and Lausanne, amounting to a sum of several hundred thousand Euros.
A dispute occurred after the summit regarding the political responsibility for the costs, which lasted for several years. Debates over budgets are common during the planning phases for Summit security and even sometimes appear in national newspapers. When observers ask who is going to pay for this, local, regional, and national governments point to each other. The exorbitant cost of securing the Évian meeting triggered a public debate about the appropriateness of G8 summits in general.

Évian 2003 G8 was not the only occasion in which conflicts ensued on who has to pay for this extra police support. For Gleneagles 2005 G8, considerable disputes emerged already before the summit meeting between the Scottish Tayside police, the Scottish government, and the central British government in London. The skirmish involved the payment of the extra police officers and material support requested from the London Metropolitan police and the British army. The dispute was not settled in advance, since the entire cost of the G8-related security operation had not been made clear yet. After the summit meeting, however, the British Ministry of Defense claimed compensation from Tayside for an unpaid bill of nearly £400,000 concerning equipment provided for the policing of two international summits in Scotland (next to the G8 meeting, this was the British-Irish summit). Tayside police passed the responsibility to the Scottish authorities who, in turn, claimed that it the British government was responsible for the G8 summit.

The British government had made its position on supporting local policing costs for major events clear in advance, stating, "There are normal arrangements which apply to the costs of security wherever it is. The costs are dealt with in the normal way. If every time there was an international summit or a major event the security costs were all paid by Whitehall, we’d end up forking out an awful lot of money." Moreover, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Defense stressed that it was not a political conflict between the central government in London and the Scottish government, but a normal bureaucratic procedure based on an agreement between the British army and the Scottish police under the framework of "military aid to civil authorities".

At Heiligendamm 2007 G8, a monetary conflict ensued between the provincial government of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and the federal government, which had initially promised to contribute €22.5 million for the Summit and some of the necessary security operations. It soon turned out, however, that the costs would vastly exceed this contribution. Already the construction of the huge perimeter fence amounted to cost of €12.5 million. In December 2006, the estimated costs of €92 million was made public. The provincial government had to rectify its annual budget for 2006 for about €126 million, €69.5 of which were reserved for the G8 summit. Approximately €10 million in G8-related security operations by federal police for border control and the army was covered by the federal government, but it refused to cover the costs for police forces since police responsibilities are up to the provinces. This way, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania was confronted with the costs for supplemental police officers from other provinces.

As funding for summit security comes out of national and local revenues already strained from other economic needs, the tensions between increasing costs and who pays the bills will likely become more acute. Hopefully, these tensions will provoke intragovernmental and public debate about budgets for securing agendas of global elites and criminalizing dissent.
Political Economy of Social Control

Summit operations are expensive because of their multidimensionality. They include not only crowd control but extensive coordinated and international surveillance operations, extending to border control. They include not only policing, but security of all aspects of the operations. They include not only security but public relations, consultants to develop communication strategies and a subtle physical containment of the media.

Generally, police actions are internal to the nation-state and focused on order maintenance regarding domestic issues. In contrast, military actions are generally external to the nation-state and aim to eliminate and destroy the enemy. Low Intensity Operations (LIO, also called Low Intensity Warfare) describes international military deployments without a declaration of war, and also domestic military deployments. LIO fall short of full-scale warfare, mainly to avoid the appearance of repression. As such, it often involves the use of less-than-lethal weapons, public relations campaigns, and the extensive gathering of intelligence. Moreover, it seeks to intimidate sympathetic observers from joining the targeted social movement.

When we examine its political economy, we discover the institutional makeup and character of the social control of global dissent, finding that it looks less like protest policing and more like a new version of LIO. Lest observers believe that the military involvement is limited to loans of some intimidating equipment and a few advisors, the budgets demonstrate that militaries are fully involved in these operations, which are directed at controlling domestic dissent. A member of the military planning team for 2003 G8 in Kananaskis described the “security methodology” as “pretty aggressive stuff. We [the Canadian security forces] were flying fighter planes en mass. If anybody got anywhere near the meeting, they would have been shot down; same thing with anybody that tried to infiltrate the areas where the leaders were gathering. We made it very clear to everyone that we had soldiers with live weapons.” This LIO also stretches beyond police and military resources to add an assortment of government agencies to the operations.

Summits are microcosms of global governance. Operational and security budgets climbing toward a billion dollars tell us the value of legitimacy of the neoliberal project to its promoters. Localities, regions, and even member nations are increasingly reluctant investors. The struggles over who is ultimately responsible for paying for the security of global events is indicative of the internal contradictions of the neoliberal economic model. Paying the bills also reveals the much-debated uncertainty of the role of the nation state in the context of globalization. Most nation-states still maintain a domestic monopoly of force, and this is why they are useful partners in mounting Summit meetings. Yet nation-states also face the costs of economic globalization, and these costs are crystallized in Summit security, whose budgets contrast rudely with neoliberal contractions of employment and social services while security operations entail an unattractive and contentious surrender of democratic space. Although dissent may not be as popular as some would hope, it’s clear that Summits are not popular.
Chapter 4
Policing of Alterglobalization Dissent

By all reports, it’s a day to wear diapers. We don’t. 3 am. Washington DC. April 2001. Spring joint meeting of the IMF and World Bank. It’s very complicated loading the vans. Our unarrestable jail support team are the only ones carrying their driver’s licenses, so they have to drive. But one is a very nervous driver. And the energy in the van on the way to our dawn position after an all-night meeting, no coffee, and 2 hours of sleep is haphazard and frantic. B and I have the map and we are in the lead van, but we are squeezed in the rearmost seat, which, with the nervous noise, is actually out of the driver’s earshot.

This is the first action after Seattle. We know it will be different. Word on the street yesterday is that they’re going to arrest everyone in sight. No point carrying signs and banners, water, cameras, or backpacks. We’ll lose everything, so just go with necessities in your pockets. I’m relieved that since we’re not anticipating tear-gas, I don’t have a stinky vinegar-soaked kerchief draining out of a ziplock into my jeans. Our legal support is well-prepared. We’re ready. But tension is high in the vans because everyone is worried that we won’t get our moment in the street before getting scooped. We drove two thousand miles to be here. We want to be present, to manifest our rage and dreams by standing in the street for at least a few minutes before the police ritual enfolds us.

As we drive through the deserted streets, 20 overly alert people shriek at every shadow. Phantasmatic police come at us at every intersection. B and I are trying to navigate from the floor of the van, where the flashlight won’t be seen from outside. Periodically someone yells “duck” and bodies crash down on us. We have to start over figuring out where we are on the map. Finally we breathe relief. We’re on a wide road with a straight shot at our destination.

“Cop car! Turn right.” Someone shrieks. Our driver meekly respond “But it’s a bridge”. “Doesn’t matter. Get us out of here!” We peek out the window, then get back down to the map. Shit, now we’re in Maryland. We have to turn around and go back. “Don’t make any illegal turns.” Our driver nears collapse. Everyone is shouting at her. She finally maneuvers us through a Marriott Hotel valet zone and back across the bridge. Now we’re within about a mile, on another straightaway. “Stop screaming at the driver.” The energy calms. She can do it. It’s just a little further. Then, ahead of us, two cruisers, parked on opposite sides of the wide boulevard. Doom. We’re so near the zone now, kids in a van. They’ll snatch us for sure. “Turn!”

“Pull in here!” “Everybody out!” “Behind the dumpster!” Suddenly the two ex-marines in our group have taken command. “Get the vans out of here.” “Go!
Go!” They send the drivers away. Great, now we’re behind a dumpster in an alley a mile from our location where people are waiting for us, the vans are gone, AND we’ll have to cross the street with the cruisers to get there. The marines organize us two by two and release us at 100’ intervals. They take the front. S & I take the rear. We have the group’s one cell phone, so we can report arrests to legal. We watch the pair in front of us make it across the boulevard and into the darkness on the other side. Our turn. We’re so obvious. I’m shaking hard as we cross that street. We make it to the other side and I look back at the cruisers just as a cop comes out of a store, moving gingerly towards his car carrying a 6-pack of coffees and a big box of donuts.

In this chapter and the next we work to expand the conceptualization of protest policing. We begin with a brief review of the literature. Then we present a thorough inventory of policing, including and beyond the streetscape. In the next chapter we move to an empirically grounded analysis of the effects of these police tactics, presenting a series of theoretical interventions which grasp the significance of police actions with regard to social movements.

As Earl points out, studies of protest policing alternately try to explain repression (treating it as the dependent variable) or try to explain movement resiliency (using repression as an independent variable). Earl herself prefers to examine dynamics of repression: the institutional positions of repressive agent (private or state agents, categorized according to tightness of linkage with and control by national political elites), the character of repressive action (coercion or channeling); observable or unobserved police action (not synonymous with covert and overt). Similarly, Wilson focuses on dynamics of criminalization of dissent: completeness, severity, and extensiveness.

Some scholars focus on what we think of as the “supply-side” dynamics of repression (how repression produces itself). In this vein, della Porta & Reiter identify police strategies: coercion (violent? preemptive?); persuasion/negotiation; cooperation/collaboration; information gathering and use as weapon; selectivity (different policing for different groups – soft/tolerant to aggressive); political opportunity structures (political, institutional and cultural); police knowledge/ images/ perception of protest issue and protesters (good/bad etc); police view of their own role in society; and external forces (civil rights and law-and-order coalitions). PAJ Waddington focuses on the troubles of repression for the police themselves: “on the job trouble” (risky or dangerous operations); “in the job trouble” in which the reputation of the police is at risk due to bad press or investigations (this explains police motivations for negotiation); “die in a ditch” situations in which the police will risk both kinds of trouble.

Other scholars focus on what we think of as “demand-side” dynamics, seeking the explanation for repression in the actions of protesters. Earl summarizes the variables used in these studies: the degree to which the movement threatens political elites; movement weakness; media coverage protecting movement; political opportunity cycle; volatility or stability of political opportunity structure. Wilson also identifies variables which could be used to study how movements’ own character influences repression: attitudes, mobilization, goals, and organizations.

The diverse approaches of these studies is further complicated by the complexity of each variable. Even the seemingly straightforward variables used by scholars may be more delicate than they appear. How should the severity of various police actions be
measured? Earl has pointed out that arrests may have been underestimated as less severe than police violence, and Gary Marx' extensive work on surveillance has shown it to be as incapacitating as any other form of repression, despite a lack of force or even direct interaction.

A common recognition of the literature is that sometimes repression has a "backlash" effect, spurring increased mobilization. This is often the case in response to police violence, however, this effect is hard to track. Earl’s study shows that the effect of repression depends on timing and the phase of a social mobilization. Opp and Roehl observe a "micromobilization" response to repression and find some movement-side variables associated with increased likelihood of such backlash mobilizations. But the literature on surveillance – owing much to the prolific Marx – shows its consistently isolating and divisive impacts.

Donatella della Porta has gathered scholars for two important edited volumes on policing of protest, the first just prior to the emergence of the alterglobalization movement (although after the emergence of the Autonomen in Europe) and the second somewhat after the emergence of alterglobalization. The earlier volume happily determined that negotiation had for the most part replaced escalated force in Western Europe and the US. This shift was accomplished by three growing tactics: "underenforcement of the law, the search to negotiate, and large-scale collection of information." The variables identified to explain protest policing were: political opportunities (police institutions, state political context, and political culture), civil rights or law-and-order coalitions, and police knowledge (ideas and images about protesters). In summarizing the findings, della Porta, Peterson, and Reiter conclude:

The dominant protest policing style in Europe is selective, that is, different police styles are used for different actors. In this way, "brutal" and repressive styles have survived. These styles are connected with the same kind of stereotypes about professional disturbers of the peace, conspirators, and so on, as before. The difference today is that these stereotypes and protest policing styles are now applied only to a small minority among the protesters, whereas historically they were used against large sections of the population, such as the members and associations of the working-class movement. It is this kind of continuity in the role of the police, in the range of options theoretically open to them, and in the mechanisms with which they individuate and label "dangerous" enemies that makes arrest or reversal of the trend toward "softer" and more tolerant protest policing styles a possibility.

Eight years later, della Porta et. al., ed., assert that policing of the alterglobalization movement involves "new strategies [that] challenge social scientists' approaches to protest policing." The 2006 volume addresses two questions: Whether the escalated force model been reimplemented or, instead, if "a new repressive protest policing style" has been developed? And was the negotiated model ever really in ascendance or was its use always selective? On these questions, the volume is far less consensual than the earlier one, with some authors arguing for novel policing strategy and others that alterglobalization policing used existing elements of "emergency" policing as well as negotiation – its oddities connected more to variables of police knowledge and disorganization within police institutions. The 2006
study reconfirms 1998 findings that “the massive use of intelligence” is “legitimized as an alternative to brutal intervention on the street.”

Most striking to us in this volume was Peterson’s description of Copenhagen police chief Kai Vittrup’s strategy, which involves an offensive paramilitary plan designed to “maintain the initiative during the summit, determining the time and place for the anticipated events and controlling their development” with a combination of the “tactic of exhaustion” and negotiation under contrived and theatrical conditions. Peterson notes that both in Denmark and Sweden police sought to “undermine... nonviolent civil disobedience actions.” We are convinced by this chapter’s answer to the volume’s question: There has been a shift to pre-emptive policing, selective to be sure, but not reserved for violent or extremist activists. We note that the shocking “Miami Model” is, in fact, the Vittrup model.

The 2006 della Porta, Peterson, and Reiter volume identifies some additional important findings with regard to policing alterglobalization. First, the transnational nature of the protest has led to momentary reversals of global integration, such as the closure of borders, violating the EU Schengen agreement to abandon internal border controls. Second, the multilayered police agencies, including multiple local agencies (mobilized to increase the size of the force, but not always willing to act under joint command) as well as various national and even foreign agencies, have difficulty agreeing upon strategy and also coordinating or even operating together in a hierarchical command structure. At Seattle 1999 WTO, Göteborg 2001 EU, Genoa 2001 G8, and Miami 2003 FTAA this caused severe police disorder. Third, the direct action communities are not recognized by police as a “political subject” (instead persistently treated as a “public order problem”) and may, indeed, refuse to collaborate with the negotiated model of policing. The police (and state) refusal to recognize certain protesters as “political” affects relations with the moderate and cooperative sectors of the alterglobalization movement as well. (Another possible interpretation is that alterglobalization is rejected as a political subject ideologically and its tactics are used as an excuse to delegitimize it.) As Peterson points out, in the case of Danish and Swedish police, nonviolent direct action itself was a source of significant concern for the police, and they sought to preempt its occurrence through raids and Vittrup’s “tactic of exhaustion”.

Della Porta et. al. imply that alterglobalization protest needs more specialized policing. They argue that the models used by the Genoa police at the 2001 G8 (based on tactics for other “emergencies” like football riots, Mafia/organized crime activities, and terrorism) were inappropriate. In her chapter, Peterson adds to the concern with inappropriate policing, particularly officers’ unfamiliarity with chain of command operations, having been trained to work alone or in small teams. Noakes and Gillham determine that neither “escalated force” nor “negotiation” fully capture what is going on. Instead, “rearrangement”, detention, and disruption are used to accomplish “strategic incapacitation”, particularly of protesters who are “transgressive” (refusing negotiation and predictable forms of protest). Della Porta & Reiter also discuss the incompleteness of active reforms within police institutions that are presumed independent of alterglobalization; these are democratization and militarization.

These scholars agree that police riots occur as a combination of police unpreparedness and disorganization, demonization of “bad protesters”, and aspects of police culture and psychology (fear and/or the rush of attack) which whip them into unplanned and undirected violence. We must wonder, however, just how
unplanned/unintentional such violence can be when police are armed with paramilitary gear and deployed in military formations. This volume relies on a presumption we find doubtful – that riots are undesirable for both sides.

Alongside della Porta and Reiter’s efforts, a great deal of the research conducted to date about social control of the alterglobalization movement has been done by legal collectives, activists, and sympathetic nonacademic observers. The US National Lawyers Guild compiled a multi-event analysis and concluded that the negotiated model has shifted to a preemptive model focused on blocking access, intimidating activists, broadscale [illegal] searches, raids and mass arrests, etc, and confiscation or incapacitation of protest resources.

We organize our inventory of police tactics in five arenas: regulatory and legislative dimensions of policing, intelligence, event policing, criminal prosecution, and transnationalization. Tactics implemented in these areas also overlap.

Regulatory and Legislative Dimensions of Policing

The very meaning and significance of “negotiation” has changed as cities have developed regulatory mechanisms to preemptively to control protest. In advance of protests, city governments have used legislative and bureaucratic mechanisms to reduce or restrict Constitutionally-protected political activity and speech. As activists prepare for a protest, they receive word that wooden sticks or bike locks have been defined as “illegal” during the protest period. They will not be able to get within X km of the meeting site. The city has assembled and budgeted for tens of thousands of police and is prepared to arrest and detain thousands of demonstrators. The city communicates that its law and law enforcement context is not only aggressive, but volatile. If we imagine the law as the ground beneath the feet of a democratic society, the behavior of cities in advance of a protest is a series of tremors, inducing anxiety and uncertainty. Anything could happen.

As discussed in the geography chapter, city governments work with global governance agencies and with the police to define and build “security perimeters”. Massive metal walls distort the geography of the city, sometimes dissecting neighborhoods. Residents are required to carry pass cards. Parts of the city become off-limits to all but “official”, credentialed participants in summits. Hotels and businesses are forced to close, tourists’ access and movements are limited. The erection of fences around perimeters is a profound and questionable act of governance.

Another regulatory tactic is the passage of city ordinances directed at a specific protest. In advance of Miami 2003 FTAA, the Miami City Council defined two or more persons moving down the street as a “parade” and eight or more gathered outside a structure for more than 30 minutes as an “illegal assembly”. For Heiligendamm 2007 G8, a “General Directive” prohibited protesting in the zone immediately outside the fence. Ordinances also restrict protest materials and defensive equipment, such as gas masks. By limiting the diameter and materials of sign support sticks, such an ordinance illegalizes most puppets, which require strong supports, and some lockdown equipment. At Heiligendamm 2007 G8 even the maximum lengths of front banners (carried perpendicular to the direction of march) was restricted, and side banners (carried along the edges of the march in parallel with its direction) were entirely forbidden. During a related demonstration in Hamburg, the police conditions for permitting a big demonstration of several thousand people even included a prohibition of jumping.
Miami removed the special “parade” FTAA ordinance (section 54-6.1) from the books promptly following the event (indeed the ordinance itself included a schedule to sunset on November 27, 6 days after the FTAA meetings ended), but some restrictive ordinances have no expiration and can result in new limitations on local protest activity long after the protest is over. Moreover, the experiences of summit protests may lead to new ordinances, such as after Göteborg 2001 EU when Swedish authorities quickly introduced a ban on masking during political assemblies. After Heiligendamm 2007 G8, German authorities tried to include face makeup as used by the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army in the prohibition on masking during demonstration.

Old laws may be resurrected. At New York City 2002 WEF the city threatened to charge masked protesters under an 1845 law “originally adopted to thwart armed insurrections by Hudson Valley tenant farmers who dressed and painted themselves as Native Americans to attack law enforcement officers over rent issues”. The law has been intermittently resurrected to criminalize queers (1965), the KKK (2001), and alterglobalization protesters (2002).

Through the permitting process, police collaborate with the city government bureaucracy in systematically restraining lawful protest by restricting use of public space for rallies and marches. Preparing for New York City 2004 RNC, United for Peace and Justice (UFPJ) requested a permit to use the Great Lawn of Central Park, a traditional place for large political gatherings. The city denied the permit and tried to force UFPJ to use a distant highway instead. Sometimes the normal role of the local government is superceded entirely. The special police departments created in Germany for Heiligendamm 2007 G8 and Strasbourg 2009 NATO were given temporary authority over legal issues concerning political assemblies. These special agencies take over the authority to allow and forbid demonstrations which is normally done by the “versammlungsbehoerde” (the “assembly office” of the city or region). This development shows not only the manipulation of law to control protest, but also the suspension of civil authority in favor of police authority.

Permitting may also require social movement organizations to pay for insurance, portable toilets, garbage cans, and to take responsibility for behavior of people who join the protest. Protest organizers may have to provide their own police (called “marshals” in the US) who patrol the edge of the march route and confront straying participants. (For example, if the march only has a permit to close one lane of traffic, the marshals, rather than local police, may be responsible, for keeping marchers confined.) Often permits define “protest areas” or “pits” (already discussed in the chapter on geography). Since the permit covers only these areas, stragglers or those reluctant to enter the caged zone are not protected by the terms of the negotiation for a protest or rally. Consistent with the agreement, those outside will be hassled, dispersed, or herded into the protest pits and held there by heavy forces at the rear. Such state “structuring of protest” forces activists to choose between utterly impotent permitted activities and more transgressive ones. Permit-holders, entering a contract with the state, then try to control other groups, which creates problems in alliances. Several times, this has resulted in major frictions and mutual accusations amongst groups of protesters. At the opening demonstration of the L’Aquila 2009 G8, one of us observed how the demonstration organizers physically attacked a group of black-clad protesters who insisted on continuing the demonstration after the police had blocked the march. These kind of incidents influence future cooperation between groups.
Another civic action is the preparation of detention facilities. At Philadelphia 2000 RNC, a derelict jail was “reopened” to house protesters. At Genoa 2001 G8, the Bolzaneto military barrack was used as detention facility, and at Heiligendamm 2007 G8 various state buildings including youth prisons were emptied to detain arrested summit protesters. Other cities construct holding facilities or arrange for the use of stadiums. In press releases the city announces its capacity and willingness to engage in mass incarceration of protesters.

Intelligence

One of the most significant scholarly studies on surveillance is David Cunningham’s study of memos from the United States’ Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO). From 1956-1971 counterintelligence missions designed to “expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize” various political organizations were official FBI policy. However, the “normal” intelligence activities of the agency before, during, and after the official program included much of the same activity, with very similar effects on targets. Histories of surveillance, police action, and incarceration of political prisoners clearly reveal the violence of the state against political activists. But COINTELPRO was explicitly organized to disrupt political organizations associated with several social movements. The FBI’s unit of analysis was the movement. And they used a range of tactics calculated to have psychological and social effects to meet their goals of “neutralizing” targeted movements.

State surveillance inhabits a shadowy realm of public affairs, often secret and barely legal. Cunningham explains that intelligence operations can serve two goals, investigation of federal crimes and (the more controversial) precautionary monitoring through information-gathering about organizations. Counterintelligence operations may have a preventative goal, to “actively restrict a target’s ability to carry out planned actions”, or may take the form of provocation for the purpose of entrapment of targets in criminal acts. Some of the “normal intelligence” activities undertaken by the FBI outside of official COINTELPRO which nevertheless have a preventative counterintelligence function are: harassment by surveillance and/or purportedly criminal investigations, pressured recruitment of informants, infiltration, break-ins, and labeling or databasing which harms the group’s reputation impacting its ability to communicate with the media, draw new members, and raise funds, “exacerbating a climate in which seemingly all mainstream institutions opposed the New Left in some way.” Infiltrators acting as agents provocateurs is, inexplicably, part of normal intelligence operations.

However, surveillance –certainly in the case of social movements resisting corporate globalization– can also be organized by non-state actors, in this case multinational corporations. A case that only became public a few years afterwards was the corporate infiltration of local ATTAC groups and an antirepression group in Lausanne, both in the context of the Évian 2003 G8. ATTAC (an organization focusing on awareness-raising and public education using non-violent methods for often symbolic street interventions), along with many other groups, was campaigning against Nestlé because of its involvement with biotechnology. John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton document a number of cases of corporate infiltration of social movement groups. Corporate social control is even more difficult to investigate than state’s
involvement because corporations are not legally accountable to citizens. We will focus here on the organization of surveillance by state and interstate agencies.

Since associations and social movements work for decades, they have interests separate from their participants’. Previous literature shows that knowledge (or fear) of surveillance and infiltration forces organizations to direct their energies toward defensive maintenance and away from the pursuit of broader goals.\(^1\)\(^\text{89}\) Alternately, activists may respond by turning from overt collective forms of dissent toward more covert, individualistic forms of dissent\(^1\)\(^\text{90}\) or to forging more militant, even violent, factions.\(^1\)\(^\text{91}\) Organizations’ funding, relationships with other groups, the press, and the public may be affected as well.

Researching surveillance of alterglobalization and anti-war groups in the US in 2006, we were surprised to find the surveillance comparable to previous eras in its inclusion of non-violent targets.\(^1\)\(^\text{92}\) However, as Cunningham has documented, the lack of criminal standard or test is nothing new. And Donner traces the recent history of “terrorist” accusations against pacifist organizations to the early 1980s targeting of anti-nuclear, anti-death penalty, and Latin American solidarity organizations.\(^1\)\(^\text{93}\) This targeting was performed by local police as well as federal agencies. Disruptive, counterinsurgent activity against organizations which have not met a criminal standard, was officially forsworn with the closure of COINTELPRO. Yet the same activity is now undertaken by a network of law enforcement organizations.

So surveillance is more than “police knowledge”\(^1\)\(^\text{94}\); it is a policing tactic. Technologies of surveillance include: Direct surveillance such as observation and visits by officers, writing down automobile plate numbers, raids, questioning, and burglary; electronic surveillance such as phone, audio eavesdropping, email, web, computer, video, photo, and car tracking devices; undercover surveillance includes police in disguise, informants, infiltrators, and agents provocateurs; databasing and the sharing of databased information.

It is inaccurate to categorize direct and indirect technologies solely into categories as overt and covert methods of observation as most of these technologies can be employed either way as part of a counterinsurgency strategy. The exceptions are raids, which cannot be done covertly, and long-term infiltrators and agents provocateurs who must remain covert so as not to be expelled. But most of the other technologies can be used either way. For example, telephone surveillance can be conducted seamlessly, without alerting the surveilled person, or it can be conducted obviously in order to signal the surveilled person that they are under surveillance (sounds on the line, disruption of service, purportedly inadvertent playback of tapes on the line, etc.). “Clumsy” operations suggest to activists that law enforcement officers intend for them to be aware that they are under surveillance. This dimension is part of the counterinsurgent function of surveillance. However, even the overt revelation of long-term infiltrators can be useful counterinsurgency as it disrupts trusted relationships and decreases communication in networks.

Overt direct surveillance is a threat similar to brandishing weaponry and functions as an immediate discouragement to protesters. People arriving at a meeting may be surprised and alarmed to find a watchful police presence outside. This watchfulness may take the form of an around-the-clock guard or frequent visible drive-bys. People arriving at a protest may be unsettled to find pervasive videotaping of the crowds. People playing roles of increased responsibility, such as speaking at rallies or
working as marshals or medics find themselves focused on for close-up surveillance
photography or video.

The threat has different significance for various people. People planning to
engage in grey area activity may be discouraged from doing so, knowing they can be
identified on videotape, or are forced to protect themselves better. First time protesters
may be concerned that their employers or others will find out about their political
activities. People attending meetings may question the reputation of the group with
whom they are meeting. People may feel more vulnerable taking a visible role in
organizing.

Around major protests, overt and constant surveillance is common near activist
spaces, such as sleeping and eating spaces, medical centers, educational events, art
workshops, and meeting and organizing spaces. (Activists often organize a central
meeting space, where decision-making “spokescouncils” are held; this has often been
called “the Convergence Center”.) At Sacramento 2003 Biotech, anticipating a
spokescouncil meeting, several officers stood on the sidewalk near the door, so that
activists had to carefully move around them to enter the meeting. (Circumnavigating
officers on a sidewalk is not trivial matter as activists have been charged with felony
assault on an officer for jostling or brushing against them, losing a shoe during arrest,
and other inadvertent physical contact.) Meanwhile, several police vehicles were
stationed directly across the street. Once the meeting started the police trained a
vehicle-mounted searchlight onto the building. At such short range, this powerful light
was a striking intrusion into the space. Persons approaching the door to enter the
meeting found themselves spotlighted. The light also shone through the windows, eerily
illuminating the meeting space. Accompanied by a helicopter hovering over the
building and circling patrol car sirens, participants felt a sense of impending assault on
the building. The 300 activists in the room became jumpy and restless and had difficulty
concentrating. Many people left, as each wave of rumours was circulated and
quelled. There was no raid, but the meeting was made ineffectual. Meanwhile a few
blocks away at the “Welcome Center” (a small warehouse with a media center and an
information table) volunteers continued to compile a long list of all the different kinds of
vehicles doing drive-bys to their facility. Helicopters circle overhead while cars,
motorcycles, and vans crawl by at all hours.

At Heiligendamm 2007 G8, police mobilized a new form of militarized
surveillance. Tornado planes of the German army flew patrol flights (allegedly without
bombing equipment) above the action camp in Reddelich and the region around the
fence in order to take pictures. Whereas the first flights preceding the protests went
unnoticed, the flight on the day before the blockades shocked the entire movement.
One of us was just giving an interview together with an elder activist about the historical
development of action repertoires of social movements in Germany and their use of
violence versus the violence of the state. The elder activist just had pointed out how the
state was establishing a threatening state of emergency in order to criminalize dissent,
when the Tornado crossed above our heads making an incredible noise (apparently
the plane was flying below the legally required minimum height of 150 meters).
Interrupting the interview, the camera immediately swung up to catch the Tornado.
After it had passed, the elder activist smiled and said: “You see, this is what I am talking
about.” According to the authorities, the pictures taken were intended to detect
transformations of the ground and potential depots of explosives. However, pictures
taken by the plane and released to the public after the protests seemed focused on persons and vehicles in the camp.

Electronic surveillance is very easy for law enforcement to implement. They can join listserves and view websites to gather information on events, meetings, and plans. They can automatically trawl the internet and intercept satellite-based communications (ECHELON). They can remote access personal computers of targets. Not much is known about exactly how governments are using these technologies, and how often they secure warrants for use. In Europe, the extent to which electronic surveillance is used only became apparent by studying the dossiers of the criminal investigation police in the case of the “Militante Gruppe” (militant group). Lawyers had requested access to the dossiers of a number of persons faced with a trial under the antiterrorist legislation Article 129a. By tapping the email communication of only a few persons, intelligence services and the criminal investigation police actually had collected the mails of several hundred activists (those who communicated with the tapped persons either personally or by mailing lists). These operations also can take either an invisible or clumsy posture. Interviewees reported to us that in meetings with local police departments agents have announced “we read your email.” Another clumsy form of computer monitoring with counterinsurgent impacts is theft of activists’ laptops.

The partner of Andrej Holm told an insightful anecdote during the 2007 Chaos Computer Club Conference about the period after the arrest of her partner under terrorist charges. In the weeks after Andrej’s arrest, she did not dare to switch her cell phone off anymore because this could have been interpreted as suspicious behavior aimed at avoiding surveillance. However, because her cell phone was indeed being intercepted, it interfered with the television. The noise caused made it practically impossible to watch television anymore. One evening, when she felt like watching one of her favorite television series, she decided to phone her mother to make clear to the intelligence services –tapping the conversation– that she was going to switch her cell phone off in order to be able to watch the show. The unexpected outcome of this phone call was that the interference between phone and television stopped for a few hours without her the cell phone being switched off.195

In the U.S., the alterglobalization movement has experienced extensive undercover surveillance. Some believe that aspects of movement culture, such as anonymity and use of pseudonyms, facilitates undercover operations. However movements with different cultures, such as the Black Panther movement, suffered the same kinds of infiltration. A number of long-term infiltrators have been identified, some through their roles as witnesses in prosecution in the 2006 Green Scare. Some of these have lived in “activist houses”, compiling data and at times attempting to provoke militant actions. One affinity group at Philadelphia 2000 RNC learned their van driver to be an infiltrator when he drove them into a police blockade, where all on board were arrested.196 In Europe, long-term infiltration seems to be more difficult, or is simply not yet discovered. What is well known, however, is that intelligence services try to recruit informants. These attempts only become known when activists refuse to cooperate and make public the invitation they received. In the case of Heiligendamm 2007 G8 and Strasbourg 2009 NATO several of such attempts became public, and activists discovered one case of successful recruitment.

Undercovers also join short-term actions, such as non-violent civil disobedience actions. Meetings and rallies are rife with surprisingly poorly-disguised police officers.
Infiltration has become so pervasive that activists now assume that most meetings are infiltrated. Given the other kinds of surveillance easily available to police, activists wonder why they engage in elaborate (but still clumsy) surveillance of non-violent events. Groups and actions are infiltrated which—if the police actually have any prior intelligence on the action planning— they surely have no basis for suspecting of violence or property crime. Activists, sure that no information-gathering purpose could be served, conclude that the infiltration serves the specific counterinsurgent purpose of disrupting the bonds of trust among groups. But some activists recommend that it enhances the moral authority of the movement since police, having observed the planning sessions, know well that the actions are designed to be entirely pacific.

In early 2006 in the US a series of indictments and investigations of environmental activism began. The resulting prosecutions, dubbed “the Green Scare”, include electronic surveillance and long-term infiltrators. Moreover they utilize another surveillance technology, Grand Juries, which gather information secretly and under duress from entire communities. Communities know who has testified, but they do not know what has been said (because Grand Juries are not open court proceedings). They also know that testimony is exacted under threat of jail time and that witnesses do not have recourse to the 5th amendment to remain silent. (If they refuse to speak, they can be imprisoned.) Grand juries are a form of community surveillance which has the counterinsurgent impact of disrupting networks of trust and solidarity. By isolating and threatening individuals, grand juries pit them against their communities. Anticipating but never knowing about the next group of witnesses to be called, communities preemptively freeze information and action.

Another form of surveillance is raids or house visits. Purportedly with the intention of acquiring information, a police team will visit a home or office. They may or may not have a search warrant. They may be heavily armed. They attempt to search the premises and question those present, using threats and bribery to gain cooperation when acting without a warrant. A couple of months prior to the New York City 2004 Republican National Convention (RNC), multiagency forces visited several activist houses in the midwest US in riot gear but without warrants, accusing residents of planning violence at the RNC. News of the visits spread quickly through activist circles. These raids were a first strike against RNC protesters, before much planning had even taken place, sending the message that protest would not be tolerated. Raids and 8 arrests took place in Minneapolis in advance of Minneapolis 2008 RNC, charging activists with “conspiracy to riot in furtherance of terrorism”. In advance of Heiligendamm 2007 G8, federal police searched 40 houses, social centers, and activist projects in several German cities. Computers, address books, and genetic materials were confiscated. The victims were accused of “formation of a terrorist organization” under Article 129a of the German Criminal Code.

But counterinsurgency is not only intelligence. Information is gathered and stored. Surveillance databases have expanded qualitatively with the digitization of information and increased interagency collaboration. Law Enforcement Intelligence Units (LEIU) facilitate direct and international (US, Canada, Australia, South Africa) interagency collaboration and database sharing. In the EU, there are increasing attempts to establish a fully unified and shared database of “political troublemakers” (although the commission working on this has not so far agreed on a definition of this category). Moreover, the automatic exchange of collected data (such as flight details) between the U.S. and the EU has been implemented in the context of antiterrorist...
legislation. In conjunction with the qualitative expansion of databasing, categories are being wielded which collapse politics, crime, and violence. These include the application of categories such as “domestic terrorism”, “criminal extremism”, and “eco-terrorism” to political organizations and their members, including pacific organizations such as the Quaker American Friends Service Committee. A 2003 conference of the LEIU in Seattle attracted protesters seeking to expose its private (but federally funded) “network” nature, its data-collection on non-criminal activities (such as protest) and its low intelligence standards.199

Video and photo surveillance is omnipresent at rallies and public events. Some of this visual material is used in court cases when activists are prosecuted. Some goes into databases. The collection of this material is alarming because it creates a criminal accusation and record associated with protesting. It is of notable concern to youth, immigrants, and others who may be concerned about their criminal records, and decreases their comfort expressing dissent.

Event Policing

While traditional approaches to protest policing focus on the battle in the streets, today’s strategies include legislation and public relations. Police promote these activities as part of a “model” of protest policing inseparable from what happens – and doesn’t happen – in the streets. Nevertheless in this section we will focus on law enforcement agency actions in the streets, where an array of policing tactics are used in seemingly erratic combinations.

According to the Vittrup strategy of “exhaustion”, in the days and hours immediately prior to the protest, individual activists and small groups are stopped, questioned, detained, and searched without probable cause. This communicates pervasive, saturated policing. Activist spaces receive inordinately punctilious fire inspections. On various pretexts (including building code violations discovered without the aid of the relevant regulatory agencies), police surround organizing spaces, cut off entry and egress, arrest those inside, and confiscate art and educational materials. At Genoa 2001 G8 masked police raided a media center and a sleeping place, beatings activists they found there. More than 60 people were hospitalized, 3 in comas. Activists fear raids because they feel vulnerable to be trapped by police inside a building with no hope of media witness and also because they don’t want to miss the political events they are preparing for. Threat of raids builds tension and a sense of constraint before the protest has begun. Activists get the sense that moving around or even having a meeting is going to be difficult. But face-to-face meetings are essential for multiple reasons: to evade electronic surveillance, to verify and authenticate information and plans, and because people may be working together for the first time and need a lot of bandwidth to build relationships quickly.

Only part of protest policing is physical control. The police spend a great deal of effort on performative activities designed to intimidate dissenters and distract or divert mobilized groups from completing their plans. Groups of police in extreme militarized costume and posture, “patrol” the neighborhoods in which activists are meeting and organizing. At Sacramento 2003 Biotech large SUVs were mounted with runners, on which 3-8 riot-gear-clad cops would ride, combat-ready, as the vehicles slowly circled the residential neighborhood where activists were organizing. Police will often choose the moment of a large meeting at Convergence to mass a large force nearby. Activist
watchers observe this massing and as the information is passed on, rumors of an impending raid disrupt and redirect energy. (Entry, exit, and business at Convergence is regularly disrupted by the building’s own security team vigilantly “locking down” the building in anticipation of police visits.) Even when there is no action going on (but often when a meeting is underway) police assemble tens of vehicles and rush around the area with all sirens blaring, implying immanent action (“siren parades”).

At Los Angeles 2000 DNC, the activist legal team won a rare injunction against raids on the convergence center. But given the instability of the protest legal landscape, activists had little confidence that this injunction would hold, so the space was still vulnerable to siren parades, massing reports, and rumors, leading to waves of fear and security lockdowns every few hours.

Once people have assembled in the streets, police use several strategies to disrupt activity. They declare assemblies illegal, even in locations and at times which have been pre-negotiated as permitted “protest areas”. Protesters are often perplexed by the lack of any immediate pretext for voiding negotiated agreements. Having declared an assembly illegal, police then threaten or engage in mass arrest or violence. At a demonstration of 10,000 people during Heiligendamm 2007 G8, protesters were prevented from participating in the permitted march before even leaving the gathering place. Police provided unreasonable reasons such as the number of people would exceed the number that was mentioned in the permit and that protesters were masked (which was disconfirmed by video recordings and observers). The march started only after several hours of waiting and was not allowed to follow the initially agreed-upon route.

Police are supposed to issue an audible “dispersal order” and give time for people to disperse before taking action against an assembly. However, it is common that the order is not given, or it is not audible, or even if it is both given and audible that inadequate time is given for dispersal. A striking example of this was when the police abruptly curtailed a rally in the protest pen at the Los Angeles 2000 DNC. They issued a dispersal order, but the pen’s one exit was laced with a concrete traffic blocks. Rally attendees were shot in the back with rubber bullets while attempting to disperse around the blocks. Likewise at Miami 2003 FTAA, a rally at the courthouse was issued an inadequate 3-minute dispersal order and then immediately surrounded and mass arrested. At New York City 2004 RNC, police used nets to capture hundreds of people who were subsequently arrested. Police use their bodies, shoulder-to-shoulder in riot gear, holding supersized nightsticks or bicycles as dual-purpose moveable fence and battering instruments.

The mass surround-and-arrest tactic often results in the arrest of passersby, people coming out of work onto the sidewalk, journalists, and delivery workers. Mass arrests are often disorganized, infuriating observers and people trying to disperse. Moreover, they are often incapable of producing convictable charges and therefore serve primarily to detain activists so that they cannot engage in protest for some hours or days and secondarily to gratuitously endanger them so as to discourage them from future dissenting activity.

Political arrestees—the vast majority of whom are arrested for non-arrestible crimes—are often held in unusual and illegal conditions. Protesters are deprived of legal rights to counsel, same-sex searches, phone calls, bathrooms, blankets, heat, beds, timely arraignment and release, and standard bonds. They are also subject to cruel and unusual punishment, such as denial of medical care, excessively tight handcuffs,
beatings in custody, being held at gunpoint (particularly unwarranted for U.S. protesters, who are never charged with violent crimes), sexual abuse, and death threats. At Miami 2003 FTAA a large number of arrestees were pepper sprayed at close range, then arrested and detained in confined spaces, without any chance for recovering and cleaning eyes and faces. Political arrestees are also often held in unusual facilities which are unsafe, exposed, condemned, or otherwise inappropriate. NYC 2004 RNC arrestees were held in a set of cages erected in a building with extensive toxic residue. At Heiligendamm 2007 G8, hundreds of protesters were kept for hours, sometimes days, in cages used for up to twenty protesters in a provisional detention facility. The conditions included constant surveillance with camera, constant light, no contact with lawyers, and only a thin mat and blanket to sleep on the floor.

The day prior to the Miami 2003 FTAA courthouse mass arrest, despite the non-appearance of any “terrorist”, no breaches of the fence, no roadways having been blocked that were not preemptively closed by police, and no window breaking or other property crime, at 3:53 pm activists remaining in the streets after the end of a union-sponsored march were told by a police representative with a bullhorn that the demonstration could continue “until there is violence”. Just under seven uneventful minutes later, a wall of police moved on the protest, firing rubber bullets and tear gas and proceeded to hunt protesters indiscriminately and violently for over 30 blocks on a path well away from the Summit site. They systematically drove protesters into the Overtown neighborhood, where residents told protesters that they had been encouraged by police to rob protesters with impunity.

Permitted and pacifist demos are regularly attacked. This was particularly noticeable in Genoa 2001 G8:

Saturday. An enormous peaceful march of 150,000 people...For around ten minutes the police, seemingly without any aim or reason, fired canister after canister into the crowd. A crowd that was not even heading towards them. Until then....People were raising their hands in the air....Soon protesters were throwing the tear gas back at the police...Those most angry with the gassing moved to the front and began to fight back.” This clearly shows the falsity of the idea that militant sections of the crowd ‘provoke’ the violence of the police and that if only we were all pacifists then the police would leave us alone. It is a ridiculous presumption in a way to believe that we can ‘decide’ how the police will react to us. We had ensured we were going to get a violent response by gathering in the streets in such large numbers and announcing our intention to get inside the Red Zone. This is a provocative and confrontational stance to take, whether or not you are throwing molotov cocktails. Then the black block get all the blame for the violence on account of being the only people actually prepared for the violence that the entire demonstration has inevitably provoked...The police respond to the level of violence you threaten and to your effectiveness. If you are ineffective but violent, you will probably get a response from the police, if you are ineffective and non-violent then you will probably not get much response from the police, but if you begin to be effective, whether you are using violence or not, then you will be met with a violent response.”

Police action is often indiscriminate, but sometimes targeted. Targeted groups are followed by helicopter wherever they go and are frequently surrounded,
questioned, harassed, and arrested. The police also attack preemptively groups from whom they expect confrontation in order to control the time and place of the conflict. “The attack was clearly pre-planned and designed to make things kick off well away from the Red Zone.”

In addition, police target well-known organizers and people with easily-identified infrastructure functions (people doing communications, medics, folks supplying music or water, clever people with bullhorns who are helping to keep spirits up). These people are more likely to be picked off for arrest or shot at. “Snatch” arrests may also be arbitrary. (A tight phalanx will rush a crowd and extract one undistinguished person). At Philadelphia RNC 2000, housing activist Camilo Viveiros was subject to an extraordinary assault by Chief of Police Timoney who then charged Camilo with assault and other crimes carrying a total of a 30 year sentence. Despite the fact that Timoney couldn’t tell a consistent story in court, the framing and fabrication of evidence against Camilo was not resolved until 2004. Such arbitrary targeting instills terror. (Of course, such tactics also enrage and politicize both activists and observers.)

There is some evidence in the US that police may also introduce the possibility of violence indirectly, by encouraging opposing groups to attend protests. In the US a number of groups we interviewed described the appearance of counterprotesters or opponents at events, which had not been announced to the public. This method is reminiscent of third world governments’ uses of paramilitaries or local elites’ private armies to suppress rival political groups. Even if these concatenations do not result in violence, they may incite arguments, which, although they tend to be small-scale, become central to media coverage, creating an impression of strife which was often quite marginal to the event itself – and moreover may have been inorganic. When two opposing political groups are present, it is always interesting to note to which group the police turn their backs. This artificial introduction of conflict changes the social context for assemblies and steals the strategic action frame from protesters.

Weapons used by police at protests include striking weapons, chemical weapons, electric weapons, projectiles (plastic, rubber, and wooden bullets), and water cannons (sometimes with pepper spray in the water, which has a high rate of dispersal and, unlike tear gas, is invisible), and concussion and shock grenades (the former meant to make a scary explosive sound, the latter to simultaneously create a disturbing lightning, both being linked with severe injuries when landing on or close to people). Sonic weapons were used for the first time in the US at Pittsburgh 2009 G20. The US National Institute of Justice is planning to implement microwave weapons developed by the US military for crowd control.

In contrast, there has not been a single case of weapons preparation or use by alterglobalization protesters in the U.S. and only a few molotovs in Canada. On the few occasions when police have seized what they claimed was a weapon they have had to withdraw the charges. US and Canadian protesters do return tear-gas canisters. (One justification for this is that the exploding canisters are less of a public hazard behind police lines, since the police have gas masks, unlike the general population.) European activists do use Molotov cocktails and similar weapons which can be used to start fires behind police lines. Europeans also throw cobblestones and other materials at police. This is a regular dimension of European labor and other protest, not unique to the alterglobalization movement. However, neither North American nor European protesters carry any firearms, knives, or other personal weapons. A European protester writes:
I see our weapons as almost being tokenistic, symbolic – it illustrates the depth of our discontent... But come on—a stone against a helicopter, a stick against an armoured car – and they call us violent? To be honest there is no comparison – they are the real butchers, they are the ones whose hands are covered in blood.\textsuperscript{207}

Purportedly “less lethal” police weapons are often used counter to the instructions. A number of protest participants and observers have suffered severe head injuries from projectile weapons whose less lethal status requires that they be shot below the waist or at the ground. Gases are often misused in enclosed spaces with inadequate exits. Moreover, tear gas is not to be used as a projectile weapon. In a similar way, water canons are a means for dispersion and may not be used to target individual protesters. This rule, along with the regulation to aim at the legs of protesters and not above, was violated by police dissolving a blockade at one of the entry gates to the red zone at Heiligendamm 2007 G8. One protester, injured by the strong water jet, is expected not be able to see anymore with one eye. At Genoa 2001 G8, police massively used CN gas, a tear gas version prohibited by the Geneva Convention on War, but not forbidden for public order policing. While still not allowed in most EU countries, rubber, plastic, and other alternative material bullets are regularly used in US.

As use of these weapons increases, their lethality is becoming more apparent. 334 people have died following taser use in the US and Canada between 2001 and 2008.\textsuperscript{208} There have also been more than 100 deaths in custody associated with pepper spray, although the US Department of Justice treats as acceptable justification that some of the victims were asthmatics or had previously been subjected to choke holds – therefore their deaths were not due to pepper spray itself.\textsuperscript{209} Protesters who have been shot with tear gas canisters at close range have suffered permanent, debilitating injury and a woman leaving a baseball game in Boston was killed by a pepper spray projectile. Police departments, community coalitions, and government officials are investigating these weapons.\textsuperscript{210} Meanwhile other “less lethal” weapons are developed by the military and then quickly passed on to police.\textsuperscript{211} A police Chiefs’ Association project encourages the adoption of these weapons.\textsuperscript{212} Weapons proliferation is much more rapid in the US. Also weapons deployment is more chaotic in the US than in Europe and European police tend not have such a wide array on hand at a given protest.

European police have also used live ammunition at a few protests. At Genoa 2001 G8, Carlo Giuliani was shot at close range and killed. Activists described this event as an assassination, but the 2009 judgment of the European Court of Human Rights – while criticizing the Italian authorities for their treatment of the subsequent investigations – holds that the police officer acted upon self-defense. An activist attempt to reconstruct the event with the video and photo material that became available through the trials, however, convincingly makes the point that the police officer was aiming first at a fellow protester who was not threatening him directly and that Carlo then took a fire extinguisher lying on the ground probably in order to prevent his mate from being shot, ending up being shot himself. Just a month earlier, protesters had been shot at Göteborg 2001 EU; one almost died. At the same event, Swedish police, armed with semi-automatic rifles with laser sights, forced 200 to 300 unarmed people, including a breast feeding mother, to lay down outside the Schillerska School (Convergence Centre) for nearly an hour.\textsuperscript{213} The reason provided for this operation was that
supposedly an armed German terrorist was inside the school. However, neither the terrorist nor weapons were found during this intensive operation.

Prosecution

Very few activists charged at mass actions in the Post-Seattle era have been convicted. The majority of arrestees have had their cases dropped, not prosecuted, or offered incidental charges involving fines such as a traffic citation. Even of those prosecuted, most are not convicted. Unchanged since Balbus’ 1973 study is the police privilege of using mass arrest as a method of control without accountability to the courts to provide reasonable charges and evidence. Serious prosecution of activists arrested at mass actions focuses on a handful of cases. These are of two types. Some are high profile activists whose conviction would simultaneously rid the state of a skillful opponent while discouraging others from taking his place due to increased penalties for effective political action. Some are ordinary protest participants. For both types, prosecutions tend to rely on inflated charges and chaotic evidence. The incredible budget, multi-agency security apparatus, violence, and mass arrests of Miami 2003 FTAA did not result in a single conviction of an activist.

But in late 2007, 25 activists from Genoa 2001 G8 were sentenced with a total of 110 years of jail time (the state asked for 225 years). “There have never been such high sentence demands for street clashes.” On November 17, about 60,000 people marched in Genoa to protest the trials of the activists and instead pursue justice for the police of the violent raids and detentions of Genoa activists. “25 people can’t shield an inconvenient historical passage that questioned so strongly our lifestyle and society.” Prosecutions related to Göteborg 2001 EU resulted in convictions unusually high for the charge, which was in most cases “breach of the peace” or “violent revolt” (“valdsamt upplopp” in Swedish). By 2003, already 60 persons were convicted for a total of 45 years prison.

Activists are also arrested and charged preemptively. Eight activists planning to participate in Minneapolis 2008 RNC were preemptively arrested in advance of the protests and have been charged with conspiracy to riot in the second degree and conspiracy to damage property, with terrorism enhancement, carrying sentences of 12 years.

US activists charged for opposing national or international events are prosecuted in the local courts, relying on evidence supplied by inexperienced local police working in an unfamiliar situation and bristling with interagency power struggles and resistance to hierarchical relations with other agencies. European prosecutions work with an integrated architecture of national riot police, who can more easily be prepared or unified around strategic cases.

Social justice activists are also experiencing increased prosecution in other circumstances than summits. In 2001, routine prosecutions of repeat civil disobedient demonstrating to close the U.S. School of the Americas delivered sentences of six-month prison terms – shocking outcomes for symbolic, negotiated, pacific trespassing. Three elderly Dominican nuns received sentences from 30-41 months for a 2002 “symbolic disarmament” (involving their own blood and a household hammer) of a Minuteman missile in Colorado. Charges are also increasing against persons involved in effective high-profile direct action, such as banner hangs, despite the peaceful and safe nature of this activity. Trespassing and property damage, traditional grey zones of
Policing
civil disobedience, are being re-cast as severe and violent crimes or even terrorism. A
good example is the so-called Tarnaq case of November 2008. Nine persons were
arrested in the French town Tarnaq as part of anti-terrorist investigations because they
allegedly had sabotaged train tracks in the context of the annual protests against the
nuclear waste transports from France to Germany. One of the arrestees was held in
custody for six months without initiation of a trial.

Most striking is the FBI’s Operation Backfire, a major federal prosecution project
indicting 15 people on various environmental property crimes, such as freeing animals
from fur farms, damaging biotechnology field trial crops, and burning SUVs at
automobile dealerships. Activists call this wave of indictments and related investigations
“the Green Scare”. In none of these cases was there risk to human life, yet this type of
activism was categorized as “eco-terrorism” and “domestic terrorism”. In early 2006, the
FBI began indicting people for a series of such actions. Indictees were offered plea
bargains for providing names of other participants, and many cooperated in order to
reduce huge threatened sentences. They knew that these threats were serious because
Jeff “Free” Luers had been sentenced to 22 years and 8 months for arson of three
SUVs.\(^{219}\) (The fact that Luers’ sentence was longer than Oregon’s sentence for rape
insulted the feminist community, which joined in the campaign to free him.) Although
the median sentence for arson in the US is 5 years, many of the Operation Backfire
sentences are much longer due to “terrorism enhancement”.

Another part of the Green Scare is the case against the SHAC-7, a group of
activists with an organization called Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty, who organized
against a company called Huntingdon Life Sciences. They were sentenced under the
Federal Animal Enterprise Protection Act (formerly the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act),
charged not with any criminal activity but with conspiracy to encourage others to
engage in activity such as protesting at company owners’ homes and Electronic Civil
Disobedience (such as sending black faxes). The SHAC 7 were sentenced with 1-6 years
in prison, with all but one receiving 3 or more years.\(^{220}\) Sherman Austin served a year in
federal prison (and was threatened with a great deal more) for the links on his
website.\(^{221}\)

During the Green Scare, Grand Juries were running in many US communities
while extensive electronic surveillance and cooperative indictees were appearing in
court. Much of the Left disassociated itself from the accused movements and did not
provide solidarity with the arrestatees nor oppose the grand juries. The isolation and
uncertainty of this time, along with the sudden severe criminalization of former grey-
area activity, caused activists to feel unsafe in every space and relationship.

Similarly, Germany’s Article 129a anti-terrorist legislation has been used against
activists accused of property crime. Seven people, including three journalists, were
detained in October 2007 and their friendship networks interrogated.\(^{222}\) After being held
in isolation for three weeks, the warrant for sociologist Andrej Holm was rejected by
federal court. He was investigated on the basis of similarities between his writings on
gentrification and anti-imperialism and the manifestos of an anti-militarist group which
took credit for burning some military vehicles. Other arrestatees included his co-editors of
a book on Venezuela.

The criminalization of non-violent activity is shaking activists deeply. Our
interviewees stated “When people are being thrown in jail for 25 years for destroying
vehicles it means that we are just supposed to follow orders.” The United States’
reclassification of military recruiters as federal officers makes interfering with them in any
way a felony (thereby criminalizing pacifist actions at military recruitment centers). Activists suspect that creeping criminalization is happening in part because current social movements refuse to be violent. The violence has to be invented or non-violence has to be re-classified. Another interviewee proposed that "People aren’t committing the crimes that they want them to commit. They can’t throw them away, lock them up, so they will invent....charges."

Another category of prosecution is criminal suits against organizations which seek to prevent them from participating in various protest activities. The US government sued Greenpeace USA, holding the organization responsible for the civil disobedience of members who had already been tried and sentenced as individuals. Greenpeace was acquitted in 2004, as the prosecution failed to prove any violation the obsolete 1872 "sailor mongering" law in question, but the First Amendment and selective prosecution issues were not addressed.223

Transnationalization of protest policing

Steadily, protest policing is taking on a character specifically directed at alterglobalization. Personnel and agencies are increasingly federalized and specialized and their strategies for managing activist citizens transnationalized. The Italian Carabinieri who police protest are military police. The French and Canadian riot police are federal police. The German Kavala that policed Heiligendamm 2007 G8 was an agency invented for that purpose. Although the US military is constitutionally forbidden from domestic action and protests are generally policed by the local police, the National Guard was mobilized for the Seattle 1999 WTO “emergency”. Even before the latest “war on terrorism”, the Army’s “anti-terrorist” Delta Force was attending alterglobalization events; they were already present in Seattle before the arrival of the National Guard.224 Miami 2003 FTAA policing was a multiagency effort of 40 law enforcement agencies, seven of which were federal, in what was infamously described by Miami Mayor Manuel Diaz as “the model for homeland security”.

the largest mobilisation of German police (17,000) since the end of the Second World War made the headlines...deployment of the army and air force against demonstrators ... a gigantic rehearsal for a civil war, an operation that was systematically prepared for over a year and a half, and whose methods and measures either tested or fully overstepped legal boundaries....1,100 army soldiers deployed were also used against demonstrators.225

In Europe, international coordination of policing is under development by various transnational agencies. Three important ones are the research program Coordinating National Research Programs on Security during Major Events (EU-SEC), the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), and the International Permanent Observatory on Security during Major Events (IPO). EU-SEC was initiated in 2004 as a response to the 2001 summit protests in Göteborg and Genoa. The main object of this research program is to coordinate police within the EU member states and Europol. As part of this effort they publish a handbook for summit protests, which is an attempt to set and disseminate standard security procedures to be followed by authorities when preparing summit gatherings by providing standard criteria and methods for risk analysis. EU-SEC itself is coordinated by UNICRI, a United
Nations institute consisting of several working groups concerned with security. UNICRI publishes the “Counter-Terrorism Online Handbook”. IPO is part of UNICRI and advises governments during security preparations for major events. Making use of the services of IPO is free for national governments. Founded in 2006, IPO was been involved in the preparations for the St. Petersburg 2006 G8, Heiligendamm 2007 G8, Singapore 2006 IMF/WB, and Hanoi 2006 APEC. IPO is planning to publish a handbook for G8 member states.

Beside directly assisting and advising the respective governments in coordinating summits, these agencies aim to standardize the criteria involved in the security operations around summits. The two handbooks that have been published also include criteria for the selection of a place. These official agencies are supported by the increased cooperation between police forces and secret services of various countries. The US intelligence services, for example, are now part of the preparations of a summit location from an early stage.
Chapter 5
A taxonomy of political violence

How is it possible to assess the relative impacts on dissent of the bodies stopped by water cannons in close proximity to the fence and the those stopped in their own kitchens by publicity about the funding and building and guarding of the fence? In this chapter, we present an analysis refined through 10 years of direct experience, observation, theorization, and praxis undertaken alone, with fellow activists, and together as a research team. After many iterations of our analytic framework we distilled a series of concepts capturing the dynamic effects of social control on dissent. We believe that scholars and litigators should focus assessments around these concepts.

The multi-functional operations of the fence and its infrastructure require consideration of the connections between physical constraints and psychic perceptions, between individual reactions and social networks. Even the most tangible forms of social control, fences and force, also function indirectly as psychological operations, Foucault’s “biopower”. Some of the least forceful forms have the most direct and immediate effects. “I’m not going to the protest because I don’t want to be on videotape.”

These complex and subtle interconnections are articulated well by Melucci. He challenges the common instrumentalist conception of social movements which focuses on how formal organizations mobilize resources to take advantage of political opportunities by mounting strategic campaigns and staging disruptive protests. Instead he focuses on the “submerged networks” in which “new ideas” are nurtured through decades of development and experimentation, eventually leading to social change.

…networks composed of a multiplicity of groups that are dispersed, fragmented and submerged in everyday life, and which act as cultural laboratories. They require individual investments in the experimentation and practice of new cultural models, forms of relationships and alternative perceptions and meanings of the world. The various groups comprising these networks mobilize only periodically in response to specific issues. The submerged networks function as a system of exchanges, in which individuals and information circulate. Memberships are multiple and involvement is limited and temporary; personal involvement is a condition for participation. The latent movement areas create new cultural codes and enable individuals to put them into practice.

In this passage Melucci summarizes several important concepts. First he theorizes the connections between the individual and the social and how each contributes specific work to movement development. The social creates a suggestive laboratory, which individuals experience through shifts in perception and meaning. Second, he emphasizes the role of discursive space through which information and ideas circulate. Third, he highlights the physicality of activity, experiments and practice, and their need for space. The body is crucial, but only one site of action. The mind, communication,
and complex physical and non-physical social spaces are equally important. And clearly the action is not all at protests, although these dimensions of social movements are expressed there.

In articulating a new analytic framework for understanding the social control of dissent, we draw on Melucci’s analysis to consider violence not only against bodies but against minds and social space. Traditional notions of political violence have focused on the body – what do we mean by space? Space is, of course geographic: assemblies require public territories, and groups require rooms to meet, construct art, provide services, etc. But Melucci’s analysis of social movements also define space as having particular institutional qualities that nurture social movements, such as privacy, independence, undirectedness (so as to be open for experiment). And there is a third meaning to space, which is yet more subtle. It is the possibility of finding networks through which to ask questions and to propose, define, practice, and develop identities, cosmologies, cultures, and codes. How do we understand the kind of space that trust needs? What would constitute violence against the space for “alternative perceptions and meanings”?

Social spaces...independent of the institutions of government, the party system and state structures...In them the signifying practices developed in everyday life can be expressed and heard independently from formal political institutions...individual and collective identities are able to exist; ‘soft’ institutionalized systems favoring the appropriation of knowledge and the production of symbolic resources; and open systems in which information can be circulated and controlled.

Melucci also argues that the political action takes place in “everyday life”. If he’s right, then perhaps we don’t need to be concerned about aggressive policing of protest. What a relief for everyone! Traffic rights can be protected without harming social movements! Unfortunately, our analysis leads in the other direction. If the heart of social movements are the shifting, informal social networks through which people “ask questions about meaning”, slowly articulate “conflicts” with social orders, and create new “knowledge” which ultimately changes society, then we need to be deeply concerned about the health of marginal, informal, prearticulate politics, not just formal, public, committed ones. We need to be concerned with forms of social control which limit, discourage, or redirect – whether they manifest at marches or in the newspapers.

In our work on the effects of various forms of policing, we have found it nearly impossible to discretely distinguish the effects of police tactics, and to track separately the effects on individuals, organizations, and communities. Various tactics used by the police arrive in the political consciousness of individuals and groups in one lump. Generally, interviewees’ discussions of experiences of police violence seamlessly integrate urban security architectures and media campaigns with street-level policing. The analysis in this chapter explores the effects of policing tactics on social space, including discourse, and social and individual psyche of activists and the wider group of dissenters. We consider the marginalizing and preemptive effects of police action, the accumulative effects of police tactics, the disastrous effects of fear on political consciousness, the vulnerability of collectivity itself to police tactics, and the evisceration of space, discourse, culture, and history. We conclude the chapter with a strong proposal regarding the meaning of political violence.
Marginalization

A powerful indirect effect of protest policing is the marginalization of political activists. Each policing tactic reviewed in the previous chapter has a communicative function. Police tactics function to identify protests as criminal and, thereby, as illegitimate. This portrayal collapses the purported interests of elites and non-elites while trivializing and dismissing protesters’ politics. It also communicates to protesters and would-be protesters themselves that what they are doing is not—as they may have believed upon setting out—crucial to their society’s well-being, but instead incomprehensible, bizarre, and unsafe. Activists cannot help but internalize these messages. They may respond by trying to make their protests sane, relevant, cheerful, and popular. They may respond by embracing a subcultural identity which scorns mainstream perspectives. They may do neither, but subtly accept the fact that their views are not a valuable part of public life and their politics are an annoyance and inconvenience to fellow citizens.

Activists we interviewed described their experiences of marginalization, or what Foucault would call “technologies of the self”. They explained “Even the word ‘activist’ is stigmatized. People have disgust for what you do. You’re not a committed, responsible citizen.” Activists recognize how their skills are delimited. They cannot function normally. “When you’re socially isolated it’s hard to be an organizer. If you’re in that kind of fear level it attacks …your ability to relate to people.” They even see themselves as toxic to other activists. “I must look suspicious. I was vague about myself. I [imagine] myself as an infiltrator.”

Policing tactics communicate several key concepts: First, that public dissent is, as argued by critical criminologists, criminal behavior. The use of surveillance cameras, intensive police presence, special armored vehicles, planning, and excessive budgets present as fact that the planned protests are a criminal matter requiring the advance preparation of security arrangements to protect the general population (since that is what the police are supposedly for). Moreover, it is not just a criminal matter requiring the attention of the authorities (like counterfeiting or double parking), but a matter of violence, aggression, and imminent general danger. The whole population of the city must prepare for large-scale violence, from which they are to be protected by security checkpoints, fences, militarized police and patrols. Dissenters reconceive themselves not as political participants, but as targets of a crackdown operation. They camouflage themselves, protect sympathizers from reprisal, and reduce communicative action so as not to draw police attention.

Travelling to Québec City for the FTAA protests in 2001, we took every precaution. We had prepared too much to let them turn us back. We knew about the fence. We knew about the border controls. We disguised ourselves in two SUVs traveling separately, in which we drank Pepsi and read People Magazine. Every item in the car had been vetted. No political t-shirts, only Gap and Banana Republic. Not too much black. Not a single item of FTAA or globalization literature. All of our training material disposed of at a rest stop more than 100 miles from the border. Only trail maps of our purported camping destination. No maps of the city where we’d be protesting. This morning at a diner, we had emptied our wallets, looking for political and social references. We had reprogrammed our cell phones, disguising all relevant information and political contacts. The guys tucked long hair into baseball caps, and sat in the back seat for good measure.
We did all of this with punctilious gusto, knowing we’d only have one chance to get across the border. We made it. We were clean. Clean, that is, of our reason for being there. We failed to anticipate what it would be like to prepare to protest without the accoutrements of political culture and we had made no preparations for rebuilding it.

Policing of protest also creates a division and false dichotomy between “good” and “bad” protesters. The state constantly asserts its respect for the rights of “peaceful”, “law-abiding” political expression. Those who refuse to follow the rules of protest permits, routes, and styles do not deserve the state’s respect. Thus, by definition, all those who disturb in the slightest the channel provided by police are threats, are violent, unpredictable, preternaturally out of control, beyond the bounds of social mores. Political policing cleverly merges social decorum with the architecture of state control. Without public consideration of the amount of space and inconvenience to be granted to dissent, the state draws an arbitrary line. Those who transgress it are faulted with an assault against society itself. They are “anarchists”, those who defy what the state says – whatever that may be today, no matter how absurd it is. The popular/hysterical use of the word ‘anarchy’ captures the merge: Action transgressing the state’s dictums, no matter how benign or trivial the transgression (such as feeding people in the park) is promptly portrayed as an explosive, corrosive, virus. Anarchy will invade your house and will turn you into an anarchist, neighbors will be at each others throats in a moment.

Marginalization and criminalization isolate those who are active. An interviewee explains how “5 peoples homes being raided leads to intimidation of millions of people. It needs to be clear that a goal of such activity is to isolate the movements that are being repressed, using the fear of millions of people to create that political isolation.” This isolation changes everything about political action. “People are staying home to avoid being on a list, so then it feels like nobody cares.” When police drive by groups’ meetings regularly or engage in other tactics such as writing down license plate numbers “This intimidates people from coming to our meetings.” Not only does it reduce participation and preempt solidarity relations between organizations and movements, it also demoralizes activists who experience their politics as more marginal than it may be.

Meanwhile, the focus of protest policing on the immanent violence of protesters provides another kind of marginalization. The political target disappears from view. Global governance, already unaccountable, hides under a fake bush. The paraphernalia of militarization takes center stage and is rationalized. The established violence of debt-holders, multinational corporations, and their chartering governments is not up for discussion. Only the purported violence of some youths presumed to be on a train somewhere, headed this way. Watch out!

Preemption

It is always “difficult”, in the words of one of our interviewees, to “assess what doesn’t happen.” Not happening is multiply determined – and activists are the first to admit this. But the preemptive effects of police violence are not difficult to find. Activists who have experienced militarized protest, or citizens who have been subjected to advertisements of impending militarization, see public streets and plazas as spaces of immanent police violence. Public space, supposedly free for assembly and expression,
is reshaped by the state into a danger zone. This restricts and reduces the fundamental political opportunity of public assembly as a social movement strategy. Even experienced activists become discouraged to organize and participate in demonstrations. Interviewees explain, "It gets tiring when you are shadowed by 40 cops ready to beat your ass down when there are no illegal actions planned. It's just a protest." Another explained "We barely did anything and got fucked with by the cops...It affects people’s motivation. They become apathetic, depressed, alcoholics. Depression and alcoholism are on the up and up. Political activism is on the down and down."

Inexperienced activists, on the other hand, are easily put off by a single show of force. In Colorado, just as the anti-war movement was becoming strong and diverse, a dispersing rally in Colorado Springs was tear-gassed. This was one of very few acts of violence on the occasion of “The World Says No to War”, the February 15, 2003 global day of protests. The violence put a little march in Colorado on the international newswire (of the 800 cities with marches, fewer than 5 experienced police violence that day). But many Colorado activists, who had been emboldened by the war and by new organizing, were thereafter terrified to attend another rally. They had brought their children. They were packing strollers and kids back into their cars when it happened. “I can think of three or four individuals who have gone to more spiritual activities, like meditations, prayers, and conversations and will not participate in public rallies.” We heard this story over and over again from Colorado organizers who immediately saw a massive decline in turnout at events.

Vittrup’s strategy aims to control the emergence and unfolding of a protest by blocking and redirecting assemblies. Counterinsurgent surveillance also aims to prevent political activities. However, many police strategies have indirect preemptive effects. The simplest measure of this is activists’ frequent use of the term “intimidation”, a description of police action which indicates an essence both preemptive and effective. When activists adjust their plans based on their perceptions or expectations of police or prosecutorial response they are enacting “anticipatory conformity”. They have already assaulted, contained, charged, or convicted their own hypothetical actions. Anticipating police repression at Heiligendamm 2007 G8, ATTAC tried to convince the Block G8 alliance to abandon their blockading concept in favor of a symbolic march towards the fence.

Another preemptive control tactic is creeping criminalization. As activists learn that formerly legal activities are being prosecuted, they don’t know what will be illegal next. The line of legality becomes phantasmic, varying according to activists’ perceptions of state intolerance. If property crime is violence, then surely formerly grey-area activities, such as civil disobedience, will be excessively prosecuted as well. And this phantasm is real. Creeping criminalization, in conjunction with conspiracy charges, chills discourse about currently legal activities that may not be legal next week.

Security perimeters, permitting, and protest pits make planned protest seem meaningless by restraining it so far away from its target. Permitting requirements preemptively discourage protest by magnifying expense and difficulty of organizing. Protest-related legislation discourages protest by creating and advertising pretexts for police criminalization of lawful speech activity. Discouragement is a form of preemptive social control.

Publicity of massive surveillance databases, along with codes and tags such as “criminal extremist” and “domestic terrorist”, have created widespread fear to
participate even in completely legal political events. Interviewees explain that “People who might be sympathetic, are now either just completely neutral or don’t want to know.” Reluctance to participate impacts donations to organizations, numbers of participants in events, willingness to sign petitions and public statements, volunteering, and participation in educational media, such as receiving newsletters and announcements.

Activists are responsible about acknowledging that quantitative shifts in membership and level of activity are multi-causal. Many said “well you can never really know” why someone doesn’t participate any more or why fewer new people have joined this year. Despite this cautiousness, nearly everyone we interviewed in 2006 in the US was able to think of people they know personally who had explicitly stated that they were leaving political activity due to their fears of surveillance. Several interviewees stated that they personally knew 20-30 people for whom that was the case. When asked to count specific people who used to be active and no longer are who the interviewee either knew or strongly suspected curtailed their activism due to surveillance or fears of it, every interview participant counted at least two people; many counted 5-10. One insisted that s/he could list 300 people. Another interviewee explained “I would not want to give you a small number because it is my conviction that almost everyone that I know in [this city] doesn’t want to come out.” We observed a similar effect in the context of L’Aquila 2009 G8. Many activists did not even consider traveling to Italy, because they were still in shock from Genoa 2001 G8 events. As one activist remarked during an informal interview: “It’s sad but the strategy of Genoa worked. I definitely don’t want to be confronted with a Carabinieri [Italian military police] anymore.”

A number of our interviewees stated their suspicions that “leaks” of database information to the media as well FOIA releases (files acquired under the US Freedom of Information Act) re not what they appear. They believe this “information” is strategic law enforcement activity designed to cause potential participants to think twice about political action. Activists who have reviewed a lot of released files observed that “the redaction was deliberately inept”, which they interpreted as a counterinsurgent act. Enhanced law enforcement databasing increases information collection with no opportunity for subjects to purge, correct errors, or challenge interpretations. Rapid information sharing between jurisdictions (including internationally) exponentially increases the impact of criminal and terrorist tags. The implications of databasing raise serious dilemmas for established organizations. Knowing well that mailing list members and donors may be spooked and withdraw their support from the organization, interviewees wondered if they have an obligation to inform members and donors about surveillance? This may explain why organizations sometimes pretend not to know or don’t want to find out. Note that it is impossible here to separate the effects on individuals from the effects on organizations.

Permeation and accumulation

Social control tactics cannot be analyzed discretely because they are rarely employed separately. The Colorado Springs 2003 anti-war tear-gassing is an unusual exception. Many of those affected had not experienced other police tactics and were thus able to describe the specific effects of that one police tactic. Customarily, dissenters participating in a single mass action easily experience ten or more tactics, from the
constraining effects of the permitting process to menacing militarization, accompanied by several types of surveillance, witnessing unnecessary arrests, and police public relations/media distortions.

Moreover, social control actions interpenetrate. Frightening confrontations and selective prosecutions are often evidence of surveillance. Police arrange an array of tactics with supra-rational relations. If it weren’t truly frightening, their array of weapons and surfeit of cameras might be absurdly humorous. Overkill ensures there’s something for everyone.

As activists and groups become more experienced, they are exposed to more tactics. New activists may not immediately register police tactics. As they come into focus the effect is cumulative. Vittrup’s strategy of “exhaustion” also describes the accumulation of experiences over time and space. Often activists wear their awareness of evident surveillance, regular violence, and unpredictable prosecution, as a badge of seriousness and commitment. But then accumulation takes its toll in brittleness. The impacts are not proportionate or predictable. We have met many activists who have reduced or ended their political action. For some, the end point was violence. For some, prosecution. For others, infiltration. And for still others, an affected friend. For one, the experience of hearing cops read her diary during a house search.

This accumulative effect does not require sophisticated multi-agency coordination. This is not to say that social control is unstrategic or untargeted. In 2000 a diverse coalition of global justice activists was energized in the Denver/Boulder Colorado region. Including long-time civil disobedients and younger direct activists, the coalition was working effectively to cohere activists from the peace and justice, international solidarity, and student movements around the emerging U.S. alterglobalization movement. The coalition was quickly destroyed when participating NGOs were investigated regarding an act of political vandalism which some believe was masterminded by an agent provocateur. Whether or not the act was manipulated, the investigation was conducted as an act of collective punishment of the coalition and had lasting divisive effects. The coalition did not survive and longstanding organizations have to date not fully recovered. Willingness to collaborate across tactical differences was destroyed.

Dispersed implementation of social control tactics have another impact, which is to convey a sense of permeation even when they are not, in fact, pervasive. The indirect effects of police action gain their power through the phantasm of total presence – a reality imparted not only through history, but also through seemingly haphazard particularity and the omniscience it implies.

The June night of the 2004 RNC raids I arrived home, which at that time was an activist house. My roommate greeted me, ashen, and whispered “they just raided 2 houses in Denver”. We knew that if a house would be visited in our city, it would be our house. We convened the residents in the backyard, where we made a list of every possible thing in the house that could be intentionally misconstrued as weapons-related. This was Colorado, so we were looking for things like camping fuel and hunting knives. One of the non-activist housemates was frustrated and disbelieving that he had to dispose of his hunting cross-bow. We made a rapid, shaky, and silent cleanup of the house, moving offsite all activist paperwork and meeting notes and our computers (which we couldn’t afford to replace if they were taken). We threw out literature from groups we
didn't want to be associated with. And then we locked the door and sat waiting. The next day, sure enough, a member of our group was visited at his place of employment. Our house was not visited, but it might as well have been. Believing we lived in a rationalized technocracy, we anticipated that raids were approaching all houses comparable to the ones raided, which meant houses where activists involved in non violent direct action lived. We readied ourselves for the costs of that visit. We had enough time to impose the terror, inconvenience, and restraint upon ourselves.

We lived suspended, jumping at the unfamiliar and terrifying sound of knocking on the usually unlocked door, unable without our computers to do any work. Clearly, they didn't need to raid us. The desired effect was already produced. We were much too tense to organize for the RNC. Although only five activist houses were raided that week, the message was sent loud and clear that the federal government was already accusing us of terrorism knowing full well that we were not armed or violent organizations, simply because we were intending to participate in protest against the RNC.

Political consciousness & terror

Political consciousness is the outcome of political dialogue. In Flacks' words, it is the personal narrative and logic that leads people to decide to "make history", taking the risks and inconvenience that entails. These decisions are sustained by immediate and extended communities which share analysis, hope, vision, and strategy. Flows and social spaces of communication are affected promptly by the fear and uncertainty induced by social control. And awareness of social control is its own vector of consciousness, developing alongside political analysis.

In parallel with the development of political consciousness and political experience is the deepening of the experience of social control, which moves from discouragement and a sense of being misunderstood to acceptance of marginalization and distortion, to a sense of danger and risk. Although trajectories are diverse, we can conceptualize layers of recognition of marginality and insecurity, including:

- My dissent is not valued by my purportedly democratic society & government. I am marginalized, trivialized, treated as an inconvenience.
- As a dissenter I am an enemy. My dissent impedes the "rights" of drivers.
- As public space is subject to violence, I feel that to express myself is a risk.
- As pacific actions are forbidden or assaulted, I feel that there is no space, no tolerance for dissent.
- As social control touches my everyday life, I feel an ongoing, personal sense of violence. The state is at war with me/us.
- I experience trauma at what I have witnessed/experienced.
- I face the ultimate, existential political choice. I cannot have a life because of state repression. I must choose between politics and my health or the safety of my family.
It is not an uncommon view among activists that one of the most important aspects of mass demos is that participants are exposed to arbitrary police violence. It is often argued that this is one of the more reliably radicalizing experiences. In addition, it is often argued that this experience crystallizes issues of power, order, and discipline in society and forces people to address with clarity how their society functions. “We left our copy of the European Convention on Human Rights behind agreeing that a lemon would be more useful.”

However this knowledge accepts a dark reversal which is that social control is the defining feature of the interaction, not the political conversation of perspectives, values, ideas, and vision.

For many interviewees, social control has caused them to see the government as lawless. Criminalization of dissenters is an unstable faultline threatening to swallow them. An interviewee explains “...rendition without charges...I think that enters into people’s subconscious, like every moment of their day.” Another says: “...like stepping off the sidewalk, those are only civil infractions and only circumstantially illegal...it’s so often arbitrary. Sometimes you can march in the streets. Sometimes you can’t. That’s the area most affected for people. Their political imagination gets curtailed by repression.”

A young activist says: “It is scary that maybe one day the police will just walk in my door and take me or I’ll have a bunch of charges that I don’t know are accumulating, legitimate or illegitimate. The way the government is operating now it doesn’t seem to really matter the accuracy of the data.”

Without clear boundaries, activists can only protect themselves by avoiding vaguely defined risk – places, organizations, topics, and people. What is striking, again, is that the activities avoided are not illegal. “I have really shifted the things that I’m willing to work on from anything that was progressive and radical to things that are more peace and justice.” Another interviewee explained “I’m cautious about people I meet. I met someone from Pakistan and I have his card. But now I am choosing to get rid of materials associated with him because he’s in the Middle East.” An interviewee describes how seeing their every action as surveilled and subject to criminalization discourages any and all political activity: “It’ll be easier for me to hang out and drink beers instead of being passionate and political ... At this point I assume the FBI will know whatever I do: [so I always think] Is this worth it being on my FBI file?” 232 “There was a time in my life when I felt like I was going to do something powerful. We were going to do something powerful. And it was all taken away. And now it feels like I’m just going through the motions. I’m just verbalizing it, I’m not living it.”

Even more difficult to handle than one’s own risk is the recognition that one’s activism puts others at risk as well. This experience reframes activism as selfish and individualistic counterposed with the wellbeing of family, friends, and communities – those for whom one is fighting in the first place. Activists come to see themselves as a toxin. After the large-scale house searches in the context of the Heiligendamm 2007 G8, two activists explained how guilty they felt about not having encrypted their computer hard drives that had been confiscated. They were afraid that all their contacts might be targeted as well.

The collective dimension of political consciousness is the production of formal and informal discourse which supports analysis and ideology. But we find with increased awareness of social control, groups are censoring in advance their expressions. They are re-designing their communications for the police, not for fellow dissenters. “The assumption that everything is being read puts pressure to word things carefully to make
Sure it’s clean... We spend a lot of time reworking and rewording simple statements.” What do they mean by “clean”? It’s not about violence or illegality; they are “concerned about seeming inflammatory [or] confrontational... We now have a “department devoted to that.” Everyone laughed. But the joviality wisped away and the group became grave, describing the significance of this vigilance as “an accepted dimension in how we operate.” Another organization even re-conceptualizes their assemblies: “We don’t hold ‘protests’ or ‘demonstrations’ we hold ‘public awareness rallies’. Our language has changed. We have to be more precise. You can’t talk like a regular person... if you’re chatting away you might say the wrong things.” Groups are also discouraged to associate with others’ ideas. “I don’t like even talking about politics... because I don’t want to get either of us confused in each other’s business. If someone is being watched for something I’m not being watched for, I don’t want to talk about politics with them.”

In the US, a major event that discouraged political association and solidarity was the mediated prosecution of Professor Ward Churchill. After an assault by conservative talk show hosts based on a small non-academic essay he wrote in response to the events of 9-11, his university investigated him with intent to revoke his tenure. Radical allies scattered to the winds. One of our interviewees summarized the mood. “Anyone associated with Ward Churchill is contaminated. If you honestly come out and say ‘I think that Ward was right’ you’re a pariah....” The state’s overt lesson was that even tenure could not protect leftists. But the covert lesson was equally chilling. The left was too scared to enact its own sacred watchword – solidarity. And leftists were perfectly willing to blame the victim to bulwark the fantasy that careful wording (counterposed to Churchill’s rash prose) could protect them from a similar fate.

But many activists are well aware that watching your words is a feeble defense. Groups don’t need to generate evidence of criminality in order to be assaulted. State counterinsurgency projects will invent the evidence, or simply demonize and criminalize words and acts formerly legitimate. And it only takes one episode of police action to scatter would-be participants and supporters, severing lines of communication and political development. Police tactics benefit from the irrational power of fear, which dramatically amplifies their effects.

The resulting isolation and marginalization of organizations damages the cross-fertilization of multi-issue analysis and organizing which has been a recent strength of social movements. (In Europe this strength developed directly from the movements of the 1960s. In the US, movements first took a detour through single issue politics after which they forged a new multi-issue “politics of difference”.) Social movement groups continue to be challenged by one another to address “multiple oppressions” and seek liberation not only of working conditions but of “everyday life” itself. In order to develop continuous analysis of new issues (biotech, water privatization, immigration...), social movement groups need to trust each other enough and interact with each other enough to learn from one another – capacities endangered by the intense fear induced by police tactics.

Collectivity

Sociology asserts that human collectivity is unassimilable into biological, economistic, or philosophical theories. Social movements scholarship is built on the recognition that collective popular responses to social problems differ fundamentally from individual
responses. Social movements literature wrestles with the perversely unpredictable phenomena of the peculiar collectivity which is the formation, diffusion, and dissipation of a social movement.

By asking the question of how individuals and groups make sense of their action and how we may understand this process, we are obliged to shift from a monolithic and metaphysical idea of collective actors towards the processes through which a collective becomes a collective....(i) Collective identity as a process involves cognitive definitions concerning the ends, means, and the field of action...(ii)...to a network of active relationships between actors who interact, communicate, influence each other, negotiate, and make decisions. forms of organization and models of leadership, communicative channels and technologies of communication...(iii)...a certain degree of emotional investment is required...Collective identity is never entirely negotiable because participation in collective action is endowed with meaning which cannot be reduced to cost-benefit calculation...passions and feelings, love and hate, faith and fear...particularly in those areas of social life that are less institutionalized, such as the social movements. To understand this part of collective action as ‘irrational’, as opposed to the parts that are ‘rational’ (a euphemism for good’), is simply nonsensical. There is no cognition without feeling and no meaning without emotion.234

As described so far in this chapter, social control affects individuals in complex ways. It also affects collectivities. Of course here, again, we cannot draw a clear boundary. What happens to collectivities also affects individuals connected (or who could be connected) to them. And an event affecting one individual can ricochet through a collectivity as well, frightening others almost as if it happened to them, while taking on collective dynamics as group history, a shared story, and a crisis point.

A special category of collectivity is the Social Movement Organization (SMO). These include formal organizations, like churches and nonprofit organizations, but much social movement work happens outside formal organization, in various informal groupings which are also SMOs. Temporary groups organize around events (affinity groups and event conveners). Other informal groups are long-term friendship-based associations better described as a community.

Social control sullies the reputation of organizations – that is the public relations function of criminalization. Without any prosecution having occurred, potential participants, donors, and supporters perceive an organization as criminal. Social justice groups that are part of religious congregations found that their implied criminalization distorted their relation with their communities. An interviewee explained: “If we were being watched and beat up, then there must be something not right about what we’re doing... As if we’re not really [religious people]...Our reputation was tainted. If the police don’t trust you, something must be wrong with you.”

As recognized by scholars, organizations under surveillance tend to shift their agenda from projects to self-defense.235 Interviewees described this repeatedly as “a distraction”. An interviewee states “what I want to be doing is on the street holding a sign and doing my protesting. But we got pulled off into being concerned with countersurveillance.” An interviewee observes that the new leadership of their group “avoids anti-war and anti-military and protest. But we’ve always been about war and
peace and nonviolence!" Other organizations described their struggles against the criminalization or restriction of demonstrations. The most striking example of this shifting agenda was a church we interviewed whose governing board was so spooked by surveillance that they curtailed charitable donations from their endowment. Interviewees expressed their shock that the church refused even to give money for aid after Hurricane Katrina.

Once the immediate self-defensive activity is over, the agenda of the organization may be permanently shifted. A long-time board member of a 27 year-old peace and justice organization reflected on the aftereffects of overt surveillance 6 years after it happened. (The interview was in 2006.) "It scared us from sponsoring events...My sense is we would have been much more active against the [2003 Iraq] war. As an organization we've avoided initiatives... We've participated in other groups' events, [holding] banners... I think we've stayed away from contentious issues. We haven't said anything about immigration or about the war."

We found widespread chilling of internal communication in organizations. Regardless of the legal status of the activities they participate in, nearly all of the groups we interviewed have reduced their use of email and telephone, instituted "complicated" communications systems, and try to have their meetings in person. Typically, a pacifist group explained "We did not use email at all, for anything. We set our meetings at rotating locations and everybody knew where the meeting was going to be. We wouldn't communicate by phone." An interviewee joked self-deprecatingly, "It totally changes the character of any conversation. 'Do you remember that meeting we talked about last week? Well it's happening tonight. What's it about? I'll tell you later.' " Interviewees were quick to point out how much this "slows us down." Because of the difficulty in communicating, "things that take a lot of planning don't ever happen."

Strategic campaigns require extensive logistics, interdependencies, coordination, and timing. Surveillance disrupts the elements of relationships and communication that make strategic planning possible. Scared to be creative, wary to trust, aware that no conversations are private, organizations have great difficulty generating strategic plans. An interviewee explains the "paralysis" of how trying to be strategic and creative to plan effective actions is impacted by "worry about the heat you're going to get for even trying – for even talking about it... if we do ANYTHING we are going to be watched, hammered down." An interviewee from another organization says "we couldn't think creatively."

A German activist relayed us a telling anecdote about the Berlin 1988 IMF/WB protests. Although many groups had been preparing action for several months, during one of the last general meetings preceding the protests, no one wanted to reveal their plans. The fear of infiltration and resulting criminalization was overwhelming. The meeting became known in activist circles as the "hush meeting". A participant at St. Petersburg 2006 G8 told how they had to organize meetings in the middle of the night at cemeteries in the absence of other available spaces free of surveillance. That this is not only a problem for activists in post-communist countries became evident during the Heiligendamm 2007 G8. The last few action planning meetings were complicatedly organized outside of the camps, moving to several different places during each meeting in order to avoid infiltration and surveillance. Besides inducing a constant feeling of insecurity, this also turned out into a time-consuming and exhausting maneuver.
Events and campaigns depend on organic leadership development and on volunteerism. Several interviewees observed the targeting of people who are stepping up and taking responsibility for logistics, outreach, or safety roles like marshals and medics. Such surveillance puts a criminal taint (implying accusations of agitation or conspiracy) on logistics roles and volunteerism in general. Moreover, long-term relationships with organizations seem risky, so affiliations become more temporary and less committed, with the result that “I’ve noticed a big shift from long term strategizing and community building.”

Conservative decisions on the part of organizations are understandable in light of the costs of surveillance to organizational resources. Governments provide little to no administrative mechanisms of accountability for false accusations, improper or unwarranted investigations, or erroneous surveillance. One organization that was illegally searched spent more than 1500 hours of volunteer time dealing with the fallout for their membership and relations with other organizations. Their lawsuit for damages took 5 years to resolve. Of the 71 organizations in our US study, only two had managed to take legal action regarding surveillance.

Organizations rely on networks for material resources as well as analytic development discussed above in the section on political consciousness. A US pacifist group in our study had been meeting in a church hall. After the media revealed that they were under surveillance, they were no longer welcome to use the church and relations with that congregation have been strained because they were viewed as having put the church at risk. Groups who need one another’s solidarity may even become wary of social associations. “As soon as your organization’s name is linked with another organization, …then there’s this sense of we’re going to trigger the alarm bells …just because we had a picnic with these folks.” Regional networks can be disrupted by social control in one area. “People say ‘I don’t want to go [to do political action] in [city]. It’s scary, it’s dangerous there.’ When you hear that you realize that the surveillance on [city’s] activists has worked….You shouldn’t have to stay home to be safe. You should feel safe wherever you go to express yourself.”

In the US, 9-11 and the Green Scare severed generosity and solidarity among organizations. With wild accusations of violence and terrorism attached to a wide range of groups, formal and informal groups became islands reluctant to associate or issue statements of support to those who might sully their reputation, frighten their donors, or endanger their ongoing (although much reduced) campaigns and participants. Most of these groups action is primarily education and communication – to share information, analysis, and vision with the larger society. After listing the paralyzing effects of social control, an activist concluded pithily “…and you’re trying to communicate with millions of people…”

Meanwhile social movement organizations persisted in rationalizing surveillance and repression. Rather than opposing government repression, many organizations have worked to articulate a hard line between legal and illegal political activities (a distinction also claimed by the organizations who refused interviews on these grounds), expending extensive resources in “careful wording” which they believe will keep them safe.

In Europe, many direct action groups of the early wave of summit protests have meanwhile become NGO-like organizations focusing on information gathering and awareness raising. Pretending to support critical civil society, European governments effectively pacify dissent by making it dependent on state money. Instead of fearing
surveillance, former activists worry now about their organization’s funding being cut and therefore refrain from organizing disruptive or transgressive activities.

Groups concerned about creeping criminalization of grey and formerly legal activity take extreme precautions, foregoing inclusivity and destroying all written records of their work. Groups also reported not taking notes at meetings. “We’re afraid to have a piece of paper with anything written on it at the end of any meeting.” Further, many interviewees, having internalized suspicion of undercovers, said that they don’t want to be seen writing anything down, as it would make them look as if they are surveilling the meeting. Moreover, concerned about future investigations, they do not keep diaries. This lack of archiving is the destruction in advance of the history of the movement, with implications for social movements’ capacity for active reflexivity.

Space and discourse

We use the concept of “space” to combine several other concepts. “Political opportunity” is a concept that has been used to describe the confluences of constraint and creativity which structure (and exclude) possibilities that social movements might use strategically. Another kind of space is the medium for the safe communion which nurtures the recognition of these opportunities as well as communication and connection between people. A third kind of space is the perhaps but not necessarily physical “laboratory” in which social movement activity is prepared, prototyped, and practiced. (Formerly conceptualized as a “resource”.) Meeting rooms, though mundane, are crucial. And other kinds of space equally so. These three kinds of space are interdependent and inseparable.

Today’s social control has communicated to interviewees a striking lack of openness of the system to dialogue, no matter how peaceful. Reflecting on police seizure of art materials, an interviewee explains: “There’s a strong statement: ‘our threshold for your dissent is so low, it’s way down here. We’re not going to tolerate perfectly legal building of perfectly legal things’.”

Activists also perceive a foreclosure of political space formerly available for civil disobedience. Civil disobedience includes negotiated symbolic actions such as crossing through a fence onto a military base (ready for a prompt and docile pre-arranged arrest). Civil disobedience also includes activity like street art, mass bike rides, and squatting; these are legal “grey area” activities which have been subject to police escalation and criminal charges. Several pacifist groups we interviewed had been infiltrated during civil disobedience actions. Interviewees reported that going through the intense experience of preparing for arrest and then finding out that one of their fellow arrestees was an agent shook them deeply. After that, “you don’t want to get your friends and nuns and old people involved.” Civil disobedience relies on the judicial system, which has in part closed the opportunities with increasing sentences and the restriction of political motivations from court proceedings (eviscerating the political content of trials and forcing the defense to rely on apolitical technicalities).

Social space for discourse and connection has been reduced. “We’re scared to be able to openly and honestly talk about issues in our community. The state is using that information to crush legitimate movements.” A middle-aged person in a peace group told us “My mom is scared to talk to me on the phone...She’s not sure what she is allowed to say and not any more.” A peace group reported on their changes since experiencing social control. “We used to be a lot closer. Now we sometimes talk in
code, we’re more cryptic, share less information. We’re all a bit more reserved in terms of our speech.” Another activist says “People are scared of the implications of just being radical. There’s almost no space that we consider safe... People just stopped expressing those views entirely.”

On one hand, the spatial control of dissent works like Foucault’s disciplinary gaze. This powerful gaze places the burden of discipline on the observed, thus interiorizing the power of observation to the point where activists become their own observer, each person regulating their own behavior. This strategy seeks to reduce feelings of anonymity, producing more pacified forms of dissent. The reduction of anonymity for the purpose of policing is not new. According to Foucault, the thrust of modern power lies behind the seemingly simple idea of surveillance and internalization, which now permeates modern society. This impulse away from anonymity is ever present in contemporary society, from community policing tactics to national security investigations. Of significance here is that reducing anonymity in specific spaces can directly impact how people act in those locations. At the end, these techniques of power produce (obedient) individuals and subjects rather than ‘repressing’ them.

The consequences became painfully apparent during the L’Aquila 2009 G8. The lack of safe spaces causes people to stop expressing their views. In the weeks preceding the summit, activists in several cities had suffered several waves of house searches also targeting social centers. At nearly all the social centers, activists hastily announced that they had nothing to do with G8-related activities and that their social center was not available for protest coordination or as a meeting place for international protesters.

Feeling Culture

“The cultural turn” in sociology, alongside the emergence of “new” social movements has emphasized the significance of culture in shaping social problems and providing the material (and constraints) of mobilization for social change. “The culture of protest” recognizes that social movements contain and nurture cultures including particular styles of interaction and expression. Eyerman and Jamison argue that cultural change is always the ultimate goal of social movements and thus the medium in which they work. Melucci considers everyday life as a site of political development – needs are first felt, articulated, and shared at the level of the mundane. They are then collectivized and elaborated as cultural movements in the process of politicization.

Social control at times takes the form of fearsome spectacle, with epic stage sets, elaborate costumes, loud explosions, and intense drama. But social control, too, has an “everyday life”. Endless judicial proceedings drain the energy of participants and grind away politics from the courtroom. Surveillance induces a jittery unreality which, internalized, trails targets far beyond the duties of their agents.

Among our methodologies is the use of our own bodies as observational devices for studying the social control of dissent.

Normally and decisively resistant to what we view as self-aggrandizing paranoia, Luis and I (Amory) fell victim to it while conducting our 2006 study of surveillance in the US. Seeking to be “responsible”, we designed detailed precautionary practices to protect our interviewees’ identities, to avoid data loss, and to prevent project delay. We kept our appointment calendars only in our minds,
backed up data in three places every night, never left our laptops in cars, and didn’t discuss the data on the phone. The one night I left my laptop in the hotel room and went out dancing, I carried a copy of the day’s data taped to my body.

Exhausted from travel and intense interviews, I found myself looping in my security logic, unable to clearly distinguish what needed to be protected, or even what could be protected. I wasn’t able to get a reality check and support from Luis because we weren’t going to discuss or revise security procedures over the phone. When I stumbled across my organization’s name while reading an interviewee’s FBI file, I had no way to seek any support. Back home after the research trips, I fought the urge to feel safe in my own home and maintained security procedures for nearly a year until we had submitted our first article. Several times during the year I spent hours looking for things I had successfully hidden even from my own memory.

When people believe they may be under surveillance, ordinary life takes on a fun-house quality, full of gross distortions, absurd oversights, and looming combustion. This can make you crazy, fast. It can also make you inefficient and temperamental.

I’m dragging my laptop through the grocery store. I have a cd in my underwear. Every time I leave my home I’m aware of its vulnerability. An activist with a project, running a hallucinatory (but not unrealistic) obstacle course of social control, I was determined to make it through, to deliver the goods. My daily life has been transformed, infused with fear and caution, evacuated of open celebration of struggle, ready for assault, and neutralized by the ambition to “run clean” so as to survive it.

This is not a culture of dissent. This is a culture of fear. Activists call it “security culture”. In an interview, an activist explained to us that security “was the first thing we talked about, even before our name or what we’re going to do.” This focus on security has, in some instances, had devastating impacts on inclusivity, solidarity, and the production of friendship bonds necessary to build a healthy activist community. The fundamentals of organizing culture are inclusivity and solidarity. Many of our interviews suggest that security culture has replaced organizing culture, mainly due to the effects of state surveillance. An activist explained “When I see people I don’t know I get excited. When I first saw the undercovers I was amazed that we had attracted folks that don’t fit in, and I was sad when I found out they were undercovers.” Another interviewee described how people who fit too well are suspicious as well as people who don’t fit in. The hallmarks of security culture are exclusion, wariness, withholding information, and avoiding diversity. An activist described their group as showing “paranoia, freakiness, and unwelcomingness that results from the fear...” Another activist jokingly described security culture as the “icemaker”, which has replaced the community building “icebreaker”. S/he went on to explain: “Like handing out a signup sheet...people are not only afraid to sign up, but afraid of asking for it.” A new activist described the experience this way: “What’s the opposite of unites? When I’m suspicious or they are, it creates a tension, conscious or not, about who people are and what their intentions are."
Another interviewee described the issue this way: “secretive planning is a disaster in community building.” “New people can’t get involved. It’s hard to build a movement on community when secrecy is an important thing.” Another interviewee pointed out that security culture has become so common that people are using it for actions that don’t need to be protected. “There’s confusion over what actions need to be clandestine and what doesn’t.”

Even we, the authors of this book, knowing well the social ravage of security culture, are by no means immune to it. Although lot of our work includes going to a lot of non-activist gatherings, even in these benign locations we promptly bristle when we see a “sign-up list” at the entrance of an event. Automatically, we give fake e-mails or assertively leave the space for “name” blank. Speaking on a cell phone is also affected. For instance, when speaking on the phone to a friend about plans for the future, we might hesitate to give details. When the friend is not an activist, they are bemused by vagueness. When the friend is an activist, they hear the delay and understand. And we both see how damaged we are. Even outside our activist work we still live in security culture.

In addition to the displacement of organizing culture by security culture, we found other distinct dimensions of cultural change in movements. Cultures of protest rely on trust, bonds of friendship, and community. After an infiltration was revealed, “people were tense, held back, uncommunicative, not feeling good about themselves and other people... [There’s] something insidious about destroying the trust.” An activist describes the intimacy and urgency of political community that was disrupted by infiltration: “We’re lonely in our churches and organizations where we work. So there’s an incredible sense of community when we meet [other peace activists]. We’re hugging and learning to protect each other.” An interviewee who learned that a long-term and close friend was an FBI informant describes the effect of the experience: “If this friend of mine could be an informant, then anybody could...anything could be true. My entire reality was disrupted......all my friendships and alliances thrown into question...I’m not really doing much any more.”

Social movement communities learn through “cross-pollination”. Experienced activists pass on their learnings, and people travel to share strategies and tactics. But if they’re afraid to be associated with each other, or can’t trust each other, these networks of information-sharing stop cold. “It was nice to be able to tell stories of like I worked with this organization and can I help you build... Here’s what we did that you all might be able to do... Now...you can’t help them out, you can’t tell them stories of things you’ve done before. Because if they were a snitch you’d be in a really bad situation.”

Another cultural shift is the avoidance of historical reflection, including debriefing which would necessarily indict individuals for their roles in events, events which might be criminalized some time in the future. Reflection is intentionally reduced as a protective measure: “Here, we can only talk about what’s going on here. Next week we can’t talk about this any more. And we can’t talk about something else until it’s sure who’s going to be part of it....” If actions cannot be discussed later, the strategy of the movement no longer advances. Too many witnesses. Destroy the history and the possibility of memory. Something might have happened, but no one will know exactly what, or who, or how it was done. There will be no expertise for next time. Social control effectively provokes an erasure of collective memory: minutes of gatherings are often not kept anymore, websites dissolved immediately after a mobilization. This way, activists
effectively administer their own marginalization. They have turned into “people without history”.

Many social movements create a “prefigurative” cultural practice as a dimension of their work on campaigns and projects. These very prefigurative practices, such as openness and equity, make them easy to infiltrate. (Although some believe that these practices function like jujitsu to redirect agents who must participate in progressive practices to maintain their cover.) But the agenda-reorienting, fear-cultivating pressures of social control may well elicit a reduction of prefigurative practices, particularly when those practices are used as hallmarks to target participants and movements.

Cultural communities may become social movements through the process of developing meaningful practice to continually embody their values. But as this practice verges on the political and is targeted as part of social control, its process may contract. We interviewed a church group who described how the pressures of social control caused the congregation to question (and ultimately to largely abandon) their formerly growing belief in a “Christian obligation” to social justice.

One of the most popular forms of prefiguration is participatory democracy. Under the pressures of social control, movements committed to participatory democracy and transparency resort to secretive planning (which they describe as elitist). Group members we interviewed were communicating much less and across fewer media. “There isn’t that constant discussion, which can be really beneficial. Then you get everybody’s opinion if you can talk to everyone.” Many groups reported that they were no longer maintaining their former level of inclusivity in decisionmaking. “Sometimes a handful makes decisions and it never used to be that way.” The loss of transparency is alarming because it means that members cannot hold leaders and groups accountable. And people don’t have the information they need to make informed decisions. Not only are the decisions made by fewer people, but by a group whose diversity is constrained by suspicion: “There’s not as many people involved, there’s not as many voices in the decision making, there’s not as many people from different walks of life.” Participatory democracy links accountability with transparency. Activists are well aware that secrecy can be toxic to their values; in seeing secrecy as unavoidable they know they have surrendered much of what they stand for. The cultural loss of the living values of transparency and inclusivity is personally and socially devastating.

Political violence

If social control disrupts the health and activity of social movement groups, we might understand it to have “maimed” the social movement. As we summarized in Chapter 1, dissenters require a sense of entitlement, efficacy, organizational networks, trust in government, sense of hopefulness, and space. We have shown how social control affects individuals’ comfort in and sense of efficacy in expressing their dissent, the development of political consciousness, fundraising, networks, redirection and usurpation of agendas and plans, displacement of strategic framing, foreclosure of space and dialogue, and disruption of culture.

In addition to these more-or-less linear effects, we have also identified irrational/terrified ones. Like solitary confinement, social control threatens the sanity of people and organizations. Fear coursing through them, individuals become paranoid.
and groups undermine their own values and abandon their projects. And they avoid one another, justifying this abandonment as essential for survival. Later, wasted by adrenalin and redirection, they default to actions and methods mere dispirited shadows of their former ambitions. They rationalize it all. They will be safe if they just don’t inflame the authorities. Since they usually didn’t do anything in the first place, this verges on irrationality. Could we use the phrase organizational insanity to describe an organization that has lost its ability to pursue its own intentions – or indeed to recall them faithfully?

Rather than finding the customary dualism in which hardcore activists become more militant while others become more moderate, today we find signs of pervasive pacification in the US and Europe. In lieu of going “underground” to continue their actions, many social movement groups are abandoning grey area civil disobedience activities and moving toward doing exclusively educational and permitted activities. Yet knowing that even educational events are under surveillance, groups do not feel safe undertaking this most pacific type of action. We heard reports from all types of groups that strategic and ideological dialogue has been both reduced and self-censored. L’Aquila 2009 G8 demonstrated the dramatic decline in popular willingness to participate in protest. In contrast to Genoa 2001 G8 where a hundred thousand people took to the streets, the major demonstrations in 2009 amounted to just several thousand protesters. This is not an unambiguous tendency, and there are signs also of increasing militance. Strasbourg 2009 NATO was dominated by property destruction and confrontations with the police.

Regardless of the apparent response of activists (which has many determining factors, including the sheer number of events to be protested), our focus is the political reality of social control. Even when participating in state-sanctioned actions, organizations are weakened. Confronted with a “protest pit”, would-be dissenters are discouraged to the point of feeling they are wasting their time. Social control works psychologically, and this includes Kai Vittrup’s negotiations in the streets, menacing costumes and formations, and surveillance months before the event... Psychological methods are by far the easiest and least controversial way to police a protest. People just stay home, or engage in legal activities that are non-disruptive.

Can we propose that social control can be fatal when it does not kill a person? We are alarmed to find security culture displacing organizing culture in most groups, including peace groups, pacifist groups, and other groups who only do legal activities. We are also concerned by the reduction of free communication and the loss of both living history and written archives. Communication and archiving are essential functions of organizations, without which they become something less than an organization, incoherent and episodic. Organizations which cannot organize, communicate internally, establish relationships, or maintain archives are in critical condition.

Melucci emphasizes “collective action as a social production, as a purposive, meaningful and relational orientation.”

Associational life depends on membership, donations, and access to space in which people feel comfortable engaging political ideas. Assaults on organizations that deprive them of resources and democratic space, and which burden potential participants with excessive risk amount to what are conceptualized on an individual level as assault or excessive use of force. If we can show that social control debilitates, disables, and destroys political activists and organizations does it make sense any longer to describe it with a term other than “violence”? If political violence includes a range of activities directed against political
organizations, and we can observe these activities regularly in Western Europe and the US, can we continue make sense of an analytic tendency which reserves the analysis of state political violence for “dictatorships”?

Purportedly democratic modern states are engaged in a good deal of violence, not only in their external relations with other states, but also in managing their own populations. This includes what is seen as legitimate spontaneous use of force in apprehending suspected criminals (sometimes executing them in the process). Violence is routine in the administrative management of detainees, prisoners, and migrants. Militarized police operations against organized groups, such as squatters and separatists, are supposed to be taken under judicial directive. Violence is also used to secure the “public order” of large, disorganized and anonymous crowds, such as sports fans or paraders. States engaged in civil war, mobilize violence through police, prisons, military, and vigilante organizations.

Violence against political dissenters in non-civil war situations is sometimes conceptualized as a “public order” conflict. It sometimes takes the form of criminalization and judiciary-directed military action. When dissenters are categorized (usually through political rather than judicial means) as “threats to security” or “domestic terrorism”, state violence may involve federal agencies and military resources.

“Political violence” is a concept that has been used to study social movement tactics (Gamson 1975, Della Porta 1995) and totalitarian societies (Corradi et. al., ed. 1992, Robben 2005, Mahmood ed. 1997). There is a fair amount of political territory between these. Research on state political violence against social movements in democracies has not gone much beyond forceful protest policing (Della Porta & Reiter, ed. 1998).

Citizens and residents of democratic modern states may enact violence against the state, including individual acts of rage, seemingly spontaneous insurrections, strategic sabotage, guerilla, or military action. All of this action is political; it is dissent by other means. The most outstanding recent examples of violent confrontations with the state were the 2005 banlieu-riots in France, and the 2008 upheavals in Greece after the police murder of the 15-year old Alexandros Grigoropoulos. In both cases, violence consisted widely of mass confrontations with the police (including the throwing of stones, rockets, and molotov cocktails), burning cars and rubbish bins for erecting barricades, trashing of shop windows, and looting. The concept of violence can produce heated debates among activists and scholars alike, each using different definitions and coming from diverse ideological perspectives. In particular, the tactics of Black Blocs produce strong reactions. Appendix A in this book contains an e-mail dialogue between two scholars: John Holloway and Vittorio Sergi. The dialogue focuses on the tactics of the Black Bloc and their relations to violence. The dialogue is included because it clearly shows the complexity of the issue and will likely prove useful for the reader.

Our research shows that overt, bodily violence against protesters is part of a dense continuum of state activity. The density is important because bodily violence is neither distinctly the worst thing that can happen to an activist nor is it entirely separable from other forms of repression, over which it looms as an explicit or implicit threat. Repression is a multimedia assault that arrives in the psyche at once. By referencing one another, both bodily violence and other forms of repression have a cumulative force and impact, as documented in studies of state terror. While we do not
intend to diffuse the meaning of ‘violence’, nor to enter into debate about its proper contents, it is apparent that less overt forms of state repression wreak comparable damage.

We are cautious about undermining the usefulness of the concept of violence by expanding it. Nevertheless, while considering state violence against dissenters we feel the need to ask about the meaning of political violence. Is political violence the subset of overt bodily violence which has a political source or is it damage to political rights?

- If a dissenting group is restricted by legislation, permitting conditions, or metal barricades from access to public space to such an extent that their ability to create a meaningful challenge is eliminated or curtailed –although no bodies be injured– is this political violence?
- If a dissenting group whose members, though marginalized, had expressed enthusiasm for political expression now finds that the environment of protest has changed such that these same members are now frightened or newly impotent to express their planned dissenting view –although no bodies be injured– is this political violence?
- If a dissenting group, having embarked upon a manifestation the planning of which has been surveilled such that the police know there are no plans for any violent actions, is pestered by searches or restriction of entry to start point, rerouted, terrorized at gunpoint, or arrested, –although no bodies be injured– is this political violence?
- If a dissenting group finds that it receives extensive media coverage it has not initiated, which associates it with property crime or violence, and which coverage seeks to convince the public (including persons concerned about the substantive issues the group works on who may have considered attending events organized by this group as an opportunity to learn more or express their views) to view it as criminal and to avoid contact with its ideas and members – although no bodies be injured– is this political violence?
- If a dissenting group finds that it has been labeled “domestic terrorist” in government databases such that donations and receipt of literature will adhere this label also to members, recipients, and donors. And if this labeling has a sharp detrimental effect on budget, audience, and operations of the organization – although no bodies be injured– is this political violence?

What kind of subjects can experience political violence? Organizations? Communities? Social movements? If some of these subjects do not have “bodies” or legal “standing”, how does violence need to be conceptualized? This is a question of unit of analysis. Civil rights protections embrace not only individual speech, which may be made impossible or discouraged, but also rights of political association and assembly. Physical violence is not the only (and not necessarily the most powerful) method of disturbing the exercise of these rights.

This recognition identifies a need for a legal concept which could establish standing for informal political organizations and social movements. If corporate political donations are protected as a form of “free speech”, then surely such assaults on membership-based organizations must be understood as a form of political violence. If
private enterprise is protected by tort law from libel, denial of service, and interference with customer access to premises, (tortious interference), then nonprofit organizations and civil society groups should also be protected from interference with advantageous relationships that affect their resources, capacity to mobilize them, and opportunity to participate in public discourse.

And social control does kill persons. Global activist networks now bring the news too often that a human rights lawyer or a labor leader has been assassinated in the Global South. And Global North alterglobalization activists have been killed abroad. A US woman and two British activists were killed by Israeli forces in Palestine, and US activists were killed in 2006 and 2008 in México. Activists are uncomfortable expressing outrage at assassinations of Global North activists; an expectation of safety seems like an expression of imperialist/white skin privilege.

But the relative safety of Northern witnesses abroad is a matter of global power relations – the very power relations which the alterglobalization movement confronts with its solidarity. Something has changed when Israel and México feel comfortable assassinating the rebellious visionary children of their powerful political allies. These assassinations are an assault on the movements of international solidarity. The deaths are called mistakes, or blamed on paramilitaries, but the message is clear: the governments are united against those who oppose their global plans and will collaborate in trivializing political murders of pacifists and journalists. Some assassinations are aimed, others are incidental, but the message is clear. They will kill activists. You are by no means safe to express yourself.
Chapter 6.
Anti-Repression: resisting the social control of dissent

San Francisco police have repeatedly frustrated protesters with spatial control tactics including holding pens, and mass arrests. Preparing another anti-war protest in 2008, protest organizers released a large list of potential targets for protest, rather than a single location or march route. Dissenters signed up to a Twitter.com feed to receive text messages identifying chosen targets and gathering times, some simultaneous. Meanwhile activist DJs on pirate radio station 102.5 provided information about police massing and action and relayed reports from protesters in the streets. Why did activists feel that such an elaborate infrastructure was necessary to express their dissent? Clearly, they wanted to escape spatial challenging, but why is this so important?

We believe that activist responses to social control contain profound insights into its meaning and significance. This chapter describes anti-repression, the tactics activists use to protect themselves from the social control of dissent. We have organized our analysis of anti-repression work to match our three approaches to social control, by looking at space, political economy, and violence.

Resisting spatial control

We have identified five anti-repression tactics which resist spatial control: confronting the zones with blockades or invasions, marching disobediently, organizing in decentralized affinity groups, disturbing police control through observation, and distributing spatially aggregated information about the protest territory.

Breaching the zones, blockading back

Protesters fight back against spatial control with their own spatial tactics. The fundamental spatial project of summits is to exclude all but elites from the conversation and decision-making about the global economy. Since this exclusion is not only symbolic of the issue, but is the actual issue, it can be challenged in the most direct manner by attempting to get in, and showing the world just how difficult it is by generating mass-media images of police keeping people out.

The Tute Bianche tactic involves a group which stays tightly together while wearing personal body armor made of household products such as cardboard, foam, rubber, and empty plastic water bottles. Over the armor, many wear white painters coveralls and life preservers, resulting in a comic bulky look. They carry collective shielding such as massive rafts of balloons old inner tubes, or plexiglass. Invoking a medieval army (in a humorous way), they ponderously approach the police lines, stop and announce their intention, as citizens to pass “with arms up”, peacefully through the police lines to attend the meetings, and then push against the police, producing comic
mayhem. This way they protect their bodies against police violence and also stage theatrical (and often successful) attempts to push through police lines while getting clubbed. After several spectacular interventions with this tactics in Italy (followed by a near total disappearance after the clashes at Genoa 2001 G8), this tactic was applied in various other countries and at many other summits, mainly in Europe.²⁴⁷

Protesters also organize to refuse the exclusion more assertively. There are two striking examples. At Québec City 2001 FTAA, the large march arrived (after a very long walk) to the fence, promptly breached it and walked in to the Red Zone. Unfortunately, most marchers were not expecting or prepared for this turn of events and didn’t seize the opportunity so the few who did were shortly rebuffed by police. At Cancún 2003 WTO, where protesters (organized by the very well-prepared South Korean delegation) collectively tugged down the fence with big ropes, protesters did not pass the fence. They stayed where they were and left the torn-down fence as a message.

Seattle 1999 WTO used a different spatial and symbolic strategy, which was that if ordinary people wouldn’t be allowed to enter the meetings, then no one should be able to go in. Protesters blockaded the flow of delegates into the meeting by blocking intersections, using a variety of creative methods. Since the successful blockades of Seattle, similar (and more or less successful) attempts have been staged at all subsequent summit protests. When global summitry shifted to remote rural venues, protesters applied more decentralized blockades, such as at Évian 2003 G8 and Heiligendamm 2007 G8.

Marching tactics and organizing crowds
Various marching tactics are used to evade spatial control during street actions. In Europe, linking arms is a frequently used tactic for protecting the space of a demonstration and preventing police intrusion or individual arrests. Alternatively, marches have been intentionally split into several parts to circumvent police lines in order to occupy a certain space. At Prague 2000 IMF/WB, a unified march broke into three color-coded marches using different routes (and tactics!) to reach the conference centre. Similarly at Heiligendamm 2007 G8, after starting as one march, protesters split up into five pre-established (and color-coded) “fingers” each time they encountered a police line. In this way, they forced the police to stretch their lines until they were so thin that protesters could “trickle” through them. The slogan given by the BlockG8 coalition organizing the mass blockades was: “Don’t aim for the cops, aim for the gaps in between them”. Later, on the street where the sitting blockades were to be staged, all the “fingers” came together again.

A few months after Heiligendamm 2007 G8, a demonstration was organized in Hamburg to protest against security politics and the repression of dissent. In response to the kettle tactic that had been used by police, the call to action for this demonstration asked participants to attempt to remain outside of the police encirclement by constantly being on move, "out of control". (The answer of the authorities was a ban on walking on the sidewalk during this specific assembly.)

Affinity groups
Affinity groups are a tactic inspired by the organization of the anarchist resistance in the Spanish civil war. From the 1970s onwards, this tactic was introduced for organizing mass direct actions. Affinity groups are the organizational unit of a mass direct action.
They provide security for individuals, enable quick communication and decision-making, and try to be self-sufficient in food and medical provision. Affinity groups determine their own contribution to the action (within the general action guidelines) and have a high degree of autonomy during the action. Many new action forms that have flourished around summit protests have adapted this organizational model, such as samba bands, pink & silver blocs, and the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army. The last is an action form tactically exploiting the figure of a clown, which confuses police and others. A large Clown Army confronted with a police line can quickly fall apart into many affinity groups (“gaggles”) doing their own thing. The ensuing chaos frequently has spoiled the police attempt to maintain spatial control and creates space for other protesters.

Affinity groups enable dissenters to maintain spatial mobility operating in functional units that can pursue their own goals and function, at times independent of each other. Activists can disperse from a confrontation without becoming impotent, because each affinity group stays together and continues decentralized disruptive actions.

Counter-observation

Activists and sympathetic legal workers have developed a grassroots culture and method of watching and documenting police behavior. Similar to volunteer medics and independent journalists, legal observation (also known in the US as CopWatch) has become a paraprofessional volunteer role taken on by people who want to support protest and dissent. Law students, legal workers, and lawyers provide this service out of a concern for political rights. At mass actions, they watch for police and protester interactions, move in close to the action, record its sequence, and attempt to record identifying information of arresting officers, violent officers, and commanders on scene. Their presence disrupts the flow of police violence and total control.

Legal observers serve several layered functions. First, they gather evidence which may be useful to the defense of charged individuals. Second, they compile data longitudinally, which may form the basis of police accountability campaigns or litigation against a specific police agency. Sometimes the presence of observers discourages police misbehavior. However, they do not serve as negotiators during conflicts, remaining in their role as observers. This way, legal observing becomes a form of counter-observation with significant spatial effects. In the presence of legal observers protest spaces are less often so isolated by police that they can assert total control. Police often try to hinder the work of observers, photographers, videographers, and even journalists. At Heiligendamm 2007 G8, police severely incapacitated the work of the observers by not letting them get close to a person being arrested, by keeping them away from a corralled demonstration, and even by giving one a ban order.

Legal observation is transmitted beyond legal workers as popular education through short trainings. It has spread virally through grassroots networks. People trained at a workshop at a mass action may then do observation spontaneously whenever they see signs of police misbehavior. They can also train and encourage others to spontaneously watch and document policing. People trained at mass actions take these skills home and keep an eye on local police harassment of youth, people of color, immigrants, etc. Some even set up formal groups with patrol schedules or volunteer to observe at for social events which anticipate police harassment. Armed
with recording devices, knowledge of the law, and official markings, watchers patrol or post observers at event locations.

A somewhat more popular, less formal, form of observation is undertaken by a broader range of people, including but not limited to official observers. People watch for signs that a fellow protester is in fact an undercover police officer. They then take photos or videos of this person, preferably showing evidence of their alliance (strange communications equipment, weapons, getting into a police car, going behind police lines). This material can be distributed through independent media to warn activists and is sometimes relevant to litigation.

*Pirate communication*

Resisting spatial control requires adequate information about (shifting) spatial possibilities. Pirate communication is an important tactic for re/enabling the circulation of information and therefore the tactical flow of protesters. Pirate communication is organized through a combination of entrusted face-to-face communication, radios, walkie-talkies, cell phones, and internet technologies.

A common element of communication during summit protests is a newswire run on a website set up to provide news and information about the protest (usually an IMC – part of the Independent Media Center network). The newswire summarizes reports from protesters in the streets such as “Independence Plaza is still occupied. DJs have arrived. People are dancing.” and “Commerce Ave and Rivers St arrests now taking place at north side of intersection.” Protesters in the streets can subscribe to the ticker and receive this information on their cell phones. Twitter technology and pirate radio are new ways to distribute this information.

At Prague 2000 IMF/WB the Centrum coordination centre enabled a flow of communication between the various marches trying to get close to the summit’s venue. The physical space of the Centrum was a hotel room, whose location was secret from all but its staff. This communication hub was fed by a team of cyclists who provided status reports by radio. Placards were used to diffuse messages about the situation at the different marches. In the early afternoon, for example, protesters of the white march stuck on the Nussle bridge were informed that the pink & silver march had reached the conference centre and could use some reinforcement. The Centrum was not a command centre, but one node in a decentralised network. It compiled and disseminated information to action groups so they could decide where to put their energies as the situation across the city unfolded. In addition, the various marches encircling the conference centre, also organized their internal communication structures. Although info-houses like the Centrum are a common part of protests, the FBI made the first successful raid on one of these facilities was accomplished at Pittsburgh 2009 G20. The workers in the info-house were charged with “hindering prosecution” because they were providing information on movements of police (via Twitter). However, the state’s attempt to criminalize Twitter was unsuccessful and charges were dropped.²⁴⁸

At Heiligendamm 2007 G8, the circulation of information about spatial control was organized through a horizontal network of on-the-ground information centers located in the action camps and in the region around the conference venue. Again, these information points pooled incoming information and distributed it to people passing by and calling.
The political economy of solidarity

Organizing solidarity against the legal consequences of social control is a costly endeavor. To share the financial burden, social movements create collective structures for sharing the costs of legal prosecution. The German “Rote Hilfe” (or Red Help) is a long-standing collective structure that supports activists who find themselves in political litigation. Functioning as a fund, this organization pools the financial contributions of supporters and re-distributes them. In Europe, one of the successful ad hoc tactics to raise money (often for specific cases or mobilizations) is solidarity concerts or parties. For the trials after major summit protests, these were organized in many cities all over Europe. Besides raising money, solidarity concerts spread awareness and knowledge about legal defense.

At Heiligendamm 2007 G8, Rote Hilfe was an important resource for activists. Equally important was the money raised by the campsite working group and contributed to the anti-repression team which not only supported activists needing legal defense but also encouraged activists to file complaints and start trials against police and authorities.

However, legal costs can start even before the protests. For example, during a march against the G8 in Germany, authorities issued a general ban order for the entire area around the meeting location. Activists planned a Star March, which directly challenged the legality of prohibition. However, the activists’ lawyer explained that the amount involved in the case could be four times €5,000 if each part of the Star March would have to be defended separately. Despite being a grassroots network without steady financial structures, the Star March coalition decided to push the case to the Constitutional Court of Germany, a financially demanding, and lengthy, process.

While some street activists are involved in the various forms of legal work described in this section, most of the workers are sympathizers who take action in these projects because they are concerned to defend political rights. They do not accept the necessity of suspending rights for this important Summit, and give their time and energy to protecting the most expansive practices of political rights.

Legal Teams

Activist legal teams are part of the mass action framework common in Europe and North America. The action framework includes various protest sectors. Major permitted marches are organized by unions, peace groups, and other large organizations or coalitions. These groups negotiate with the police and often even provide their own internal policing, through a “marshall” system, which attempts to keep participants on the negotiated course. Meanwhile the direct action sector (who may participate in the permitted marches but often also mount all sorts of other actions before and after the permitted marches) is organized through a working group system, usually involving: a headquarters space for information, meetings, art, storage; a housing assistance group; an independent media facility (Indymedia); public relations strategy and spokespeople; a school which provides non-violence and other trainings; clinics and medics; kitchen; communications; and action scenario teams. Activist legal teams are part of this structure, one of several autonomous but coordinated action “working groups” providing infrastructure specific to the action. Attached to and staffed by the direct action sector, these working groups see themselves in service to all protest
sectors, including the non-direct action protest sectors. Media, medical, and legal groups most likely to be used by protesters from all the sectors.

The majority of workers in the legal team are non-lawyers. However, the team must include a few lawyers who are responsible for the tasks requiring their status, such as filing injunctions, visiting arrestees in detention, and appearing in court. The majority of the work can be done by non-professionals who in the process gain skills and knowledge as “legal workers”. The work they do includes: teaching Know Your Rights trainings and preparing materials; mapping the participating police agencies and jails; tracking arrestees through the jail system; communicating legal information at activist meetings (interpreting proclamations, summarizing statistics, and reporting status of arrestees); issuing press releases; compiling data; and staffing a hotline to record reports, field questions, and provide information to arrestees, their families and supporters. Experienced protest legal workers sometimes train volunteer lawyers in preferred techniques for advising and representing political arrestees, which differ from normal criminal defense strategies.

In advance of a mass action, the legal team announces a hotline phone number and encourages all activists to write this number on their skin daily in indelible ink. (Nevertheless, many of those attending permitted events may not know about this phone number.) The legal team answers calls at this number 24 hours a day for the week surrounding the actions. The legal team provides legal support to all participants and arrestees (which may include non-activist passersby, journalists, and participants with all the different protest groups). Given the mayhem of protest arrests, the activist legal team is often the best first responder since other lawyers are unprepared for the peculiarities of protest detention systems. In Europe, a number of leftwing lawyers associations (such as the German “Republikanischer Anwaltsverein”, part of Heiligendamm 2007 G8) are working to establish a permanent European Legal Team to secure a continuity of experience and avoid building a new organization for each mobilization.

Support for arrestees includes vigilantly tracking every arrestee through various facilities, ascertaining conditions for release, making jail visits to all arrestees to check on their conditions, communicating status to each arrestee’s supporters to assist in securing release, documenting unusual conditions, archiving evidence, negotiating with city officials regarding arrestees, mounting legal interventions regarding specific cases (foreign nationals, youths, injured people, solitary confinements, arrestees needing medication), and even arranging to post bond or sign for people who do not have anyone to do it for them. The legal team is expected to provide reliable information to the public relations team, independent media, the action scenario team, and the headquarters (nightly meetings). This information includes: number of arrestees, locations, conditions for release, needed logistical support for released arrestees (food, transportation, medical care, housing), and the most important targets and topics of immediate political demands (such as moving groups of arrestees from dangerous facilities – although usually the demand is simply “release all arrestees now”).

After all arrestees are released from detention, the legal team moves to two phases of post-action work, criminal defense and preparing for civil suits. For criminal defense, the team establishes communication with arrestees, tracks information regarding court dates and charges, recruits volunteer lawyers for court appearances, and organizes an evidence archive for use in the defenses. In addition, the legal team can help develop a strategy for the defenses, organize the arrestees in collective
defenses (sometimes conjoining individual cases), and train volunteer lawyers in
defense strategies (maintain to the maximum extent solidarity with other arrestees and
keep political dimensions of the arrest and prosecution at the forefront of the case). The
legal team may also engage in press work.

To prepare for civil suits, the legal teams archives reports of police harassment,
excessive use of force, and testimony of conditions and treatment in detention. This
material may be used as part of civil inquiry processes as well as the preparation of
multiple lawsuits against the city representing various groups of protesters or others
violated as part of the social control of protest. One of the most extensive archives –
despite the material destroyed by police during the Diaz raids– is the work of “Supporto
Legale” a legal support team founded for the Genoa 2001 G8 protests.249

Activists trained as legal workers in political contexts have gone on to use their
skills for other solidarity work, such as assisting prisoners in filing appeals (Up Against the
Law Legal Collective, Chicago, now inactive), supporting homeless people in fighting
tickets (Toronto), and advocating for the release of detained immigrants.

Street legal

In addition to legal observers, lawyers and legal workers familiar with relevant law
sometimes provide legal services in the street during a protest. There are several types
of street legal work. The first type is called a “police liaison” (often called “police
spokesperson” in Europe). This person needs no legal knowledge or training. They serve
as a communication device between protesters and the commander on scene. They
do not negotiate, although they may communicate offers from one side to the other.
By identifying and introducing themselves to the commander on duty early on in the
action, they may be able to maintain access to that person once things heat up (when
access to the police line is often restricted). Decisions are taken by protesters in
consensus decision-making procedures and the police liaison communicates the
decisions to commanding officers.

A second type of street legal is a lawyer who appoints themselves to locations
where police action seems immanent, including raids. This person does not represent
any protesters, but acts alone proactively to defend protesters and spaces by invoking
the law. They identify themselves as a lawyer and aggressively inform officers and their
commanders about illegal acts they are conducting or threatening. This person may
travel with a legal observer or assistant with video camera and other equipment to
document incidents. These lawyers may later head civil suits against the police for
violations witnessed.

The third type of street legal is a liaison between the legal team and the top-
ranking officials in charge of police operations. This relationship may be established by
the legal team days or weeks ahead of the action. Again, this liaison has no authority to
negotiate on behalf of activists. What they can do, since they have direct contact with
police command structures, is to get clear information on changing situations such as
closure of formerly permitted protest areas, imposition of curfews, locations of arrestees,
and other police actions. They can then communicate this information to activist media
and organizing spaces. The police are not obligated to provide information to this
person. They are unlikely to give accurate information on street tactics they plan to use
(mass arrest, tear gas, etc.), but they often will provide information on what they have
declared to be illegal and about the location of prisoners. It is notable that persons
working all three types of street legal are not immune from arrest or police brutality. For example, all three types and legal observers were arrested for example at Miami 2003 FTAA.

Political litigation

There are two kinds of litigation, criminal defense (discussed above) and proactive civil litigation against government agencies. Proactive civil litigation includes individual and group suits regarding injuries inflicted by police in the streets or in custody and class action suits regarding violations of civil rights, including exclusion zones, use of weapons, mass arrest, raids, and other forms of social control.

Barkan summarizes the literature on proactive civil litigation by social movements in general, finding the literature split on the efficacy of such attempts to “regulate business behavior...prevent immoral behavior... effect desegregation... stop construction of nuclear power plants...[and] end the [Vietnam] war”. Even when successful, court orders regarding social justice concerns are not necessarily enforced. In his 1990 study of environmental justice struggles, Bullard finds that while neither litigation nor any other single tactic appeared to be effective, a combination of tactics including litigation was often successful in securing facility closure or reduction. Barkan also points out that legal victories which establish “claims of right” confer entitlement which can strengthen movements.

Barkan identified four lines of inquiry with regard to both defense and proactive litigation: “At what stage of social movements are they likely to [devote resources to] litigate?” “To what extent do various aspect of the legal system affect decisions by social movements to turn to the civil and criminal courts?” “What is the influence of the press on the frequency of civil disobedience and on decisions to conduct a political defense?” “What circumstances lead to decisions by government officials to use the courts as a means of social control?”

Proactive litigation regarding social control focuses on protecting activism and activists against a creeping affront on expressive rights and ill-regulated political policing. Protections of the First Amendment are not as numerous as violations, but there are a variety of efforts underway. This brief overview is limited to those closely associated with the alterglobalization movement, although there are many other relevant and important activities, in which many alterglobalization activists are involved, such as the more than 100 local resolutions suppressing local enforcement of the Patriot Act in the United States and lawsuits regarding 9-11-related detentions and war crimes.

• After Seattle 1999 WTO, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice failed in their challenge to the illegality of the no-protest zone but won a settlement from the city for 155 protesters arrested outside of the no-protest zone with no probable cause.

• In 2002 the ACLU, joined by a popular movement, challenged the Denver police department and mayor to release files being kept on 3200 Colorado activists and 208 organizations, which were found to include the pacifist Quaker American Friends Service Committee, some nuns, and many activists whose only crime was participation in entirely lawful protest activity. The activists dubbed the files “spy files” and, once they were released by court order in 2003, organized people to go request their files. After this success the ACLU on December 2, 2004 “launched a nationwide effort to expose and limit FBI spying on people and
groups simply for speaking out or practicing their faith." The initial step of the campaign is Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests in 10 states and the District of Columbia intended to demonstrate that "FBI and local police – working through so-called Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) – are spying on environmental, anti-war, political, and faith-based groups." The FOIAs seek two kinds of information: 1) the actual FBI files of groups and individuals targeted for their political views or their religion; 2) information about how the structure and policies of the JTTFs are encouraging rampant and unwarranted spying.\(^\text{253}\)

- Savvy media work around the revelation of infiltration of a group called Fresno Peace led California’s Attorney General Bill Lockyer to mandate the state’s law enforcement agencies to “follow the California State Constitution, which prevents them from infiltrating groups that are not under investigation for criminal activity.”\(^\text{254}\)
- The Partnership for Civil Justice has ongoing litigation in Washington DC regarding infiltration, long-term undercover spying, mass arrests, mass intelligence-gathering operations on protesters, the use of Civil Disturbance Units, checkpoints, odious permission requirements for persons planning to protest the inauguration, and agents provocateurs. They have succeeded in gaining settlements to individuals as well as policy changes including no longer engaging in the “illegal practice of rounding up and arresting demonstrators for ‘parading without a permit’ without notice and opportunity to leave.” The DC city council has adopted a bill which prohibits use of riot gear and encirclement of First Amendment protected assemblies without establishment of probable cause, requires display of nameplates and badges, and mandates release of First Amendment assembly arrestees within 4 hours.\(^\text{255}\)
- After an egregious attack on anti-war demonstrators in 2003, the ACLU of Northern California, the National Lawyers Guild, and a team of prominent civil rights attorneys, successfully pressured the Oakland Police Department to end the use of less lethal weapons against demonstrators in November 2004.\(^\text{256}\)
- Individual and group lawsuits regarding policing and incarceration at Miami 2003 FTAA have paid US$1.05 million. But these suits have only addressed personal damages, not policy for protest policing.
- Three female activists charged with “failure to disperse” at Miami 2003 FTAA were strip-searched in jail. In preparing their lawsuit against Miami-Dade County, they found that strip searches women arrestees with non-violent charges (prostitution, loitering, traffic offense…) were standard policy. The policy has been changed and a US$ 6.25 million settlement is being distributed to women violated in the last five years.\(^\text{257}\)
- The New York City Civil Liberties Union successfully pressured the city to destroy the fingerprint records of people arrested during New York City 2004 RNC. But as of 2008 their cases regarding protest policing have not been concluded.\(^\text{258}\) The Partnership for Civil Justice litigated against the City of New York with plaintiffs ANSWER and National Council of Arab Americans to protect access to Central Park. They argued that in denying permits, including for their planned protest of the RNC in 2004, the city is essentially privatizing the park, restricting use for corporate events and denying mass demonstrations. The ruling provided both a settlement to the plaintiffs of US$50,000 (plus payment of legal fees) and a court
order that the park must remain available for first amendment activity, with research and planning undertaken to ensure park sustainability.259

- There are two major lawsuits regarding Genoa 2001 G8. The first concerns the violent raid on the Diaz School.260 The verdict on this lawsuit was reached in November 2008. Thirteen of 29 police defendants were convicted, not including any of the commanding officers. As Italy has no law against torture, the victims of the Diaz raid plan to take the case to the European Court of Human rights. The Bolzaneto trial concerns 45 police, jail, staff and doctors accused by a group of 300 victims of “misuse of authority, constraint, abuse, intimidation and falsification of evidence”.261 The plaintiffs were granted compensation ranging from €2500 to €15,000. Only 15 of the accused were convicted and the maximum sentence given was 5 years 8 months, but indeed this person was a commanding officer, the chief of security of the jail. The defendants are appealing, which means that by the time their next trial is completed even if they are convicted they will not be required to serve jail time due to the long time since the crime.

Despite the occasional successes in proactive political litigation, there are thousands of citizens whose rights have been violated who remain unrepresented. After ten years, Seattle has been challenged on only a few of the many illegalities perpetrated at Seattle 1999 WTO. Fewer than 50 of the thousands of activists violated at Miami 2003 FTAA have been represented in suits against the state, and only a handful of the state’s illegal actions have yet been challenged. Fewer than 400 of the protesters of Genoa 2001 G8 have been represented in court, and only those with the most severe injuries. Those who only had their attempt to express themselves violated, but received fewer bruises, have not been represented at all. Organizing these suits requires a team of dedicated lawyers, capital to cover the costs until the case is completed, and sustained vigilance at the courts. The immediate and tragic result of inadequate prosecution is that police, commanders, and cities can violate the law with relative impunity. They know that they will get away with most of the illegal activities they undertake. Moreover, with the new practice of taking out insurance policies to cover the costs of litigation and settlement, the police and officials are under even less pressure. In the long term, it means that the law is undermined by the practices of the police; de facto social control of dissent is increasingly divergent from the law.

One final observation regarding this litigation is that it has a very different social organization than the previous stages. As described above, many anti-repression practices have empowering, self-diffusing, highly participatory, and synthetic qualities. Due to its centralization and dependence on experts, civil litigation tends not replicate these qualities. While all other phases of anti-repression involve diverse participation and constant communication both in strategy and operations, the civil suits are strategized and implemented in isolation. While radical democracy and egalitarianism are fiercely enforced in every other aspect and process of the movement, the civil suit process involves “trusting the experts” (and trusting the state’s judicial apparatus), a concept that global justice activists abhor in every other moment of action. This switch happens in part because generally the litigators are the same lawyers who participated in the legal team, perhaps in the streets, and in the criminal defense of the activists. They have proven themselves and are the subject of great respect and gratitude. But the other part is that (with a few exceptions) activists have not attempted to figure out how to turn proactive litigation into a participatory process.
Perhaps the lawyers are concerned that winning requires an expert strategy, or perhaps the task of training volunteer legal workers for this kind of case seems unwieldy. As a result, litigation does not benefit from activist resources such as volunteers (so important to the legal team and criminal defense phases), savvy activist media teams, and mass solidarity (such as court solidarity). Despite historical recognition that the success of social justice lawsuits is closely related to the persistence of social movement mobilization, political litigation teams often do not manage to publicize the news of the cases through activist networks, with the result that activists don’t even know the status of the cases. Moreover, the legal strategy the settlements may not be synchronized with broader social movement strategy. Without a culture and method of participation, activists are unable to collectively define procedural or substantive demands, so the lawyers are left to act autonomously. This is not to criticize the few and extraordinarily dedicated lawyers who bring these suits. But since such litigation is a method of compelling state accountability for the effects of social control, its limitations are striking.

Surviving political violence

In addition to protecting space, activists have developed tactics for protecting their bodies, minds, psyches, and culture from the violences we discussed in Chapter 5.

Know your rights, know our past, know your enemy

The most basic aspect of anti-repression is a grassroots viral education program to teach people their rights as dissenters. Education takes the form of workshops, pamphlets, Internet resources, video clips, pocket-sized cards, and stickers covering issues such as speech and expression, interactions with police, rights in custody, and recommended behavior such as remaining silent.

Know Your Rights educational materials are customized for particular political events, addressing local or event-specific laws, and have also been developed by political activists for solidarity work with immigrants, youth, sex workers, and other groups. This empowering information flows beyond specific political contexts, empowering learners and turning them into spontaneous educators.

A special form of Know Your Rights education in the US is preparation for grand juries. Witnesses called before grand juries don’t have the rights that criminal defendants have. They can be jailed for refusing to testify. However, since the proceedings are secret and there is no judge, it is easy to use witnesses to sow fear throughout a community. This is why the Grand Jury Resistance Project and other groups recommend refusing rather than cooperating with grand jury subpoenas. They provide community trainings to help people prepare.

Besides education about rights, this form of resisting social control is also about sharing anti-repression experiences and histories. Grounded and situated knowledge is often the most useful one to push tactical innovation. All the reports, magazines and mailing list discussions taking place before, after, and in between protest events are an important part of building a collective (tactical) memory.

Solidarity

Political arrestees are often subject to exaggerated detention, unusual conditions, excessive charges, and targeted abuse based on the political dimension of their
criminalization. These conditions can be addressed as they are happening and also later in court through various forms of collective action. These legal strategies are called solidarity and begin at the moment of arrest. Solidarity is one more subject of trainings and grassroots viral education offered in the weeks and days prior to a mass action. Viral trainings in solidarity principles and tactics even take place in arrest vans and continue in jail.

Activists have developed a set of tactics which enable arrestees to disrupt the jail in order to protect endangered arrestees, demand better conditions, and pressure for collective release and/or minimal charges. When hundreds of people are in jail, these tactics can be significant. They include: refusing to be identifiable (this requires that people not carry any form of identification), refusing to identify their citizenship (in solidarity with non-citizens), non-cooperation with processing procedures, singing, chanting, dancing, stripping, going limp, clinging together, hunger strikes, etc. These tactics have been successful in attaining a range of concessions such as return of prescription medicine to arrestees, return of isolated prisoners to the larger group, and collective reduction of charges. Jail solidarity works in conjunction with ongoing negotiation between city officials and lawyers from the legal team, activists doing solidarity vigils (often generating encouraging and disruptive noise) outside the jail, media coverage, and phone campaigns.

When jail solidarity is not feasible or is unsuccessful in reducing charges, arrestees may use court solidarity to address their criminal charges. Court solidarity includes tactics which may be disruptive, but which, more importantly, help arrestees strategize collectively and keep public discourse focused on the political content of activists’ court appearances and trials. Court solidarity tactics include: mass appearances in court (including sympathetic non-arrestees); signs and costumes drawing attention to the violations of free speech; petitions for combined charges/cases, trials, and sentences; demands for full trials, speedy trials or jury trials (if many people request full court proceedings, it pressures the prosecuting attorney to dismiss charges so as not to clog up the court system and his staff); introduction of political content in the court proceedings; and press conferences and other media work drawing attention to the trials and sentences.

A focal point of solidarity is always the subset of arrestees charged with severe crimes. The resistance of a larger group with lower charges helps maintain a spotlight on the political nature of the severe charges and criminalization of the smaller group, in an effort to deligitimize those charges. Arrestee networks can develop strategy and share experiences to minimize convictions. The arrestee network after Philadelphia 2000 RNC was particularly strong and democratic.

Normal strategy for criminal defense seeks to minimize individual risks by accepting reduced charges, pleading guilty, seeking dismissal based on technicalities, and distinguishing individuals so as to separate them from group criminality. Defense of prosecuted political activists generally takes a different strategy, maintaining a collective dimension to defense (individuals are being targeted because of their participation in collective action), keeping the politics in the forefront of the defense, and extending court proceedings to the maximum (asserting prosecuted dissenters’ innocence and insisting on the recognition of charged activity as protected expression), while discouraging the prosecution of activists by increasing the costs and burden on police and courts.
Collective organizing of arrestees and access to movement lawyers enables large groups of arrestees to reject states’ attempts to negotiate small guilty pleas. In this way, the state is prevented from minimizing the burden on the courts while still criminalizing protest. Insisting on court proceedings for charged dissenters is more likely to yield acquittal and to maximize exposure of the state’s inappropriate attempt to constrain dissent. Following Heiligendamm 2007 G8, the strength of the legal team reduced the risk for charged protesters to reject the state’s proposal of a small fine, go through a real trial, and be totally acquitted. The state was thwarted in its bid for criminal records.

Trauma groups

Trauma groups are part of the established repertoire of resisting the social control of dissent. Along with many of the other working groups organized around a mass action, healers and psychologists offer a space and services to assist activists to recover from trauma. The healing or trauma center may operate during the days of action, and may continue for months afterward. People with strengths in various methods of healing may join this working group and focus their energy on caring for fellow activists after their experiences of social control in the street and/or in jail.

In Europe, a well-known trauma group was started after the experience of a group of protesters attempting to block a bridge to prevent the Évian 2003 G8 delegations from reaching the summit venue. The blockade consisted of a rope crossing the bridge with on each side an activist (with climbing experience) hanging on one end of the rope. The group had installed a careful security and warning system and traffic was stopped instantly. It did not take long until the police arrived. The police did not try to communicate with the activists but immediately started to clear the road and to push activists to the sides. More police arrived soon, and there were German, Swiss, and French police and military present. As soon as the road was more or less cleared they lifted the rope and let cars pass underneath. The police commander was clearly aware about the climbers hanging on the two ends of the rope. Another policeman is caught on film how he looks down the bridge to check the rope construction. A little bit later, the same police officer walked to the rope and cuts it. Martin Shaw fell 20 meters into the stony bed of the shallow Aubonne river. He survived, however, with serious injuries. Gesine Wenzel avoided a similar fate because activists on the bridge managed to catch her rope and hold her. Many of the participants in this action started the group to deal collectively with the traumatic experiences of police brutality and violence.

Security Culture

Security culture refers to practices commonly used in the alterglobalization movement, whereby activists take precautionary actions to minimize police infiltration and surveillance. These tactics demonstrate that activists already know that law enforcement will infiltrate the movement, often using “state security” and possible acts of terrorism as an excuse. These practices may include keeping some information private, organizing in smaller groups, and not using technologies that are easily infiltrated. Overall, these practices serve as a double-edged sword, meaning that while it provides some protection from overzealous law enforcement, it also tends to disrupt organizing activities and important aspects of movement culture, such as trust and
outreach. That is, sometimes security culture is practiced at an unhealthy level, usually induced by a heavy dose of paranoia. Most damaging is the difficulty it creates for including newer members.

For example, during preparatory meetings for Heilingendamm 2007 G8, we experienced a familiar security culture ritual. A few minutes after the start of the meeting, one person asked whether cell phones should be switched off, a common practice that everyone at the meeting knew. Nevertheless, several people had not done so, which lead to a bit of fumbling around for cell phones. This ritualized moment is prolonged by a short discussion about whether it would be necessary as well to take out the battery of one’s cell phone. Activists are aware that police use cell phones not only to intercept phone conversations but also to tap real-life meetings. While switching off cell phones prevents such a possibility, the battery still sends signals, which means that intelligence services can potentially trace who is present at a meeting. Many activists, therefore, prefer to take out the battery during meetings, or, more securely, to leave their cell phones at home entirely. Being aware of the danger of interception, activists have developed a security culture. In this case, the ritual is relatively benign. But, as discussed in chapter five, security culture can easily become excessive, undermining the trust and discourse necessary to build a social movement.

Protecting bodies

Activists are innovative in finding ways to protect their bodies during street actions. Street actions are the moments when the bodies of protesters are most exposed to being physically harmed, and the high numbers of injured protesters at several summit protests testify the urgency of such tactics. However, the protective structures developed by activists also include protective aspects for bodies before and after actions.

The most spectacular form of protecting bodies in the streets is the tactic of the Italian White Overalls/Tute Bianche, described earlier in this chapter. Two tactics with a more longstanding tradition in protest movements are the practice of wearing masks and black clothes. Both serve to make individual bodies unidentifiable and protect protesters against the widespread surveillance techniques of authorities. The rather arbitrary term ‘black bloc’ relates to this way of dressing. It dates back to a German court sentence which fabricated it in an attempt to prosecute activists for being part of a criminal association. Besides inhibiting identification, the practice of wearing collectively black clothes and masks (certainly when marching in a tight bloc) exposes a threatening image. At the same time, such a bloc can also serve to protect other less militant protesters, as was witnessed at Washington DC 2000 IMF/WB. The tactic of resisting identification and forming a tight bloc is often reinforced by holding banners on each side of the group demonstrating. Gas masks are also worn as protection against tear gas and pepper spray attacks (when not prohibited by temporary ordinance or in Germany where is illegal as “passive armament”). An alternative protection against tear gas is vinegar-soaked cloth.

This brings us to another aspect of protecting bodies during street actions: most countries have nowadays a structure of action medics offering their services during big protest events. Moreover, they offer trainings at the convergence centres or action camps in order to spread basic knowledge of dealing with specific effects of police weapons and wounded people. Ideally, during actions each affinity group includes at least one person with basic medical knowledge. People trained to provide medical
services at mass protests have also served in other emergencies. Some of most effective emergency medical personnel in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina, were the medics network developed in the US alterglobalization movement.

A more precautionary method of protecting individual bodies from police violence is de-arresting. De-arresting is often carried out in spontaneous response to the arrest of an individual by organized affinity groups. However, the refined police tactics of snatch squads where several riot police insulate the arrest team makes it more difficult for activists to implement this tactic effectively.

Besides their organizational and spatial function, protest camps and convergence centers also fulfill an important function in protecting protesters' bodies. Offering a safe space for retreat, it is here where activists can rest, regenerate, sleep and eat. The skills and infrastructure of activist (mobile) food kitchens is crucial for the daily life on a camp. In Europe, most countries have one or several such groups with the material and skills to cook for up to several thousand people. It comes as no surprise that police tried to withhold such a mobile food kitchen at the border to France prior to Strasbourg 2009 NATO. Police argued that hundreds of kitchen knives would be illegal armament and that kitchen towels could serve to mask the black bloc.

Camps also provide a medical clinic, which is important because activists do not feel safe (and in the US cannot afford) to visit a hospital for help with injuries from police violence. Activist medics provide prompt, free, and knowledgeable care for injuries from police weapons (and accidents).

Since police attacks on convergence centers and camps have happened several times, activists have developed more careful security systems for guarding, protecting, and defending these spaces. Another innovation in the organization of the camps are chill-out spaces especially important for activists staying for a long time on the camp with a lot of organizing tasks and protesters having encountered traumatic experiences. In Europe, these chill-out spaces are often called the “out of action” tent. Creating a relaxed atmosphere for relaxing from the daily pressure on a protest camp was an important step to counter the frequent phenomenon of burn-outs. “Out of action” spaces are often organized by people who actively observe and invite people to use this space.

Remaining out of order

Activists want to remain out of order. They understand that effective dissent must be potent, loud, well-placed, expansive, and free. Activists and their sympathizers know they need access to political rights in their fullness, and more. They need the psychic space to nurture creativity, courage, and connection. They need to experience their own action as crucial to the political scene, and therefore worth all the effort and risk. Spatially channeled, held at a distance, and marginalized, activists innovate tactics for invading, blockading, and seeping in. They dissolve on one side of a boundary and re-form on the other. They use creative combinations of high and low tech communications, large and small mobilizations. They present themselves in every possible symbolic language, from armies to tug of war teams to dancers. They are committed to reterritorializing the political landscape with their rights and their refusals, enforcing democracy in the war zone that has imposed itself on this neighborhood, that village, those fields. Disrupting the presumption of control, only their insistent presence reminds us that something is very, very wrong.
Summits have huge budgets at their disposal to normalize their presumptive “leadership” and to criminalize unwelcoming hosts. Activists defend their rights and lives with volunteer lawyers, training legal workers on the fly, answering the phone all night. The political economy of social control is a budget that someone will pay later. The political economy of dissent is encamped in a borrowed school or stadium, voluntaristic, participatory, stuck in another long meeting, due back at work on Tuesday, bringing home memorabilia in the form of legal skills that will change communities. Lay legal workers learn the relevant laws, the court system, to provide counsel and evidence. The ragtag legal collectives of the activist scene compile the data; they can prove the political integrity of the unarmed activists and the illegal brutality of the police.

As we have shown, political violence takes many forms, affecting trust as well as bodies, daily lives as well as mass mobilizations, self-concepts as well as criminal records. All of these violences must be avoided, and if not, healed. Activists develop technologies of education, solidarity, communal institutions, and culture to thwart and recover from these violences. How to build continuous solidarity structures that can respond to the effects of social control measures in the daily life of people that may not yet even have considered participating in protest, is less clear. In the end, extending the networks and practices of solidarity beyond the protest event can only advance the struggle against the pervasive and preemptive effects of social control.
Chapter 7
Democracy Out of Order

There is only one good democracy, the one that represses the catastrophes of
democratic civilization. Jacques Rancière

This is a book we wish we did not have to write. You might prefer not to have read it. At
stake in our subject is democracy itself. For those who see the liberal democratic state
as a medium of peaceful and progressive social change, that promise is in deep
trouble. To protect democracy we must confine it because too much democracy is
dangerous. Thus, we witness the reduction of democratic liberties in the name of the
preservation of democracy itself. Defending democracy from democracy is becoming
an indelicate matter, as pointed out so lucidly by Rancière who concludes that
democracy is (and has been) the enemy of the elite, an object of “hatred” among
that class. To those unfazed by such a discovery, those who believe that the liberal
state manufactures consent in the interests of capitalism, this book confirms the
consolidation of that project.

We began our investigation with two observations. First, that the concept of
“policing” was inadequate to describe the temporality, spatiality, complexity, and
diversity of social control tactics we witnessed. Second, that “protest” was the wrong
unit of analysis and in a significant sense. We surmised that the impressive apparatuses
of control were impacting a much broader public – dissenters. Their unit of organization
is the social movement.

Exploring the literature on social control and dissent, we found its roots in the
idea that social control is neutral and positive for social cohesion. This perspective led
for some period to a narrowing of the field to deviance and criminal deterrence.
Marxist criminologists questioned the construction of criminality in the context of
capitalism. Most helpfully, social theorists, along with media and education analysts
have postulated that control is exercised through the production of norms, so that
people discipline themselves and do not experience coercion. With a few notable
exceptions, social movement scholars have focused on the policing of protest as the
locus of social control, leaving aside analysis of the impacts of political criminalization
on would-be dissenters. Dissent is generally envisioned based on the legal right of
individuals to free speech. But dissent –particularly dissent ultimately linked to social
change– is produced in a landscape of activities that are collective. This collectivity is
part of social movements. While assemblies and associations have some legal
protections, social movements do not.

Seeking to better describe the landscape of social control in the era of
globalization, we began with geography, territory, and space. Our analysis in Chapter 2
demonstrates that the social control of space is not about preventing dissent
completely, but rather about channeling and controlling the form of protest. Many
observers expect the state to engage in some degree of social control of protest – to
make sure that it doesn’t “get out of hand”. But these observers may not have fully
appreciated the historic role of dissent in democracy. Skeptics might ask “So what if the state moves the protest around? Aren’t people still expressing themselves?” There are three ways that channeling dissent in a way that reduces its social impact ultimately diminishes the quality of democracy.

Channeling pre-designs the spaces of possible confrontations, setting the stage for some forms of dissent, while reducing the possibility of others. Social movements scholars have concluded definitively that the effective expression of dissent is a function of its disruptive capacity. Without the opportunity to be disruptive, dissent is impotent, decorative, and unable to effect political contention which is its aim, and right, in a democratic society. Disruption in turn relies on access to the unexpected. This means to disrupt spatial routines, to dislodge the normal happenstance of everyday life so that the larger citizenry can pause to think, reflect, and act. When the state channels a protest through permits, established routes, or by incapacitating movement, dissent becomes predictable and governable. Denying protest the capacity to be unexpected in space and/or time deprives dissent of its disruptive capacity, thereby canceling its contentious participation in the political arena.

The territories defined by security fences are only one aspect of such preemptive rearrangement of space. A second aspect is spatial operations such as intruding into activist headquarters and preparatory meetings or incapacitating the creation of convergence centers or protest camps. By depriving activists of materials, artworks, and the capacity to organize, their forms of expression are again channeled.

Preemption is not only precaution or prevention of effective contention, but also the criminalization of dissent. Security territory clearly demarcates a space inhabited by legitimate authority and a space occupied by illegitimate assault. In these spaces, the protester is no longer a participant in democracy, but a violent offender, a ferocious unknown, who must be fenced, channeled and guarded. The explicit and implicit implications are clear to those who might consider expressing themselves: Today, you are already the enemy.

Next we turned to the political economy of social control in the era of globalization. As we show in Chapter 3, Summit security budgets are huge. In addition to the official expenditures bankrolled at a federal level, extensive direct and indirect costs are (contentiously) imposed on localities and regions. Moreover, summit security has become an industry, with permanent security think tanks, departments of the European Union, and collaborative agencies. More striking yet is the scope of the multi-agency international networks, which attend to each successive event, including military, immigration and border control, civil agencies, and civil intelligence services of several countries. The low intensity operations performed by a mix of military and civil agencies is advised by international experts: while the local police agency might be a new one each time, the advising around them is increasingly provided by a formally networked agglomerate of security agencies, providing an accumulation of experience that otherwise could not take place. This is the global control of dissent.

The institutionalization of this extensive mobilization for social control makes the threat ever more real and ever more “Other”. We must read this mobilization as communicating in no uncertain terms that dissent is not part of us; dissent is an Other that we must defend against. Dissent is not a normal part of history, political process, and daily life but a new and extraordinary threat that governments have to be ready for.

105
The architecture of Othering (or “security”) is very expensive. It is becoming increasingly more costly to police global governance events. These are now routinely the most expensive police operations in host nations' history. The expenditure and networked control of a summit protest has no precursor in normal policing operations: summits mobilize extra-parliamentary national budgets and international expert advisement. The environment of willingness to spend increasingly larger sums of money is comparable to the discourse and practices of war. But recent wars have been accompanied by extensive public debate about morality, strategy, and expense. In comparison, security operations for global governance summits are mostly taken for granted. The budgeting looks like war, but there is no political objective for the military operation, and never a victor. The search for a comparison is elusive, and informative.

The abrupt, jarring, intense militarization of space for brief periods, followed by an equally abrupt and surreal return to “normality” could be described as the creation of what Agamben calls a state of exception – a legal event in which the sovereign power dispenses with the rule of law purportedly in order to preserve the rule of law. For example, the state calls for martial law so that the rule of law can survive an external or internal threat. Agamben argues that the state of exception, overused, becomes the permanent rule.\textsuperscript{267} States of exception are constructed around civil flashpoints (or “emergencies”), such as riots, in which laws are suspended in order to impose “calm”. But domestic riot-control does not generally involve long-term investigations and prosecution of “organizers”, border controls, security geography, and appellations of “terrorism”. So state of exception is not an entirely adequate comparison.

Another possible comparison is counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency involves the long time-scale, a focus on individuals and groups, and expenditure of extensive and focused government resources. It involves domestic militarization, ongoing campaigns against insurgent groups which far outlast the flashpoint event (Low Intensity Warfare), and the suspension of rights as in a “state of emergency”. Most striking in this comparison are the European and US efforts regarding individuals associated with the alterglobalization movement (who have been treated as counterinsurgents) and the organized state programs to identify, isolate, criminalize, prosecute (with 20 year sentences), and assault them (with extrajudicial force).

While imperfect, these comparisons are revealing. Protest events are subject to a physical and budgetary environment comparable to war. Protests are now routinely defined as necessitating a “state of exception”. Activism relating to global governance is being dealt with not as protest, which is guaranteed in every modern democracy, but as counterinsurgency. It is important, however, that this is not the story. National elites are not at war with their own people, but with the domestic Other (and his confederates from nearby countries). Thus the discourse of terrorism is the public face of elites’ mobilization for domestic counterinsurgency.

In preparing the material for Chapter 4, the legal machinations and police operations which take place with the most immediacy around global governance events, we found our data organizing schemes perpetually tangled in their own web. When we tried to analyze what we knew best and most personally, we were unable to clearly distinguish policing itself from public relations, surveillance from event policing, and policing from prosecution. Most frustratingly, we had great difficulty sorting out those social control tactics with psychological objectives. Recognizing that this tangle pointed to knowledge we had yet to articulate, we turned to a more inductive and experiential analysis. The themes that emerged to structure chapter 5 were about
marginalization, preemption, permeation, the impacts on political consciousness, building collectivities, discourse, and movement culture. We recognized that every policing tactic had psychological impacts and that these impacts were in fact its most important. We recognized, finally, that security perimeters, massive budget outlays, personnel mobilization in the tens of thousands, new weapons, and the rest of the police tactics discussed in chapter 4 have the unmistakable effect of discouraging participation in the social spaces that nurture dissent, and thus constitute, singly and as a whole, political violence against the population as a whole.

As we demonstrate in the chapters on geography and policing, social control of protest is taking the form of preemptive criminalization. Such criminalization is now familiar in a world where teenage activities like graffiti and skateboarding have been criminalized. Yet, these remain minor crimes. When we talk about the criminalization of protest, what kind of crime has the state defined? The expenditure and organization of resources led us to conclude that protest has not been criminalized as a lower-order crime. The crime is insurrection. But this “crime” is a right asserted at the foundations of democracy. So policing and prosecuting it is, indeed, political repression, rather than social order policing.

We conclude that the control of dissent has become a project in itself, which might resemble war but is not quite the same. While this may indeed not be new, it makes sense that there is a newly organized form of violence for these internal wars. Counterinsurgency will look different in an era of the “rule of law” and manufactured consent. This form of violence is organized to operate against dissent at the psychic level, not only through criminalization and the threat of force, but through Othering, marginalization and trivialization.

Chapter 6 describes “anti-repression” activism. This work has an isolated responsibility, which is to assemble sober and precise information about the points of impact between dissenters and the state. Anti-repression activism avoids ideology and hyperbole in the interest of presenting incontrovertible data to the press and in court. This stark focus, accompanied by severe frugality, affords a unique view on social control.

We showed that anti-repression work produces key analyses about how social control functions. This is possible because anti-repression collects a particular kind of data through time and space and can therefore analyze the police operation in total and compare it with other operations. For instance, the Miami Legal Defense team was able to assemble data to demonstrate that the police operation shifted from a security to a terror operation. The legal team in Genoa was able to determine that the assault on the Disobedienti march to the red zone was a pre-planned police attack rather than a public order operation. Moreover, anti-repression work eventually gains precise information about victims, which, among other things provides the decisive finding that they are neither terrorists nor violent insurrectionaries, and moreover that (except for some passersby) they qualify as dissenters.

Social movements, to be effective, require two kinds of space which we think are particularly important sites for studying social control. First, they require diverse, secure, and informal social space for exploration to nurture collective intellectual and creative development. This is the space would-be dissenters enter to find solidarity, education, encouragement, and collaboration for expressing themselves. Our chapter on political violence shows the destruction of this space. Social movements also require access to
public space where they can effect disruptive challenges to the existing system. Our chapter on geography shows the preemptive foreclosure of this public space.

Critical criminologists have long questioned the political motivations for criminalization. Our chapter on policing shows the creeping criminalization of dissent through laws, police behavior, surveillance, and prosecution. Our chapter on political economy shows that the expenditures on controlling alterglobalization can be compared to low intensity warfare and civil war counterinsurgency. Yet our chapter on activist forms of legal defense (anti-repression work) shows how this work has documented that the victims of social control are indeed dissenters, and not violent insurrectionists. We must conclude that dissent is being treated as insurrection, and political violence is now directed against the foundation of democracy.

Tragically, social control of dissent has only been litigated around harm to individuals and formal organizations. We believe that the most important socio-legal project is to gain legal standing for social movements as a class, so that the interests of innumerable affinity groups of dissenters may be litigated.

Until then, cameras, lemons, and fast sneakers.
Appendix A:
Summits directly observed by authors

Seattle November 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO)
Washington DC April 2000 International Monetary Fund/World Bank (IMF/WB)
Los Angeles August 2000 Democratic National Committee (DNC)
Cincinnati November 2000 TABD (Trans Atlantic Business Dialogue)
Prague September 2000 IMF/WB
Québec City April 2001 Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
Genoa July 2001 G8
Washington DC September 2001 Anti-war
Göteborg June 2001 EU
New York City February 2002 WEF
Washington DC April 2003 IMF/WB
Denver May 2002 International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
Sacramento June 2003 US Department of Agriculture preparatory meeting for WTO
Évian June 2003 G8
Cancún September 2003 WTO
Miami November 2003 FTAA
San Francisco February 2004 Anti-war
Gleneagles July 2005 G8
Heiligendamm July 2007 G8
Strasbourg April 2009 NATO
Appendix B: Of Stones and Flowers

This is an electronic mail dialogue between John Holloway and Vittorio Sergi, both of whom are involved in the alterglobalization movement. The dialogue was initiated following Heiligendamm 2007 G8. We include the entire correspondence here because it demonstrates the complex perspectives on violence in the alterglobalization movement. It is reproduced with permission of both authors.

‘Of stones and flowers’, a dialogue between John Holloway and Vittorio Sergi around the events in Rostock on June 2, 2007.

Dear Vittorio,

The events at the end of the anti-G8 march in Rostock on Saturday 2 June, when there was an outbreak of prolonged and violent fighting between some of the demonstrators (the so-called “black block”) and the police, disturbed and challenged me. I felt critical of the violence of the black block, but also felt the need to discuss and understand. I think a lot of people on the march felt the same way -- critical but wanting to talk and understand rather than condemn (there were, of course, others who simply condemned the action, but that is not my position).

I wanted to discuss with you in particular because I know you were in the middle of the battle and because I have a very great respect for you and I think we can discuss honestly and without disqualifications. The aim for me is not to win an argument, not to come to an agreement, but to understand.

1) Let me explain the way I experienced the march:

My friends and I did not have a pre-established place of affiliation on the march. We walked along the march before it started, looking for an attractive place to insert ourselves. We walked past the large block of people (generally young, mostly men) dressed in black, many with hoods and many with their faces masked. We inserted ourselves finally near the front of the march, just behind the samba group with their drums and their dancing. From our perspective, the march was very big, colourful and fun. There was a massive, but at that stage inactive, police presence at the side of the road. We were particularly impressed by the clowns and the way in which they went up to the squadrons of police and made fun of them, imitating them, blowing bubbles at them, dancing around their cars and so on.

When the march reached its end-point, the harbour, I felt it had been a successful, enjoyable and colourful march. The “black block” arrived shortly afterwards and a friend I was with remarked that it looked as if they were ready for a fight. A minute later the fighting broke out, with columns of heavily-armoured police rushing back and forth and lots of young people dressed in black throwing stones at them. This was the first I saw of the violence which would dominate both the reports in the media and many of the discussions in Rostock over the next few days.

2) I think there are three main reasons why I found the violence disturbing.

Firstly, I felt that it was the unfolding of a two-sided, predictable ritual. There were two sides prepared for battle, two sides who knew that, once the preamble of the
march was completed, there would be open, violent conflict, in which the majority of people present on the march would be mere spectators. What was disturbing was the predictability and the symmetry of the conflict. In this there was a sharp contrast with the clowns who confronted the police in an unpredictable and absolutely asymmetrical way: in terms of sexuality, movement, dress, behaviour, solemnity and so on, the clowns were the opposite of the police, whereas the black block, in terms of uniform, sexual composition, disposition to violence, solemnity were very like the police.

Secondly, I was disturbed by the macho tone of the black block. Although there were some women and perhaps some older people, the block was dominated by young men, and the atmosphere generated was of the sort often associated with large gatherings of young men: aggressive, boastful, insensitive to the feelings of those who surrounded them.

Thirdly, the action was divisive. It seemed to me to go against the wishes of the great majority of those present, and caused considerable resentment among many. The participants in the action seemed to dismiss the feelings of the other demonstrators as irrelevant. I had the feeling that the other demonstrators were in some way being labeled as reformist or non-revolutionary. In other words, the action was identitarian, imposing a label upon others and dismissing their feelings as unimportant. An anti-identitarian approach would recognise other people as being self-contradictory and try to find a way of stirring the contradictions within them.

A very different and more sympathetic reading of the action would be to say that that was precisely the aim of the violence: to appeal to the hatred of the police and to move people to action. Someone in one of the discussions compared throwing stones at the police to occupying a house: in both cases you help people to overcome their fear of authority. This argument I can understand, but I think it is probably not true, in the sense that I think the action probably did not have this effect. I think the clowns' mockery of the police was probably far more effective in demystifying state authority.

Perhaps I am saying that in any action, the question of its resonance is very important: not that the action should be judged simply by its resonance, but that its capacity to resonate with the rebelliousness that exists in repressed form in most people is of very great importance. Not only that but that resonance is a question of asymmetry. That which we want to stir inside people is their anti-capitalism, and the only way in which we can do that is through actions that are anti-capitalist in their form, actions that propose ways of behaving and ways of relating that are quite unlike those of capitalism. The resonance of asymmetry seems to me the key to thinking about forms of anti-capitalist action.

3) In explaining why I feel disturbed and challenged by the events of 2 June, I do not simply condemn the violence. It is clear that the violence used by the demonstrators was virtually nothing compared with the violence exercised every day by capital against us. I accept too that there may be circumstances in which the use of violent methods strengthens the movement against capital. But this is the problem: the action in this case seemed to be separated from any consideration of its effect on the movement as a whole. I may well be wrong about this and I may be quite unfair in much that I have said, but then I would be glad if you could explain it to me (and to anyone else who may read this).

Best,

John
Caro John,
Your letter, in which you express your criticism towards the violent clashes of the 2nd of June in Rostock, seemed to me an excellent opportunity to begin an honest and necessary discussion. I will try to answer all your major questions. My reply is not motivated by the abstract need to bring forward an apology of violence or of the "black block", but by the urgency to explain, as a participant myself, the reasons, problems and state of an open process of rebellion.

The march of June 2nd had, in all its aspects, a ritual and predictable character. The fact that it would take place before the beginning of the summit cast a shadow on the following days, when more radical groups would confront a long week of actions without the coverage of a great event during the days of the summit. The march also constituted an effort to represent a united movement, despite its differences. This aspect is closely linked to the customary dynamics of summits and counter summits which has, for the past ten years at least, constituted one of the main public expressions of anti-capitalist movements around the world.

On the other hand, due to the precedents in Germany and the rest of Europe, the march of June 2nd had a different air to it; there was energy and hope for a new drive for social movements: that also explains the large number and strong militant spirit of the participants. All organized political subjects, from the clowns you mention to ATTAC and the "black block" itself, wished to be represented and have their space of representation on the big stage. And so did the police, actually... it had announced the biggest security operation of its history, with a contingent of 17,000, and it couldn’t... The so-called black block was created as a large group of affinities, made up by various smaller groups which varied as to composition and geographical origin. The etiquette (black clothes, covered faces) should not fool anyone as to the diversity of subjects present.

The Dissent! group took up the role of a “hub”, i.e. a centre of connection and distribution of information amongst groups which were more inclined towards direct action and did not consider it convenient to participate in the Block G8 alliance, which due to its broad and plural character included, amongst others, important reformist subjects such as ATTAC and the German section of the European Left party, known today as “Die Linke”.

Thus, the block included anarchist groups from many different places (Poland, Germany, Denmark, Holland, England, United States, Greece, Catalunya), as well as autonomous groups from Italy, Sweden, France, Euskadi, Switzerland and Germany, amongst others.

Also, many anti-fascist groups which in Germany do not have a sole organization but are largely influenced by the Antifascistiche Linke Berlin (part of the Interventionist Left, i.e. also of the Block G8 coalition) joined the Block from the bus bearing the slogan “Make Capitalism History”.

The block thus included 3,000 to 5,000 people who defied the ban on covering their faces and carrying sticks and other instruments of self-defence in the marches. The common intention of the participants in the block was to directly attack the private property of banks and corporations, as well as the police. There were also discussions as to measuring the amount of force which could be employed according to the response of the rest of the march; almost the majority agreed on acting in a way which would not harm it.
So I do not believe that this choice was in total contrast with the spirit and intentions of the rest of the march. Maybe of one part, but then again there is always a great deal of differences in this kind of international marches. However, throughout these years it has been established that all forms of protest should have the right of “citizenship”, in the boundaries of respect for others. Also, the block did not wish to stay in the background or fringes of the march for a political reason. Radical forms of direct action are also a part of the movement and militant groups involved in that kind of action, or simply those who support it or individually participate in it, respect other forms of struggle; there would be no sense in separating them.

The tactics of the block was an escalation of actions which would lead to a direct confrontation once having reached the harbour, where most police forces were concentrated.

It is true that, as you mention, the block also aimed at motivating and involving the rest of the march in a resistance against the police and in attacking corporations and their façades. Indeed, that did happen when the police, frustrated at not being able to defend itself from the beginning, attacked the entire march as well as the people watching the concert. Those present reacted in many ways when that happened, from throwing stones to creating chains and advancing with their hands in the air, managing to contain the offensive of the police, despite the armoured cars and water tanks.

It is true that the block was made up mostly of young people and the fact that there were not so many women as men is an aspect of a differentiated participation in actions and initiatives; however, that is something that occurs in many communities and organizations and depends on a broader problem surrounding the forms and languages of political action. Nonetheless, I was surprised by the number of women participating in the clashes, by much larger than what could have been observed in Italy.

You also consider the majority of young radicals as a lack of comprehension towards other forms of life and ages. On the contrary, I consider it to be a starting point, as well as a necessary form of construction of a common movement which, as always, begins amongst the young, due to the urgency, rage and passion with which the negation of the existing is exercised, “the negation of the negation” in practice. Turning our gaze towards Mexico, Oaxaca for example, we observe a very different composition in the barricades, but that is due to a political and social “popular” form that exists only in few occasions and places in Europe. The division between young generations and the rest is deeper and relates to complex causes which also bear political implications; however, this issue cannot be solved in one march.

Against those who speak of a depressed and apathetic generation, I felt, on the contrary, a lot of positive energy and passion in this contingent. Many different ways of living and a lot of decisiveness and will for conspiring and cooperating altogether in order to achieve a radical social change.

Action, in the case of a march, is not simply symbolic; it seeks direct effectiveness. It has shown, for example, that the police is not invincible when put up against a multitude that seizes the initiative and cooperates. It has also shown that the struggle against an economic, social and military system cannot limit itself to events or public moments of representation (and mediation), but that it rather overflows and takes the initiative, it can mark the time, space and form of a confrontation that can
also be called class struggle, that it does not have to restrain itself to defending the few collective riches that still remain in hands of the people.

For this reason, I attach the document which resulted from the discussion between various groups that participated in the confrontation march of June 2nd and has been put up on the Dissent! website.

Plan B has started already: join to the battle of joy
4 June 2007 - international brigades

There are certain moments when it seems appropriate, without it ever being a matter of calculation, to address everybody in a manner as simple and direct as possible. One of these moments has arrived.

We want to speak briefly about what happened on the 2nd of June in the city of Rostock during the demonstration against the G8. We speak, of course, from a partisan position, but one forged of multiple voices which at certain moments manage to become singular. One of these moments has arrived.

This 2nd of June, thousands of people didn't wait for the ritual which we have so often been subjected to in this movement to play itself out: mobilizations, demonstrations, less than symbolic actions, conferences crowned with pat conclusions long ago prepared by some obscure functionary. Nor did they accept donning the worn out postures of those who pretend to be concerned with the state of the world and abandon themselves to a pious compassion for the most misfortunate.

These thousands, on the contrary, did not content themselves with reacting or resisting, but took the initiative, consciously attacking the places where, day after day, capitalist exploitation and the material effectiveness of the global civil war are extended. The G8 is not only the expression of the domination of capital over the world, a theatre of dubious quality where the leaders put onto the stage another ritual, one that serves to codify their rule over the lives of subjects. The G8 is the symbol of the suffering inflicted daily on millions of people. That we should be reproached for our violence when it is they who have their hands full of blood!

In the end what happened was very simple: free beings decided to collectively and practically oppose the symbols of capitalism and the baleful face of the state incarnated by all the police of the world. The assemblies and long speeches, if they are not followed by irruptions in the streets of our metropolis, produce only suspicion and resignation.

We want to also recall another truth in relation to the combatants in the battle of Rostock: they are women and men originating from every corner of the world and have no need of an identity card to recognize each other, constitute gangs, and experiment new forms of life. We are the nationless who seek to destroy the frontiers - as much material as symbolic - which separate our lives, thought and bodies. We are made of multiple singularities who desire to join in order to create the conditions of a more ecstatic life. We come from everywhere, it is why we are everywhere. Those who affirm the contrary are brazen-faced liars.

There is another truth: under every black mask was a smile, in every stone thrown against the common enemy there was joy, in every body revolting against oppression there was desire. We don't harbor sad passions and resentments, if that had been the case we wouldn't have fought and resisted for
so long. Thus don't be deceived, look at those with whom you are connected, or whom you love; perhaps you will find one of these bodies, one of these smiles, one of these hands engaged in the struggle. Joyful passions placed in common and joined to the assault on command - such is the secret of the battles waged in the heart of the asymmetrical conflict which opposes us to the sadness of the weapons and bodies of power. Individually we are nothing, together we are a power. Together we are a commune: the commune of Rostock.

We all arrived here with a personal and collective history, a history of struggle and battle waged in every corner of the earth. We don't want this event to be perceived as a simple continuation of the old cycle of struggle which, since September the 11th, has known so many disappointments. We believe on the contrary that the 2nd of June was the signal of a powerful and determined rupture with this phase of defeat and that this battle inaugurates new offensives. That this breach permits us to flee together to the other side of the mirror, the side of freedom.

And now comrades, we block the flows...

Long live the commune of Rostock and Reddelich!

International Brigades

June 2nd must also be judged in a broader time frame. During the following days, the same people that encouraged the clashes were involved in constructing and participating in many self-managed camp activities: from the kitchen to the collective bars, workshops, alternative media, parties, political and artistic workshops, the multitude (yes, mostly young...) returned to its everyday positive forms of action.

The massive blockades of the 6th, 7th and 8th were in benefit of the variety of forms of struggle and action; none was more determinant than the others. Dissent!, as well as Block G8 and non-organized groups and individuals joined the marches and blockades, other forms of swarms... Everyone, from the most radical pacifists to the toughest anarchist groups, cooperated in order to avoid a violent escalade of the conflict and to make blockades effective.

That leads us to the conclusion that in the minds of most of the participants in the June 2nd march, the black block is but a transitory form, a swarm, and not the "army of the movement". It also adopts an aesthetic form that is closely linked to the influences of the "Autonomen" German movement of the 80s, as well as to the Anglo-Saxon anarchist movement, especially active in the environmental struggle. It is, thus, a transitory form, a kind of intelligent mob with a long history in radical dissent in Europe and the United States. The donning of black clothes and covered faces is of a practical utility in times of generalized video control. It also reflects the resonance of powerful symbols of rebellion such as the balaclava. From the Zapatistas of 1994 to Carlo Giuliani in Genoa in 2001, the rebels cover their faces in order to be seen.

The clashes of June 2nd and the following days urgently pose the question as to how to react against the repressive apparatus. Pacifism and its ethics cannot be an alibi for impotence, or worst, as in the case of ATTAC, for the collaboration with the repressive military apparatus. However, there have been consistent pacifists, whom I have seen receive blows and gas discharges in the face for trying to break the police lines or resist in a blockade, on the ground with dogs and truncheons biting their skin. Nonetheless, we must work together in a wider and more coordinated sense in order to be able to defend autonomous spaces, in the countryside as well as the cities, defend
strikes, road and train blockades, marches and meetings, in a growing state of siege and militarization, in Mexico as well as in Europe.

That is why I do not believe that the clowns that you so admire are an efficient response to these matters either. They have a very positive role in confusing and delegitimize the authority and aggressiveness of the police, but we cannot all become clowns, neither will we always be able to stop tanks with flowers. We need everyone, we cannot disqualify anyone in this movement and uneven power relation.

By the way, we will always love flowers, but the days of putting flowers in gun barrels have gone by. The images of military helicopters flying above the heads of thousands of unarmed protestors, launching police assault troops, gas charges, water tanks and horses against the defenceless crowd speak of the madness and dangerousness of the police apparatus in our days. That is not insignificant. Put up against this phenomenon, most radical groups do not respond with militarization; on the contrary, there is a conscience and a rejection of symmetrical violence, of hierarchic organization and authority. However, this does not mean there is not a search for forms of power, for ways of changing power relations through asymmetrical forms of resistance and attack.

I hope I have answered a few questions and maybe cleared some doubts. However, everything is under an open process of discussion and creation; that is the positive aspect of today’s movement. Rostock was a partial, but encouraging victory. We continue to walk and discuss!

Saludos,

Vittorio

Caro Vittorio,

We agree on much, but not on all. The question of the composition of the “black block” (or perhaps “black non-block”) is not so important – although I do remain suspicious of any group composed largely of young men, and I would be even more suspicious of one composed largely of old men. And I agree that it is important to see the march in the context of the week’s actions, where the atmosphere was certainly a very good one of respectful unity-in-diversity. I also agree that violence is not the central issue: my argument is not a pacifist one. And yet the whole thing of the stone-throwing keeps worrying me.

Let me emphasise again that I respect those who throw stones at the police. But for me respect cannot mean just a side-by-side co-existence: it means saying “we are comrades, that is why we must discuss our differences and doubts openly”. That is what these notes are about.

We are at war. Let’s start from there. The last twenty years or so (and especially the last five years) have seen a great intensification of capitalist violence against humanity. We can see this as the Fourth World War (as the Zapatistas put it) or as the war of all states against all people (as Eloína and I put it in an article a few years ago). The question then is how we should fight this war.

The notion of war is perhaps unfortunate, because it usually suggests asymmetry: one army fights another army, and there is not much difference between the organisation (the social relations) of the two sides. Generally, it does not matter very much which side wins: either way, the war and the militarization which accompany it signify a defeat for humanity, for the sort of social relations that we want to construct. It
is generally the more numerous, better equipped, more cleverly aggressive side that wins.

There are two problems about thinking of the struggle for a new world in these symmetrical terms. Firstly, we would probably lose: there is no way we can match the military power of the capitalist states. And secondly, and even more important: symmetrical organisation means that we are reproducing the social relations that we are struggling against.

The question then is how we think about fighting this war asymmetrically. The enormous strength of the flowers in the guns and of the clowns confronting the police is that they emphasise this asymmetry. They say clearly “our strength is that we are not like you and that we shall never be like you.”

You suggest that clowns and flowers may be important but that it is not enough. You say “we must work together in a wider and more coordinated sense in order to be able to defend autonomous spaces, in the countryside as well as the cities, defend strikes, road and train blockades, marches and meetings, in a growing state of siege and militarization, in Mexico as well as in Europe. That is why I do not believe that the clowns that you so admire are an efficient response to these matters either.” But what does “defence” mean? It does not mean “defence” in any absolute sense. The armed force of the state could overcome stone-throwers just as easily as it could overcome flower-carriers or clowns. Defence really has to be understood as dissuasion. How do we dissuade the state from exercising the full force of its armed power? Is stone-throwing more effective in this respect than flower-carrying? Probably not, because the dissuasive effect is not a question of physical strength but of resonances: of the resonances that the participants succeed in stirring throughout society. It is above all these resonances that impose limits on state action: the degree to which the resonances make the state afraid of the social reaction that might follow from a violent repression. Thinking in terms of resonances and reactions, we must ask: is it easier for the state to violently repress a group of stone-throwers or a group of flower-carriers? Violent repression is possible in both cases, but I think it is probably easier for the state in the case of stone-throwers.

Take the Zapatistas, for example. How do we explain the ability of the Zapatistas to resist (so far) a violent repression by the state? Not so much in terms of “defence” but in terms of dissuasion. The Zapatistas have dissuaded the state from violent repression by being armed for self-defence, but above all by their communiqués which have resonated so strongly through the world. Maybe we should see the Zapatistas as armed clowns: by being armed but always acting in a way that emphasised their asymmetrical relation with the state. Their flight, with marimba and all, when the army attacked on 9 February 1995, is an outstanding example of that. Perhaps the greatest strength of the Zapatistas is that they have always understood war as a question of aesthetics, of theatre. The obvious contrast in Mexico is with the EPR, which is a classical armed organisation and has never succeeded (or perhaps tried) in stirring the sort of resonances that would act as a defence against a state.

Which is more radical, the EZLN or the EPR? For me, without doubt, the EZLN, because they are constantly re-thinking the struggle, above all because they are far more asymmetrical in their relation to the state. But I can see that for some people, groups like the EPR may appear more radical, because they appear to represent a more direct and violent confrontation with the state.
The state, in its fight against us, constantly tries to weaken the social resonances of our movement, in part by pushing us more towards direct, symmetrical confrontation with it. If they succeed in doing that, then open repression becomes politically more easy for them. That is my worry: not a moral condemnation of stone-throwing, but that what appears to be more radical is in fact less radical and weakens the struggle against capital.

If we think of the issue in terms of the Fourth World War and how we fight that war, then I would suggest as a principle of the effectiveness of struggle that our struggle must be asymmetrical to that of capital. Asymmetry (the clear manifestation that we are not like them and will never be like them) is crucial to the strength of anti-capitalist resonances. There should be room for people who throw stones, but there must also be room for people who say that stone-throwing is not a very effective way of fighting (and of course that guns would be an even less effective way).

Saludos,
John

Caro John,
By a strange coincidence, I write these lines while returning to Italy from Mexico. I had to return for personal reasons, today, when a new confrontation is feared in the town of Oaxaca, where I was last week, when thousands of people who wished to celebrate the popular festivity of Guelaguetza were violently repressed by the police and the army, resulting in many men and women imprisoned and injured.

The reality of violence, of its menace and its use against the nonconformists, is presented over and over again as the reality of oppression, of inequality, of exploitation. That is, as a social relation.

And also as a form of organization, of military and militarized groups and apparatus, such as the army and the police. The history of these people is filled with this violence, its memory, in America as well as in Europe, records a long chain of violations, injustices, unpunished crime perpetrated by these organizations, whose reason of existence lies in the defence of the State and capital.

Now, our discussion has led us to some important points, on which I still disagree with you: I agree with your approach on asymmetry. It is of great importance and an obvious significance in relation to the current situation. Parting from the inequality of power in the current social power relations, it is reasonable to think that no radical change will be accomplished in a symmetrical revolution, in a sort of topsy-turvy world, but rather through a diagonal change, a tearing, thousands of ruptures. This perspective obviously affects political practices and, therefore, practices of confrontation with the established powers. However, I believe it does not exclude open confrontation.

I see the need for blending various forms of action in this asymmetrical confrontation, in the same way that the forms of breaking the relation of violent domination which imposes relations of exploitation depend greatly on cultural differences and different historical heritages. For example, the same practice of participating in a demonstration is very different in Germany, against the G8, or in Oaxaca, this morning, in order to boycott the Guelaguetza of the authoritarian PRI government, in the same way that participating in a pacific march in Pakistan, Guinea Conakry or Colombia can mean risking one’s life. Thus, according to the context, the violence used by the people for their defence is of different forms and natures than the
ones used by those in power, it has different political aims, it responds to different
criteria, to that of the defence of dignity and not of the imposition of an abstract order
and legality.

Obviously, aspects of symmetry and forms of coordination are also present. When we think of an asymmetrical confrontation with power we cannot ignore the issue of organization. Our action must be spontaneous and creative, but it must also be coordinated and organized along with others, so as to consider three fundamental aspects of the development of all revolutionary politics: time, space and, as Machiavelli pointed out, opportunity. Referring to a violent confrontation with the state forces, you say: "Firstly, we would probably lose: there is no way we can match the military power of the capitalist states. And secondly, and even more important: symmetrical organisation means that we are reproducing the social relations that we are struggling against."

I do not agree. Given that we are going through the "Fourth World War" and that the violence of power is not simple defensive, i.e. it is not presented as a police officer safeguarding a bank, but rather as a thief who enters our house in order to steal, we must consider defence as necessary and pledge our commitment to the possibility that asymmetrical forms of confrontation could also put the military power of capitalist states in a difficult position.

If we think that it is not possible, that it is not possible to put an end to the oppression of the armed groups of the state, then symmetrical confrontation for gaining power (and control over the repressive bodies) would once again be the only tragic options for us, who are underneath.

My second comment is on your mention of the EZLN. I agree with your observation about the theatrical and ritual sense of this army of indigenous peasants. From their point of view, I have even heard the militaries being called "brothers". The Zapatistas do not dehumanize the enemy, they try to conserve its human face and, to this moment, they have managed to avoid fratricide war with the paramilitary groups despite their numerous crimes. Their form of political struggle has been, without doubt, peculiar and the fact that the conflict in the South East of Mexico has not ended in carnage, as happened ten years ago in Guatemala, is without a shred of doubt something positive that partly depends on the EZLN itself. However, we must consider that the EZLN had, and still has, a disposition to war. In this sense, I do not believe this organization should be considered more or less radical than the EPR, for example. To this day, the latter has a modus operandi which is much closer to forms of the past, more openly confrontational and focused on the enemy army; however, despite its clear Marxist-Leninist political positioning, it would adopt markedly asymmetrical forms of guerrilla warfare if that were to lead to a tactical advantage. We could rather say that, from our point of view, the EZ had the capacity to adapt and innovate its forms of political action, and its experience of "asymmetrical" struggle is a good base for thinking about possible forms of revolutionary political struggle in the near future.

Despite our differences, I agree with your concern about the need to turn asymmetrical struggle into a virtue of the anti-capitalist movement, to express our rejection towards the system in a negative, non-dialectical way.

Taking "Fourth World War" seriously amounts to admitting that there is a system of violence set up against us. Therefore, our strategy of confrontation cannot be accused of triggering the repression; maybe it can supply media elements for its justification, but then again we know that the latter can occur without the need for an effective excuse.
You say: “It is above all these resonances that impose limits on state action: the
degree to which the resonances make the state afraid of the social reaction that might
follow a violent repression.” The resonances of our action can indeed put a limit,
dissuade the State, and there will be, no doubt, marches and actions where it will be
better to throw flowers instead of stones. However, as the recent history of the people
of Oaxaca shows, there are moments when it becomes clear that violence comes from
above, against our flowers and our dancing.
We began our discussion in the protests against the G8 in Germany and ended up in
the streets of Oaxaca, without a conclusion, it would seem. . . We know there is an
ongoing confrontation, made up by different simultaneous confrontations, and that the
security machinery of all States is being militarized and organized against the “internal
enemy”.

However, we also know that our victory, from a revolutionary perspective, has to
commit to the defeat of war and of the enemy at the same time. It would be
meaningless to win a war and lose dignity.

How this is possible, we can only found out in practice. Ciudad de México --

Caro Vittorio,
You are right, of course, that we are talking not just of Rostock but of many different
situations in the world that require different responses.

Thinking of Mexico, there is one image that keeps on coming to my mind in the
last few days: the famous photo of the Zapatista women literally pushing back big
armed soldiers who were trying to invade their village. This photo has been very widely
circulated all over the world and has undoubtedly had an enormous political impact.
For me it illustrates the force of asymmetry, but it could be argued that it also creates a
romantic, unreal image of the conflict in Chiapas. Perhaps one way to close the
dialogue (for the moment) would be to leave that image as a question.
Ciao,
John
Appendix C: Suggestions for future research

We believe that the new landscape of social control of dissent that we have articulated should be explored through the following matrix, which encourages a combination of analytic categories from social movements with ours for social control.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Movements</th>
<th>Social Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Geography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Opportunites</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultures of Resistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some of the relationships that should be analyzed include: Political violence, particularly psychological operations, constrains the ability of the movement to make its own frame. Laws affecting activists, particularly ongoing prosecutions, as we’ve described, affect movement cultures because they affect everyday lives. As states exert social control through the geography of cities and public space, and manage a geography of global governance itself, they deny and create political opportunities, not only for street fights, but on a symbolic and discursive level as well. Criminalization steals the frame from dissenters, who must struggle to retain their personal, organizational, and political focus. Prosecution and surveillance invade the everyday life of activists and organizations, disrupting their capacity to build and maintain cultures of resistance.

We hope that this book inspires as many questions as it answers, and thereby contributes to vigorous investigation of social control and an equally vigorous protection of dissent. Some of the research agendas we would like to see further developed are:

- The quantitative extent of discouragement of dissenters
- The long-term effects on local police of temporary militarization and intense “Othering” of citizens
- The extent and content of critical intra-governmental discourse on security budgets
- The extent of linkage between domestic and regional dissent-management institutions and terrorism-management institutions
- The international cooperation of intelligence services and their role in criminalizing dissenters
- An assessment of how far nationalisms counter the tendency to globalize security operations
- The interrelation of social control and cooptation mechanisms in channeling dissent


122


Cleyre, Voltairine De. Direct Action. Mother Earth Publishing Association, 1912.


Danaher, Kevin. 50 years is enough: the case against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. South End Press, 1994.


Eyerman, Ron, and Andrew Jamison. Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach. Penn
Bibliography


——. "Antwort der Landesregierung auf die Kleine des Abgeordneten Udo Pastörs, Fraktion der NPD." Drucksache 5, no. 1811 (February 10, 2008).
——. "Antwort der Landesregierung Mecklenburg-Vorpommern auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Birgit Schwebs, Fraktion Die Linke." Drucksache 5, no. 2411 (March 31, 2009).


Legault, Josee. “We need a G20 probe: Arrest record shows police were out of control in Toronto.” The Gazette, July 9, 2010. http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&q=++Legault%2C+Josee+We+need+a+G20+probe&btnG=Search&as_sdt=2000&as_ylo=&as_vis=0.


——. Undercover: Police Surveillance in America. Berkeley: University of California
Bibliography

New York Civil Liberties Union/ACLU. “Police Trampled Civil Rights During Republican


Polletta, Francesca. "Culture and Its Discontents: Recent Theorizing on the Cultural
Porter, Adam. "It was like this before... 75-79." In On Fire: the battle of Genoa and the anti-capitalist movement, 75-79. Tucson, AZ: One-Off Press, 2001.


Rebick, Judy. "It Won’t End in Quebec City." rabble.ca, April 26, 2001.


Sarin. “Bodyhammer: Tactics and self-defence for the modern protester.”


http://www.brennancenter.org/content/elert/lawsuit_on_strip_searches_settled/.

Starr, Amory, Luis Fernandez, Randall Amster, Lesley Wood, and Manuel Caro. "The
Bibliography


Janowitz, “Sociological Theory and Social Control.”


15 P. A. J. Waddington, Policing Citizens: Authority and Rights (Routledge, 1999), 64.


19 Chomsky, Necessary Illusions; Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent; Michael Parenti, Inventing Reality (Palgrave Macmillan, 1986); McChesney, The Problem of the Media.


21 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (Routledge, 1990); Annamarie Jagose, Queer Theory (Otago University Press, 1997).

22 Erich Goode, Deviant behavior (Prentice-Hall, 1984).

23 Michel Foucault et al., Technologies of the self (University of Massachusetts Press, 1988); Michel Foucault, The history of sexuality (Vintage Books, 1988).


Pamela Oliver, “How Does Repression Work?” (2002), http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~oliver/PROTESTS/PROTESTS.HTM. She excludes the cooptation seen as important by Piven & Cloward.


Ibid.

Ibid., p. 185.


Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent.


For a nice summary of the major options and what is at stake in them, see Nick Crossley, *Making Sense of Social Movements* (Open University Press, 2002).


58 Eyerman and Jamison, *Social Movements*.


60 Melucci, *Nomads of the Present: social movements & Individual needs in contemporary society*.


62 Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*.


64 Melucci, *Nomads of the Present: social movements & Individual needs in contemporary society*.

65 Tarrow, *Power in Movement*.


Voltairine De Cleyre, *Direct Action* (Mother Earth Publishing Association, 1912).


Frantz Fanon, *The wretched of the earth* (Grove Press, 1965).

Piven and Cloward, *Poor People's Movements*; Tarrow, *Power in Movement*.


See the work of the following authors for a discussion on the decentralized character of the movement: Kevin McDonald, “From Solidarity to Fluidarity: social movements beyond ‘collective identity’--the case of globalization conflicts,” *Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest* 1, no. 2 (2002): 109; Graeber, “The New Anarchists.”

Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*.

At the time, this fenced-in protest perimeter was considered large, but shortly after these types of perimeters would grow to encompass much larger areas.


Because the exact legal definition of the difference between detention and arrest differs across countries, we conflate the numbers here.

Josee Legault, “We need a G20 probe: Arrest record shows police were out of control in Toronto,” *The Gazette*, July 9, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&q=++Legault%2C+Josee+We+need+a+G20+probe&btnG=Search&as_sdt=2000&as_ylo=&as_vis=0.


Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*.


We have found only a single, as yet unpublished, scholarly report: John Kirton, Jenilee Guebert, and Shamir Tanna, *G8 and G20 Summit Costs*, Unpublished (Unpublished report from the G8 G20 Research Groups, Munk School for Global Affairs: University of Toronto, 2010), http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/factsheet/factsheet_costs.html.


The expenditures cited are documented in Fernandez, *Policing Dissent*.

In 2010, the G8 and the G20 met simultaneously.

Kirton, Guebert, and Shamir Tanna, *G8 and G20 Summit Costs*.


In total, 14 of these Tornados were used for the security operations in Heiligendamm. The Ministry of Defense, however, claimed that these flight hours would be counted as official training hours which have to be done anyways by the soldiers in training.


Fernandez, Policing Dissent.


Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, “Antwort der Landesregierung Mecklenburg-Vorpommern auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Birgit Schwebs, Fraktion Die Linke.”


An estimated one third of the shop windows in the wealthy shopping district of Geneva were broken during the summit protests.


House of Commons, UK, G8: Gleneagles Summit Costs.


Ibid.


Initially France had promised to cover two thirds of the costs of the protest.


Interestingly, the Ministry of Defense pretended that the actual wars going on in Iraq and Afghanistan would place budgetary restrictions on homeland support.


Ibid.

Interestingly, the rise of the estimated costs was justified with and security protocols related to alleged danger of international terrorism, protocols that were beyond the influence of the provincial government. Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, “Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Finanzausschusses (4. Ausschuss) zu dem Gesetzentwurf der Landesregierung,” Drucksache 5, no. 100 (May 12, 2006).


From an interview with a member of the planning team, first published in Fernandez, Policing Dissent.


Ibid.


della Porta and Herbert Reiter, Policing Protest.


Earl, “Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes.”


Oliver, “How Does Repression Work?.” She excludes the cooptation seen as important by Piven & Cloward.


della Porta and Herbert Reiter, Policing Protest, 30-31.


Ibid., 5-6.

Ibid. p. 33.

Ibid. p. 5.

Raid of the Hvitfeldtska School, Göteborg 2001 EU.


Miami, FL USA, November 2003 FTAA meetings.

della Porta, Peterson, and Reiter, The Policing of Transnational Protest, 16.


Ibid. p 33.

Ibid., p. 35-36.


Ibid., p. 185.

Ibid., p. 6.


della Porta and Herbert Reiter, Policing Protest.
http://annalist.noblogs.org/static/library


http://rnc8.org

www.leiu.org


Adam Porter, “it was like this before… 75-79,” in On Fire: the battle of Genoa and the anti-capitalist movement (Tucson, AZ: One-Off Press, 2001), 77.


http://www.less-lethal.org


http://www.freerfenow.org Luers is due to be released early, in December 2009.
http://shac7.com

See http://www.freesherman.org


“…actors who experience and contest the system’s contradictory requirements do not do so all their lives and do not belong to a single social category”. [page 61]

Melucci, Nomads of the Present: social movements & Individual needs in contemporary society, 60.

Ibid., p. 173

After asking this question, the tape recorder was turned off and/or the interviewer left the room so that participants could coordinate their tallies so as not to count anyone twice.

Flacks, Making History.

Hughes, “life during wartime,” 25 In Europe, lemon is the favored low-tech chemical barrier against tear-gas. In North America, vinegar is used instead. Both are used to wet a cloth and place over the nose and mouth.

Starr et al., “The Impacts of State Surveillance on Political Assembly and Association.”


Boykoff, The Suppression of Dissent; Cunningham, There’s Something Happening Here; Davenport, “Understanding Covert Repressive Action”; Marx, “Civil Disorders and the Agents of Social Control”; Marx, “Thoughts on a Neglected Category of Social Movement Participant”; Marx, “The Dynamics of Social Movements”; Marx, Undercover; Flam, Mosaic of Fear.
Critical Mass is an international tactic in which a group of bicyclists travel city streets together to defend rights of bicycles, oppose automobilism, and have fun. Acting on the concept “We aren’t blocking traffic, we are traffic”, participants directly challenge traffic policy. In several US cities, Critical Mass has been criminalized, riders arrested, etc. see http://www.critical-mass.org/.

The reduction of anonymity is clearly present in community policing, as indicated by its association with Neighborhood Watch programs. These programs involve the vigilance of neighborhood residents to reduce the anonymity of any “outsider” entering the neighborhood.

Discipline and Punish, 237.


Melucci, Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age, 386.

Black Bloc is a tactic that involves a group of protestors wearing black clothing, black boots, and black ski masks, bandanas, or motorcycle helmets to cover their face. The tactics, which originally developed in German in 1980s, aimed to prevent identification.

The tactic of Tute Bianche is influenced by the struggle and methods of the Zapatista's in Chiapas: expressing fierceness which avoids violence, radicalism which does not seek to take the state, politics beyond ideologies, and face for the invisible. Politically, Tute Bianche blocs are generally aligned with immigration rights, prisoners, marginalized radicals (including communists and anarchists), and “everyone else made invisible by the free market.” (Giorgio, a member of Ya Basta from Rome, quoted in The Guardian 19/7/01. in Linden Farrer.) Like other tactics, Tute Bianche is not a standing organization with members. Persons from many groups participate in the Tute Bianche tactic on demos.


Ibid., 948.

Hickey v. City of Seattle, 236 FRD 659, 660 (WD Wash. 2006).


United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, National Council of Arab Americans and the A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. The City of New York City, et.al., 04-CV-6602 (WHP),


For an example, see http://www.midnightspecial.net/comic.

A lot of activist discussion texts emerging in the context of summit protests are collected on the website www.gipfelsoli.org and www.infoshop.org.

For a detailed account of the epistemology of the use of bodies during summit protests in Europe see Scholl, “Desiring disruption. The two sides of a barricade during summit protests in Europe..”
